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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, Kim Hak-Sun, one of up to 200,000 former "comfort
women"' from Korea and other parts of East Asia forced into Imperial
Japan's military prostitution from the 1930s to the end of World War II,
broke her silence. Since then, the reparation movement for the "comfort
women" has become an international human-rights cause c6l6bre for the
struggle against sexual violence in armed conflict at the United Nations,2
1. The term "comfort women" is an inappropriate male-centered euphemism. I use this
term only because of its common usage to refer to a specific historical institution.
2. The U.N. human-rights bodies produced two key reports in support of "comfort
women" redress in the 1990s. U.N. \ECOSOC, Comm'n on Hum. Rts, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1 (Jan. 4, 1996) (prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy) [hereinafter
Coomaraswamy Report]; U.N. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Systematic Rape, P6, U.N. Doc.
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ILO, 3 NGOs,4 and national legislatures.5 As a result, the frame of
women's human rights often dominates the narrative of the redress efforts
of the "comfort women."6 It is worth recalling in this regard that Kim
Hak-Sun first came forward after speaking with an atom bomb survivor
with whom she built rapport as fellow Korean victims of Japanese
colonial rule.7
3. Comm. of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
[CEACR], Int'l Labour Org., Individual Observation concerning Convention, 1930 (No. 29),
Japan (ratification: 1932), ILO Doe. 061996JPNO29 (1996); 061997JPNO29 (1997);
061999JPNO29 (1999); 062001JPNO29 (2001); 062002JPNO29 (2002); 062003JPN029 (2003);
062004JPNO29 (2004); 062005JPNO29 (2005); 062007JPNO29 (2007); 062008JPNO29 (2008);
062009JPNO29 (2009); 062011JPN029 (2011).
4. Ustinia Dolgopol & Snehal Paranjape, Comfort Women, an Unfinished Ordeal: Report
of a Mission (International Commission of Jurists, 1994) [hereinafter ICJ Report]; Amnesty Int'l,
Still Waiting After 60 Years: Justice for Survivors of Japan's Military Sexual Slavery System
(2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA22/012/2005 [hereinafter
Amnesty Report]. A more lengthy factual and legal analysis can be found in the widely publicized
mock trial organized by women's groups in Tokyo in 2000. Judgment of the Women's
International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japan's Military Sexual Slavery (2000),
available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/Japan/Comfort_
Women Judgement _04-12-2001part I.pdf & http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLI
C/Docs/NLP/Japan/Comfort WomenJudgement_04-12-2001_part_2.pdf [hereinafter 2000
Women's International Tribunal Judgment]; Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial Comment, Women's
International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 335 (2001).
5. H.R. Res. 121, 1 10th Cong. (2007); Resolution on Justice for the "Comfort Women"
(Sex Slaves in Asia Before and During World War II), Eur. Parl. Doc. B60525/2007 (Dec. 13,
2007). The legislatures of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Canada, the Netherlands as well
as a number of Japanese local legislative councils and the state legislatures of California, New
York and New Jersey have passed resolutions on the "comfort women." However, the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) lawsuit filed by 15 "comfort women" against Japan in U.S. courts failed in the
2000s. L. David Nefouse, Trials & Errors: The Rights of the Korean Comfort Women and the
Wrongful Dismissal of the Joo Case by the District of Columbia Federal Courts, 12 CARDOZO
J.L. & GENDER 559 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Cheah Wui Ling, Walking the Long Road in Solidarity and Hope: A Case
Study of the Comfort Women Movement's Deployment of Human Rights Discourse, 22 HARV.
HuM. RTS. J. 63 (2009) [hereinafter Cheah]. For a view stressing the intersection of sexism and
racism in the harms suffered by Korean "comfort women," see Kyeyoung Park, The Unspeakable
Experiences ofKorean Women Under Japanese Rule, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 567, 576-78 (2000);
Michele Park Sonen, Healing Multidimensional Wounds of Injustice: Intersectionality and the
Korean "Comfort Women, " 22 LA RAZA L.J. 269 (2012). For a historical investigation of the
"comfort women" institution under the colonial governing structure, see Kang Jeong-sook, A
Study for Colonialism Characteristics of Japanese Military "Comfort Women" System: Focusing
on Korean "Comfort Women" (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Sungkyunkwan Univ.)
(accessible at www.riss.kr database) (S. Kor.).
7. TRUE STORIES OF THE KOREAN COMFORT WOMEN: TESTIMONIES COMPILED BY THE
KOREAN COUNCIL FOR WOMEN DRAFTED FOR MILITARY SEXUAL SLAVERY BY JAPAN AND THE
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION ON THE WOMEN DRAFTED FOR MILITARY SEXUAL SLAVERY BY JAPAN 40
(Keith Howard ed., Young Joo Lee trans., Cassell 1995) [hereinafter TRUE STORIES]. Up to 50,000
of the 220,000 people killed by the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were Koreans, who
892016]1
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In this Article, I seek to place the "comfort women" reparation
movement in East Asia's broader colonial and post-colonial legal history.
The post-World War II settlement shaped by Cold War politics failed to
reconcile Japan and its Asian neighbors, especially Korea, over the
colonial and wartime subjugation and sowed the popular resentment
shared by Korean "comfort women."8 The Japanese and Asian victim
states suppressed individual compensation claims and signed lump-sum
agreements. After South Korea's democratization, the combination of
national grievances and empowerment of individuals propelled a broad
reparation movement by victims of Imperial Japan that encompassed
"comfort women" in the 1990s. Japan's reliance on post-war treaties and
other technical grounds to avoid compensation forced the anti-colonial
and human-rights discourses to respond with novel legal counter-
arguments utilizing the (quasi-)judicial process. The judicial orientation
was in marked contrast with the German reparations for Jews and other
victims of Nazi persecution, which created novel legal frameworks for
redress based on political or moral responsibility.
The anti-colonial and human-rights discourses relied on overlapping
but differentiated legal arguments. The "comfort women" and their
supporters initially focused on the illegality and injustice of Japanese
colonial rule, which were central to their grievances, but came to rely
more on universal norms such as crimes against humanity and anti-
slavery rules to advance their cause at the international stage. The rise of
the women's human rights movement enabled and buoyed their "litigious
feminism" but reframed the issue as violence against women.9 The United
Nations and NGOs largely avoided legal appraisal of colonial rule, but
the victims viewed human rights as a means of vindicating their claims
for the colonial-era injustice. However, universal human rights had
had been mostly taken there as wartime forced laborers. Choe Sang-Hun, A Unique Misery for
Korean Survivors ofAtomic Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2016 ("In the debates prompted by Mr.
Obama's coming visit, few have as many claims to an apology-from Japan, from the United
States, even from their own government in South Korea-as these Korean survivors."). On the
continuing tragedy of Korean atom bomb victims, see generally ICHIBA JUNKO, HIROSHIMA 0
MOCHiKAETTA HITOBITO: "KANKOKU NO HIROSHIMA" WA NAZE UMARETA NO KA [THE PEOPLE
WHO BROUGHT BACK HIROSHIMA: WHY DID THE "HIROSHIMA OF KOREA" ARISE?] (2005) (Japan).
8. On the complex post-war political interaction between South Korea, Japan and the
United States, see ALEXIS DUDDEN, TROUBLED APOLOGIES AMONG JAPAN, KOREA, AND THE
UNITED STATES (2008). For an interesting comparison of the geopolitical context that shaped the
post-war memories in Japan, German, and Austria, see THOMAS U. BERGER, WAR, GUILT, AND
WORLD POLITICS AFTER WORLD WAR 11 (2012).
9. The term "litigious feminism" appears as part of the title in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi,
Comfort Women: Beyond Litigious Feminism, 58 MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 223 (2003). Hilary
Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 614 (1991); for
a critical appraisal, see Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization
ofSex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008).
90 [Vol. 28
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limited utility for other victims such as forced laborers and survivors of
bacteriological warfare.
By contrast, the "comfort women" and other South Korean victims
advanced their causes in the South Korean judiciary on the basis of
redress for colonial-era historical injustice as much as international
human-rights law. After democratization in the 1990s, popular pressure
nudged the courts to order compensation for the victims of the Korean
War (1950-1953) massacres as well as the post-war authoritarian-era
abuses. The judges who charted new legal territories to right domestic
historical wrongs similarly took a hard line against Imperial Japan's past
injuries. In a series of decisions, the courts ordered the South Korean
Government to release classified documents and exercise diplomatic
protection, and held Japanese businesses liable for wartime forced labor.
The courts relied upon domestic jurisprudence rather than international
human-rights norms, but explicitly rejected the legality of Japan's
colonial rule on constitutional grounds and upheld the claims of other
victims as well as "comfort women."
This Article will follow a largely chronological order with discussion
of relevant legal points. Part II narrates the history of political and legal
developments since the Imperial Japan period that set the stage for the
"comfort women" reparation movement from the 1990s. In Part III, I will
discuss the main legal issues concerning the Japanese reparation. Parts
IV and V will explore and analyze the redress efforts at the U.N. human-
rights bodies in the 1990s and the South Korean judiciary since the 2000s
respectively.
II. IMPERIAL JAPAN AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. Imperial Japan up to 1945
Japan joined the West's imperial scramble in the late 19th century.
Japan's triumph in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 secured the cession of
Taiwan and an indemnity of 200 million tael or four times Japan's annual
budget.o After the crushing victory over Russia in 1905, Japan acquired
southern Sakhalin, the Kwangtung concession and sphere of influence
over Korea. Japan established a protectorate over Korea in 1905 and
annexed it outright in 1910. Japan's colonial empire was unique not only
as the sole non-Western one. China, Japan, and Korea were "extremely
10. UTSUMI Aixo, SENGo HOSHO KARA KANGAERUNIHON TO AJIA [JAPAN AND ASIA FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF POST-WAR REPARATIONS] 12 (2002) (Japan) [hereinafter UTSUMl]. Peking
also ceded Liaodong, but the "Triple Intervention" orchestrated by Russia with France and
Germany forced Japan to return it in exchange for additional indemnity.
912016]
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rare examples of historic states composed of a population that is
ethnically almost or entirely homogeneous."" Although a nation or
nationalism in the modem sense was a 19th century Western import,
ethnic nationalism quickly took root in Korea as it had been "a coherent
political community within a stable territorial boundary with a well-
established agrarian bureaucracy" for centuries.12
Imperial Japan's absorption of Korea was problematic even by the
standards of Western-imposed international law of the time. Korea had
established diplomatic relations with Western powers and had acceded to
two 1899 Hague Conventions.'3 International lawyers since have
questioned the legality of the 1905 protectorate and 1910 annexation
treaties primarily for coercion of Korea's state representatives.14 The
Japanese rulers in Korea brutally suppressed the March 1 Independence
Uprising of 1919, inspired by President Wilson's call for national self-
determination.1 5 After a devastating earthquake in the Tokyo area in
1923, frenzied local mobs and soldiers slaughtered up to 6600 ethnic
Koreans. 16
The fascist takeover and renewed territorial expansion in the 1930s
proved to be Imperial Japan's undoing. The Japanese forces invaded
Manchuria in 1931 and China proper in 1937, and attacked Pearl Harbor
and Western colonies in Southeast Asia in 1941 after forging a fascist
alliance with Germany and Italy.' 7 In the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the
Allied leaders pledged that Japan must relinquish "territories which she
has taken by violence and greed" and that Korea will become independent
"in due course." 8 The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea,
formed by exiled Korean nationalists in China after the failed 1919
Uprising, declared war on Japan and prepared joint military operations
with the United States although Imperial Japan surrendered before their
execution in 1945.19
I1. ERIC HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH,
REALITY 66 (1990).
12. GI-WOOK SHIN, ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN KOREA: GENEALOGY, POLITICS, AND LEGACY
18(2006).
13. Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land [Hague II], July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803; Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the
Geneva Convention of Aug. 22, 1864 [Hague III], July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827.
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. ANDREW GORDON, A MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN: FROM TOKUGAWA TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 177 (2008).
16. Id. at 153-54.
17. Id. at 202-07.
18. 9 DEP'T STATE BULL. 393 (1943).
19. Although the Provisional Government failed to win dejure recognition internationally,
it was recognized de facto by China in 1944 and by France in February 1945. STEFAN TALMON,
92 [Vol. 28
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The 15-year war was brutal. Over 20 million Chinese, 2 million
Japanese and millions more in Japanese-occupied Philippines, Indonesia,
Vietnam and Burma perished. The Japanese "liberators" committed
outrages against Asian populations not to mention the Allied combatants
with little regard for the laws of war.2 0 The absolute nadir was the Harbin-
based Unit 731 commanded by General Ishii Shiro, Imperial Japan's
equivalent of Dr. Josef Mengele: from 1932, the unit developed a germ
arsenal through thousands of vivisections and killed half a million
Chinese by spreading plague, cholera, anthrax and other epidemics.2 1 Not
surprisingly, no effort was spared to win the war in colonial Korea, where
242,341 were conscripted into the military and 724,787 taken to Japan as
forced laborers.2 2 In the weeks before Allied occupation, Tokyo ordered
systematic destruction of documents that may be used in the Allied war
crimes trials.2 3
It was in this wartime and colonial context that Imperial Japan used
"comfort women" for military prostitution. The Japanese military set up
early comfort stations in China with Japanese women reportedly to
reduce rapes and venereal diseases in the early 1930s and expanded it
following the all-out war with China in 1937.24 The Japanese forces
planned and constructed "comfort stations" in the occupied areas with the
women taken from Korea and Taiwan as well as from the local population
RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO
GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE 288 (1998).
20. Japan tellingly refused to apply the laws of war or grant POW status in China citing a
lack of formal declaration of war. Akira Fujiwara, Nitchfi Sens6 ni Okeru Horyo Gyakusatsu
[POW Massacres in the Sino-Japanese War], 9 KIKAN SENS6 SEKININ KENKY0 [THE REPORT ON
JAPAN'S WAR RESPONSIBILITY] 20-22 (1995). It also violated its official assurances to treat the
Western POWs in accordance with the 1929 Geneva Convention: the mortality rate for the U.S.
and U.K. POWs held by Japan was 27% in comparison to 4% in Europe although it should be
noted that two-thirds of Germany's 5.5 million Soviet POWs did not survive captivity. JOHN
DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 48 (1987). To be fair, the
Japanese had no monopoly over atrocities. American racism was apparent in the killings of
surrendering Japanese as well as the gruesome practice of collecting the body parts of dead "Japs"
as souvenirs. Id. at 61-71.
21. The Chinese and sizeable Russian and Russian Jewish population in and near Harbin
were easy prey. DANIEL BARENBLATT, A PLAGUE UPON HUMANITY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
JAPAN'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM 33, 58 (2005). Allied POWs and Korean nationalist
guerrillas were also used as "maruta" or "logs."
22. UTSUMI, supra note 10, at 38. See also JUNG HYE-KYuNG ET AL., GANGJE DONGWON
EUL MAL HANDA: MYEONGBU PYEON [UNDERSTANDING FORCED MOBILIZATION: THE DRAFTEE
LISTS] (2 vol.) (2011-2012) (S. Kor.).
23. The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: CHARTER, INDICTMENT AND
JUDGMENTS 593 (Neil Boister & Robert Cryer eds., 2008).
24. YOSHIMI YOSHIAKI, COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE JAPANESE MILITARY
45-49 (Suzanne O'Brien trans., 2000).
932016]
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and enlarged them as the war progressed.25
B. The Politico-Legal Settlement after World War II
Japan's post-war settlement with its neighbors, including South
Korea, was a function of international and domestic factors, both
influenced heavily but not solely by the Cold War politics. In the end, the
unsatisfactory settlement of reparation issues, (il)legality of Japan's 35-
year rule, and suppression of individual claims left many South Koreans
bitter not only at Japan, but also at their own government.
At the end of the war, unlike Germany, which came under the joint
occupation of the United States, British, French, and Soviet forces, the
United States was the sole occupier of Japan thanks to its monopoly over
nuclear weapons.26 In fact, it was Korea that was divided into U.S. and
Soviet occupation zones that morphed into two mutually hostile states,
who went on to fight the devastating Korean War (1950-1953). Similarly,
China was wrecked by civil war (1947-1949) ending in Communist
victory and Nationalist retreat to Taiwan. Japan's bilateral security treaty
with the United States obviated the need for multilateral cooperation.2 7
Thus, the Cold War ensured West Germany's dependence on its NATO
allies including France and Britain, the occupying powers, while South
Korea and Taiwan had to curry Japan's favor.
The U.S. reparation policy underwent drastic changes. As in Europe,
the United States initially sought the equalization of regional economic
power by redistributing Japan's industrial facilities and denying Japan "a
standard of living higher than that of neighboring Asiatic countries
injured by Japanese aggression."28 After the "loss" of China in 1949 and
North Korean attack in 1950, Washington ended the occupation of Japan
in return for permanent U.S. military base rights in Japan. The United
States pressured its wartime allies to accept "services of the Japanese
people in production" instead of monetary payment in the 1951 San
Francisco Peace Treaty.29 Significantly, no government representing
25. Id at 49-63, 91-94.
26. On the turn of events in the pivotal closing days of the war, see TsuYosHI HASEGAWA,
RACING THE ENEMY: STALIN, TRUMAN, AND THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN (2005).
27. Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, Sept. 8. 1951, T.I.A.S. 2491, 3
U.S.T. 3329 (entered into force Apr. 28, 1952). A regional military alliance modeled after NATO
proposed by President Quirino of the newly independent Philippines never materialized despite
support from Nationalist China and South Korea.
28. YONEYUKI SUGITA, PITFALL OR PANACEA: THE IRONY OF U.S. POWER IN OCCUPIED
JAPAN, 1956-1952, at 38 (2003). For the history of U.S. policy on post-war Germany and the origin
of the Cold War, see CAROLYN WOODS EISENBERG, DRAWING THE LINE: THE AMERICAN DECISION
To DIVIDE GERMANY, 1944-1949, at 9-12 (1996).
29. Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 14(1), Sept. 8, 1951, 136 U.N.T.S. 46 (entered into
94 [Vol. 28
8
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss1/3
THE "COMFORT WOMEN" REPARATION MOVEMENT
China or Korea, the nations that suffered the most from Japanese
aggression and colonialism, was invited to the Peace Conference due to
Cold War politics.30 Nationalist China (Taiwan) and Communist China
renounced the estimated war reparation claims of 100 billion dollars in
1952 and 1972 respectively in return for recognition as the legitimate
government of China.3 1 In Southeast Asia, Japan paid reparations to
Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia and South Vietnam in the form of
"economic assistance" such as infra-structure projects that boosted
Japan's economic penetration through investments and exports.32
South Korea raised colonial-era property claims but not war
reparations against Japan since it was not recognized as an Allied
belligerent.33 In 1948, Washington transferred to Seoul the vested
Japanese properties in Korea that comprised 85% of colonial-era assets.34
force Apr. 28, 1952) [hereinafter San Francisco Peace Treaty]. The Cold War politics also shaped
the post-war disposition of the unpaid wages and benefits of Korean forced laborers. LEE SANG-
EUY ET AL., GANGJE DONGWON EUL MAL HANDA: ILJE GANGJEOMGI JOSEONIN PIJINGYONGNOMUJA
MISUGEUM MUNJE [UNDERSTANDING FORCED MOBILIZATION: UNPAID WAGES OF THE KOREAN
DRAFTED LABORERS DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION PERIOD] (2015) (S. Kor.).
30. South Korea cited the Polish Provisional Government's attendance at the Versailles
Peace Conference after World War I to argue for a seat at the San Francisco Peace Conference.
PARK JIN-HEE, HAN-IL HOEDAM: JE IL GONHWAGUK Ut DAEIL OEGYO JEOGCHAEK GWA HANIL
HOEDAM JEONGAE GWAJEONG [KOREA-JAPAN TALKS: THE FIRST REPUBLIC'S JAPAN POLICY AND
PROGRESSION OF THE KOREA-JAPAN TALKS] 89 (2008). The United States backed Seoul's
participation mainly for strategic considerations and even Japan was resigned to accepting it, but
the United Kingdom successfully lobbied against it for fear of antagonizing Beijing to the
detriment of its commercial and political interests in China and Malaya. Kim Minsoo, Tainichi
Kouwa Jyouyaku to Kankoku Sanka Mondai [The Debate over Korean Participation in the
Japanese Peace Treaty], 131 KOKUSAI SEIJl 133 (Japan) [hereinafter Kim]; Kang Seung-Mo,
Great Britain's Postwar Insecurity and the Question of South Korean Participation in the
Japanese Peace Treaty, 28 SEOUL J. KOREAN STUDS. 153 (2015) [hereinafter Kang]. Ever the
consummate diplomats, the British carefully couched their opposition in legal technicalities. Kim,
supra, at 140-41. Kang, supra, at 158-61, 163.
31. UTSUMI, supra note 10, at 20-24; Joint Communiqu6 of the Government of Japan and
the Government of the People's Republic of China, art. 5 (Sept. 29, 1972).
32. UTSUMI, supra note 10, at 25-27.
33. Kubota Kanichiro, head of the Japanese delegation, confidently stated on October 13,
1953:
Japan is willing to compensate for any looting or acts of destruction it committed
in Southeast Asian countries during the war. But as no such case had occurred in
Korea, I think we have no compensation to make to Korea. But if such cases did
occur we will pay for them.
Yvonne Park Hsu, "Comfort Women" from Korea: Japan's World War II Sex Slaves and the
Legitimacy of Their Claims for Reparation, 2 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL'Y J. 97, 118 n.142 (1993).
34. Ordinance Number 33, U.S. Army Military Government in Korea, Dec. 6, 1945; Initial
Financial and Property Settlement Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea
2016]1 95
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The San Francisco Peace Treaty stipulated that Japan recognize the
"validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals" and
dispose of the property claims "by special arrangement."3 5 In the resultant
negotiations that began in 1951, Seoul submitted property claims worth
2.2 billion dollars, but Tokyo made a 4.6 billion dollar counter-claim for
the vested Japanese assets,3 6 arguing that the U.S. disposition of Japanese
properties in 1945 violated the 1907 Hague Convention. 37 The talks broke
down in 1953 when Japanese chief delegate Kubota Kanichiro stated in
defense of counter-claims that colonial rule was benevolent.3 8 Japan
retracted the Kubota statement and counter-claims in 1957.
The two states finally reached agreement in 1965 amid much
controversy. A compromise clause papered over the impasse on the
legality of Japanese rule.3 9 Following the Southeast Asian precedents,
Japan agreed to provide 300 million dollars in products and services and
200 million dollars in loans as "economic cooperation" for the bilateral
claims "including those stipulated in Article IV(a) of the [San Francisco
Peace Treaty]" to be "settled completely and finally" in a lump-sum
settlement.0 In Seoul, President Park Chung-Hee suppressed the
protesters by declaring martial law.
The Cold War also left strong imprints in the domestic sphere. The
U.S. occupation transformed Japan into a democracy with a war-
renouncing constitution.4 1  However, while the United States
and the Government of the United States of America, U.S.-S. Kor., Sept. 20, 1948, 62 Stat. 3422;
T.I.A.S. No. 1851.
35. San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 29, art. 4. The article was added specifically at
South Korea's request.
36. PARK JIN-HEE, HAN-IL HOEDAM: JE IL GONHWAGUK UI DAEIL OEGYO JEOGCHAEK GWA
HANIL HOEDAM JEONGAE GWAJEONG [KOREA-JAPAN TALKS: THE FIRST REPUBLIC'S JAPAN POLICY
AND PROGRESSION OF THE KOREA-JAPAN TALKS] 160-62 (2008) (S. Kor.). The Japanese officials
privately admitted that its interpretation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was a tactical ploy to
off-set or reduce "excessive" South Korean claims. Id. at 166.
37. Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land [Hague II], art. 46,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 ("Private property cannot be confiscated.").
38. TAKASAKI SOJI, "MOGEN" NO GENKEI: NIHONJ1N NO CHOSENKAN [THE ORIGINAL FORM
OF "ABSURD REMARKS"] 192-96 (1990). Secret internal government reports in 1947 and 1949
already argued that Japan need not pay reparations for colonial rule because it benefited Koreans.
Id. at 188-89.
39. "It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan
and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void." Treaty on Basic
Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, art. 2, June 22, 1965, 8473 U.N.T.S. 258
(emphasis added).
40. Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of
Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation [hereinafter 1965
Agreement], arts. I & 2, 583 U.N.T.S. 173.
41. The United States rushed through the new emperor-retaining but war-renouncing
Constitution in 1946 before the establishment of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and Allied
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marginalized the militarists responsible for the Pearl Harbor attack, the
Cold War dynamics empowered conservative civilian bureaucrats and
politicians led by Premier Yoshida Shigeru (1946-1947, 1948-1954) who
had supported Japanese aggression in China in the 1930s but retained pro-
U.S. sympathies.42 In 1955, the conservative parties merged to form the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which ruled Japan uninterruptedly until
1993.43 Not surprisingly, the conservatives came to dominate the
Supreme Court.4
The post-war individual redress and accountability proved
disappointing. While the US authorities ordered the release of political
prisoners, none received compensation.45 This contrasted with the
reparation measures for the victims of Nazi persecution in the U.S. and
U.K. occupation zones in Germany that developed into a federal
compensation law in 1953.46 Other than the trials held by the Allied
nations, most famously by the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo,
the United States did not authorize the Japanese courts to try war
criminals as in Germany, denying a chance for self-reflection of past
atrocities.4 7
Council for Japan that would have given the anti-emperor Soviets a veto over constitutional
revision. Ironically, the war-renouncing Article 9 was necessary to allay the Allied domestic
opposition to the emperor's retention. JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE
OF WORLD WAR II, at 360-70 (2000).
42. GORDON, supra note 15, at 235-36. To his credit, Yoshida was detained for 40 days by
the military in the war's closing months for his efforts to bring about Japan's early surrender.
43. In fact, the LDP is still in power after brief hiatuses in 1993-1994 and 2009-2012.
44. The centralized power in the Chief Justice makes it easier for a shake-up by the
government. David S. Law, The Anatomy ofa Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87
TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1589-93 (2009).
45. NIHON NO SENGOHOSHO [JAPAN'SPOST-WAR REPARATIONS] 134-38 (Japan Federation
of Bar Associations ed., 1994) (Japan). Another interesting development was the deletion of
Japan's duty to compensate its nationals for the waiver of their claims against the Allies in the
draft peace treaty that are found in the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
in 1947 and West Germany's treaty with the Allies (Convention on the Settlement of Matters
Arising Out of the War and the Occupation). Id. at 360-61.
46. NANA SAGI, GERMAN REPARATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 38-48 (1986);
CHRISTIAN PROSS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE STRUGGLE OVER REPARATIONS FOR SURVIVING
VICTIMS OF THE NAZI TERROR 19-41 (Belinda Cooper trans., Johns Hopkins University Press
1998).
47. In addition to their own military courts, the Allied occupation authorities empowered
the German courts to try Germans for the crimes stipulated in Control Council Law No. 10
including crimes against humanity, resulting in 5228 convictions by 1950. David Cohen,
Transitional Justice in Divided Germany After 1945, in RETRIBUTION AND REPARATION IN THE
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 82-83 (Jon Elster ed., 2006). In the 1950s, West Germany rejected
crimes against humanity as ex post facto law and the convictions under the domestic penal code
dwindled to 21 in 1955, but embarrassing domestic prosecutions and East Germany's propaganda
campaign led to the creation of the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklirung
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As a result, Japan's post-war social discourse was dominated by the
symbiotic interest politics between the LDP and its key support group the
izokukai (Japan War-Bereaved Families Association).4 8 Since the 1950s,
the LDP showered the 8-million-strong izokukai with generous military
pensions in return for votes.4 9 Izokukai Chairman and LDP Premier
Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998) who denied Japan's past aggression
summed up their sentiments when he asked, "how those who live today
and cherish the memory of their deceased kinsfolk would feel if they were
told, 'That was a war of aggression after all.'?50 Hence, Japan's postwar
pacifism had roots in self-perception as a victim, symbolized by
Hiroshima, rather than critical reflections on Japan's aggression and
wartime atrocities.5 1
Post-war Japan's compensation regime excluded many classes of
victims. The first to bring lawsuits against the Japanese state were in fact
Japanese civilians whose claims against foreign governments were
waived without compensation by the San Francisco Peace Treaty and
other post-war treaties.52 Japanese civilian war victims and Taiwanese
veterans excluded from Japan's compensation regime followed suit.5 3
The conservative courts rejected all these claims but the Supreme Court
struck down administrative measures excluding foreigners from benefits
under special legislation for atom bomb survivors in the 1970s.54 In these
early cases, the main issue was discriminatory treatment rather than
nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen (Central Office for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes) and more
prominent trials. DEVIN 0. PENDAS, THE FRANKFURT AuSCHWITZ TRIAL, 1963-1965: GENOCIDE,
HISTORY, AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 12-21 (2006). Washington's decision to spare the Emperor
Hirohito, who reigned until 1989, from the Tokyo Trial also made the Japanese less than
forthcoming about discussing their war crimes.
48. See FRANZISKA SERAPHIM, WAR MEMORY AND SOCIAL POLITICS IN JAPAN, 1945-2005,
at 7-9 (2006) (On the role of izokukai and four other significant interest groups of the right and
left in Japan's history debate).
49. Id. at 63-80.
50. WAKAMIYA YOSHIBUMI, THE POSTWAR CONSERVATIVE VIEW OF ASIA: HOW THE
POLITICAL RIGHT HAS DELAYED JAPAN'S COMING TO TERMS WITH ITS HISTORY OF AGGRESSION IN
ASIA 20-21 (1999).
51. See Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N.
L., 1, 5-6 (2002) (discussing a similar phenomenon in Germany where in 1952 only 10% of the
populace approved of the Nuremberg Trial suggest that future events are more important in
shaping the memory).
52. JAPAN'S POST-WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 45, at 359-66, 463-74, 479-80.
53. Id. at 121-24, 244-52, 480-84. Japan's exclusion of civilians and ex-colonials was
exceptional and harsh compared to other post-imperial states and World War II belligerents.
Okuhara Toshio, Eibei Shokoku ni Okeru Senso Higaisha no Hosho Seido [The Compensation
Regime for the War Victims in Western Nations], 452 HOGAKU SEMINA 52, 52-55 (1992).
54. Chosenjin Hibakusha son sin to Saiban Kiroku: Hibakusha Hosho no Genten [The
Trial Record ofKorean Atom Bomb Victim Son Jin-Doo] (Nakajima Tatsumi ed. 1998) (Japan).
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wartime atrocities committed by Japan.5 5
Other Asian states also displayed weak liberal tradition. The South
Korean Government used Japan's payment for the state-led economic
development and persecuted the protesting victims of wartime Japanese
forced labor.5 6 By contrast, the Netherlands insisted upon and concluded
a separate agreement with Japan for the compensation of its civilian
detainees by threatening to reject the San Francisco Peace Treaty citing
their domestic political clout and constitutional rights.57
During this period, best-selling books and popular movies in Japan
and Korea made the story of "comfort women" a public knowledge, but
social stigma kept the women from coming forward.5 8 The deep-rooted
patriarchal Confucian mores faulted the "defiled women" for failing to
preserve their "chastity."59 Such gender norms were also an important
factor condemning the survivors to silence.
C. Reparation Movement Since the 1990s: From the
Political to the Legal
Democratization in South Korea since the late 1980s opened the
political space for the previously silenced war victims. The yujokhoe
(Korean Association of Pacific War Victims & Bereaved Families),
forcibly dissolved by government in the 1970s, regrouped in 1988 and
55. JAPAN'S POST-WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 45, at 359-66, 463-74, 479-80.
56. In the 1970s, Seoul used only 9.7% of the proceeds from the supplies worth $300
million received from Tokyo under the 1965 Agreement for personal compensation: among the
forced laborers, only the families of 8552 dead received nominal sums. Seoul had initially
demanded $364 million for over 1.03 million forced laborers and conscripts from Tokyo. Lee
Yoo, Gangie Dongwon Pihaeja Bosang Eoddeokke Haenna [How Was the Compensation for the
Forced Mobilization Victims Done?], YONHAP NEWS, Jan. 17, 2005, available at
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=shm&sidl=1 04&oid=00 I &aid=00008
85179 (S. Kor.).
57. Protocol Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands Relating to Settlement of the Problem Concerning Certain Types of Private Claims
of Netherlands Nationals, Japan-Neth., Mar. 13, 1956,252 U.N.T.S. 3; see LINDA GOETZ HOLMES,
UNJUST ENRICHMENT: How JAPAN'S COMPANIES BUrLT POSTWAR FORTUNES USING AMERICAN
POWs 138-40 (1st ed. 2001) (explaining that while the San Francisco Peace Treaty stipulated
compensations for the POWs in Article 16, it was silent about the civilian detainees. interestingly,
the U.S. and U.K. diplomats were aware of Japan's acceptance of reparation terms more favorable
than the ones in the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Burma, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and
Sweden, but secretly decided not to take advantage of the most-favored nation clause in Article
26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.).
58. C. SARAH SoH, THE COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND POSTCOLONIAL
MEMORY IN KOREA AND JAPAN 159-69 (2008).
59. Id. at 224-25. Perhaps to a much less extent, but similar derogatory attitudes could be
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had 15,000 members by late 1991. Around this time, progressive
Christian women activists began studying the "comfort women" issue.
Tokyo initially claimed that the private traffickers recruited "comfort
women" without state involvement.60 This prompted the formation of the
Jeongdaehyeop (Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual
Slavery by Japan) in 1990.61
The war victims' brand of popular nationalism differed from the elite
statist vision of authoritarian regimes. While the latter pursued unpopular
co-operation with Japan for the overriding Cold War economic and
security interests, the former prized democracy and reconciliation with
North Korea as ethnic kin. President Park (1963-1979) inherited Japan
connections as a colonial-era graduate of the Japanese military academy.
His military successor President Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-1988) was a
close Cold War ally of Japan's right-wing Premier Nakasone (1982-
1987) and U.S. President Reagan (1981-1989).
Major breaks for the "comfort women" came with Kim Hak-Sun's
public testimony in Korea in August 1991, a lawsuit filed by three
"comfort women" along with dozens of Korean forced laborers and
conscripts in December62 and the historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki's exposure
of damning government documents a month later that forced Tokyo to
admit responsibility and apologize.63 Other revelations such as the
national broadcaster NHK's reporting of a survey of Chinese forced
laborers commissioned and concealed by the foreign ministry after the
60. ICJ Report, supra note 4, at 12-13.
61. Id. at 13. The Korean name of the organization (jeongshindae munje daechaek
hyeobeuihoe) literally means the "Council on Jeongshindae Affairs" which not only differs from
the English translation but is problematic on its own in terms of historical accuracy. The
jeongshindae (literally "body-proffering corps") was a women's forced labor corps under the
ostensible guise of voluntary services employed by Japan toward the end of World War II to run
undermanned factories. Unlike the "comfort women," the jeongshindae was formally created and
governed by legislation for industrial labor so the two were different institutions on paper.
However, the two became indistinguishable and even synonymous for Koreans because the
colonial authorities often utilized business agents to recruit Korean women to the jeongshindae
with the promise of decent pay and educational opportunities-not unlike the "comfort women."
Some early researchers even assumed (mistakenly) that the Japanese authorities converted
jeongshindae laborers into "comfort women." The resulting confusion led the modern-day South
Korean activists to use the term jeongshindae for their organization's name in 1991 and the
Korean name has remained unchanged since. Soh, supra text accompanying notes 58, 57-63.
Tragically, some jeongshindae forced laborers were divorced by their jaundiced husbands under
the mistaken impression-facilitated by the very name of jeongshindae-that they had been sex
slaves.
62. Korean Wartime 'Comfort Girls,' Conscripts Seek Compensation, JAPAN EcoN.
NEWSWJRE, Dec. 6, 1991, at 1, available at LexisNexis Academic.
63. David E. Sanger, Wako Journal; History Scholar in Japan Exposes a Brutal Chapter,
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war followed.64 A poll found 51% of the respondents supporting some
kind of response to Asian demands for compensation.6 5
Japan's pacifist left pushed for a national dialogue on Japan's war
responsibility in response to the passing of war-scarred Xenerations and
the U.S. demand for Japan's increased military role.6 The Japanese
NGOs and the opposition Socialist Party cooperated with Asian victims
and called for state action.6 7 The German reparations for the Nazi victims,
as well as the U.S. and Canadian compensation for the World War II-era
Japanese internment, put Japan's reparation policies in contrast.6 8 Even
some moderates favored coming clean with the past to bolster Japan's
international stature.6 9
Initially, the "comfort women" and other war victims pursued a
political course for redress based on historical responsibility, but Tokyo
resorted to technical legal defenses.7 0 In May 1990, the women's groups
urged Seoul to demand from Tokyo: (1) official, written apology for past
crimes; (2) end of cover-up, fact-finding and apology for "comfort
women"; and (3) resolution of the "comfort women," ethnic Koreans in
Japan and war reparation on the basis of national independence.7 ' The
64. MABOROSHI No GAIMUSHO HOKOKUSHO: CHUGOKUJIN KYOSEIRENKONO KIROKU [THE
PHANTOM FOREIGN MINISTRY REPORT: THE RECORD OF FORCED RELOCATION OF THE CHINESE]
(NHK Shuzaihan ed., 1994) (Japan).
65. UTSUMI, supra note 10, at 5-6 (additional information on file with author).
66. GORDON, supra note 15, at 242.
67. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) had set up a special committee on war compensation
headed by its former chairwoman, Doi Takako. SDP to Send Doi, 3 Other Women Lawmakers to
Taiwan, H.K., JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 22, 1992, available at LexisNexis Academic. In
December 1992, a major international conference to this end was held in Tokyo. WAR
VICTIMIZATION AND JAPAN: INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEARING REPORT (Int'l Pub. Hearing Exec.
Comm. ed., 1993).
68. JAPAN'S POST-WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 45, at 225-43.
69. Papers Urge Coalition to Solve 'Comfort Women'Issue, JAPAN ECoN. NEWSWIRE, Aug.
5, 1993, available at LexisNexis Academic (discussing that even the mainstream conservative
news editorials urged a parliamentary resolution to apologize for wartime atrocities.).
70. Tong Yu, Recent Developments: Reparations for Former Comfort Women of World
War II, 36 HARv. INT'L L.J. 528, 536-40 (1995). Sympathetic observers agreed that political action
by Japan was necessary. Id.; but see Yvonne Park Hsu, "Comfort Women "from Korea: Japan's
World War II Sex Slaves and the Legitimacy of Their Claims for Reparation, 2 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 97, 128-29 (1993) (arguing that a judicial resolution is preferable to a legislative one
since "the plaintiffs will be better served by a decision of the court clearly delineating the injuries
to the victims and Japan's obligation to make reparations.").
71. Lee Hyo-jae, Ilbongun Wianbu Munje Haegyeoleul Wihan Undong ui Jeongae
Gwajeong [The Progression of the Movement to Resolve the Japanese Military "Comfort
Women "Issue], in ILBONGUN WIANBU MUNJE UI JINSANG [THE TRUTH OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY
"COMFORT WOMEN" ISSUE] 313-14 (The Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual
Slavery by Japan and the Research Association on the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery
by Japan ed., 1997) [hereinafter Lee].
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open letter to Tokyo in September demanded: (1) admission of forced
draft of Korean women, (2) official apology; (3) fact-finding; (4) a
monument; (5) compensation; and (6) history education.72 However,
Tokyo disappointed with its inept initial investigative report on "comfort
women" in July 1992. While issuing apologies, Japan asserted that all
claims were waived by post-war treaties.74
Despite mounting political pressure, the South Korean policy-makers
also used legal excuses to avoid the "comfort women" and other
reparation issues. The foreign ministry initially argued that the 1965
Agreement settled all claims despite dissent from the justice ministry and
a former foreign minister.75 In early 1993, the government announced that
it would provide special welfare support to the survivors while insisting
on fact-finding but no material compensation from Japan.76 On August 4,
1993, after much backdoor diplomacy Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary,
Kono Yohei, issued a statement conceding the use of coercion.77 A
Korean foreign-ministry mandarin commented that "comfort women"
will cease to be an issue with Japan prompting the jeongdaehyeop to call
for his dismissal. The claims of other war victims never registered.
72. Id. at 314-15.
73. Id. at 319.
74. See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN/.4/1992/SR.34/Add.1 at 16
(discussing statements by Japanese delegates at the UN Commission on Human Rights.); see also
Asia-Pacific Nations Seek 19.3 Trillion Yen Redress, JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 7, 1993, at 1,
available at LexisNexis Academic. By 1993, the World War II-related damages sought in
Japanese courts by foreign victims had amounted to 19.3 trillion yen. Id.
75. Jeongsindae Baesang Hyeobsanggil Teuyeodda [The Way for Negotiation on Comfort
Women Redress Open], DONGA ILBO, Apr. 27, 1992, at 1; I Osibsamneyon ilje Bulbeob Haengwi
Chaekim Pyomyeong Jeongsindae Baesang Geungeo idda [Grounds for Comfort Women and
Other Reparations Found in Japan's 1953 Comment on the Responsibility for Imperial Japan's
Illegal Acts] DONGA ILBO, June 16, 1992, at 1. Kim Yong-Shik, former chief delegate and foreign
minister during Korea's long negotiations with Japan, revealed excerpts from the conference
minutes in 1953.Id. The justice ministry's report can be found at National Archives of Korea (on
file with the author).
76. Lee, supra note 71, at 329. There were no prior consultations with the victims. Id. lje
ha Ilbongun Wianbu ae Dachan Saenghwal Anjeong Jiwonbeob [Act on Life Stabilizing Support
for the Japanese Military Comfort Women Under Imperial Japan], Act No. 4565, June 11, 1993
(S. Kor.).
77. Kang Byeong-Cheol, Wianbu Gangie Dongwon Injeong gono Damhwa Naogikaji
[How the Kono Statement Admitting Coercive Mobilization Came About], YONHAP NEws (Dec.
17, 2012), available at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2012/12/16/0200000000AKR
20121216030600043.HTML (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean) (discussing Yu Byung-Woo, the
director-general for Asian affairs in 1993, provided his account of behind-the-scene maneuvers).
78. The South Korean Government officials expressed concerns that the "comfort women"
claims could open a floodgate of claims from other World War II-era victims in their internal
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The two governments' lack of political will and legalistic response
forced the war victims to seek legal remedies in domestic courts and U.N.
human-rights bodies in contrast with the largely political approach taken
by the Jewish victims after World War II. During the war, Nathan
Feinberg suggested applying international minority-protection norms to
German Jews; however, Siegfried Moses preferred to have "the justice of
the claims recognized ... followed by political decision on the part of the
powers, formulated in concepts of international law" instead of advancing
"only those claims which accorded with international law."7 9 The Jewish
leaders followed Moses' call for "political, not legal, action."so In 1952,
the state of Israel and the world Jewry, represented by the Claims
Conference, concluded a historic reparation agreement with West
Germany. Political efforts, notjudicial remedies, won compensation from
German businesses for wartime forced labor.8 ' In the 1990s, the Jewish
victims, again, relied primarily on political rather than judicial means to
secure redress.8 2 The German state, or corporations, admitted legal
liability in none of these cases.8 3
III. MAIN LEGAL ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE REPARATION
A. (Il)legality of Imperial Japan's Colonial Rule over Korea
A group of international lawyers and historians in Japan and Korea
79. NANA SAGI, GERMAN REPARATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 18-19 (1980).
Moses set out his detailed arguments in his 1944 booklet "Jewish Post-War Claims." Id.
80. Id. at 19-20.
81. See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, LESS THAN SLAVES: JEWISH FORCED LABOR AND
THE QUEST FOR COMPENSATION (2002) (discussing the difficult negotiations with IG Farben,
Krupp, AEG, and Rheinmetall). Indeed, the German courts invariably denied damages claims of
ex-forced laborers. Benjamin Ferencz, West Germany: Supreme Court Bars Claims of Forced
Laborers Against German Industrial Concerns, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 561, 564-65 (1967).
82. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999). The plaintiffs suing
the businesses lost in the two court cases before the 2000 Agreement; Iwanowa v. Ford Motor
Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999). See Stuart Eizenstat, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS,
SLAVE LABOR, AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II (2004)(discussing the details of
the 1990s reparations and U.S. Government's active engagement); see also Detlev Vagts & Peter
Murray, Litigating the Nazi Labor Claims: The Path Not Taken, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 504
(2002) ("the [2000] settlement not only provided rapid relief to claimants with arguable legal
claims, it also benefited persons who would have had no legal recourse for their suffering and
compelled labor.").
83. Libby Adler & Peer Zumbansen, The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A Critique of the
German Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers ofthe Third Reich, 39 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 1, 43 (2002) ("Given the choice between accepting compensation along with an
acknowledgement of "political, moral, and historical" responsibility under the Foundation Law
or receiving nothing at all ... the choice for plaintiffs seems obvious").
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advocated the illegality of Imperial Japan's colonization of Korea based
on its particular factual and legal circumstances. At issue was whether the
1905 protectorate and 1910 annexation treaties were null and void even
under the public international law of the early 20th century.
Prominent international lawyers had raised doubts about the legality
of the 1905 protectorate and 1910 annexation treaties although no state
raised formal objection. Contemporary French writers cited Japan's
coercion of Korean officials and contradiction with its obligation to
secure Korean sovereignty in preceding international agreements as
grounds for illegality and their analysis has been followed by leading
European and American authorities.84 The 1935 Harvard Research Draft
and a 1963 report by the International Law Commission (ILC) cited the
1905 Treaty as a treaty invalidated by the use of coercion against the state
delegates as opposed to the state.8 5 It has also been argued that both
84. Francis Rey, La Situation Internationale de la Corde, 13 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.G.D.I.P.] 40, 53-58 (1906) (Fr.); Jean Perrinjaquet, Corde et Japon:
Annexion de la Corde au Japon.-Traiti du 22 aofit 1910 et ses Consequences, 17 REVUE
GENERALEDE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.G.D.I.P.] 532, 536 (1910) (Fr.). A comprehensive
list of later works also mentioning the 1905 Treaty as an example of coercion against state
representatives can be found in Sasagawa Norikatsu, Dentouteki Kokusaihou Jidai ni Okeru
Nikkan kyuu Jyouyaku [The Old Japan-Korea Treaties in the Period of Traditional International
Law (1904-1910): The Points of Legal Disputes Concerning the Treaty Coercion], in KOKUSAI
KYODO KENKYu KANKOKU HEIGO TO GENDAI: REKISHI TO KOKUSAIHO KARA No SAIKENTO [JOINT
INTERNATIONAL STUDY ON THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA AND MODERN TIMES: REAPPRAISAL FROM
HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW] 494-95 nn.35 & 36 (Sasagawa Norikatsu & Yi Tae-jin eds.,
2008) (Japan). The notable American works include CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(3d ed. 1948) ("Violence or intimidation used against the person of the sovereign or of his
diplomatic agent, as in the case of... the pressure exerted against the King of Korea by Japan in
1905 to accept a protectorate, would, of course, invalidate the agreement signed under such
duress."); GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 437 (1st ed. 1965) ("Another well-known instance in which pressure was
brought to bear on the person of a sovereign was that of the King of Korea, in 1905, forced to
accept an obviously invalid agreement under which Korea became a Japanese protectorate.").
85. Article 32. Duress, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 1148-49, 1157 (Supp. 1935). In article 32
(Duress) of his draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, Professor Garner referred to the 1905
treaty as invalidated by coercion against the "ratifying authorities." See James T. Kenny, Manley
0. Hudson and the Harvard Research in International Law 1927-1940, 11 INT'L L. 319, 320-27
(1977) (discussing the League of Nations' 1930 codification conference and the codification
project launched by Professor Hudson). The ILC report identified Japan's coercion of the Korean
emperor and his cabinet for the 1905 Treaty as one of the "alleged instances of the employment
of coercion against not only negotiators but members of legislatures in order to procure the
signature or ratification of a treaty" that "will necessarily justify the State in repudiating the treaty"
along with the U.S. military's 1915 siege of the Haitian parliament for treaty ratification and
Hitler's tactics in obtaining a protectorate treaty with Czechoslovakia in 1939. Second report on
the law of treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 and
Add.1-3 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 50, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1963/ADD. . Waldock cited the aforementioned Harvard Research Draft prepared by Professor
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treaties failed to meet the ratification rule in the treatises by Oppenheim
and other Western and Japanese jurists.8 6 However, Japanese scholars
countered that even a treaty transferring sovereignty could take effect
through cursory domestic ratification procedure and that the 1905
Protectorate Treaty did not meet the threshold of impermissible coercion
of a state representative.87 The issue is sensitive as it may entail opening
a floodgate for reparation from past colonized nations.88
The legality of Japanese rule had ramifications for Korean claims
against Japan. Tokyo argued that the laws of war, applicable between
belligerents, did not protect Korean "comfort women" who were
Japanese nationals.89 Indeed, Japan otherwise would have been liable for
35 years of military occupation of Korea.90 The issue was also significant
in domestic litigation since Tokyo argued that forced labor was duly
authorized under wartime mobilization order.9' While the victims won
compensation in a few cases before lower courts for employer liability
Hudson.
86. Park Bae Geun, Syebeobjeok Gwanjeom ae seo bon Hanguk Byeonghab Gwanryeon
Joyak ui Hyoryeok Joyak Chegyeol Hyeongsik gwa Jeolcha reul Jungsim eu ro [Validity of the
Treaties Related to Annexation ofKorea Re-examined: A Review on the Form and the Procedure
of Treaty Making from the Perspective ofInter-temporal Law], 54 KOREAN J. INT'L L. 91 (2009)
(S. Kor.).
87. Sakamoto claimed that, under the international law as it existed in 1905, such coercion
needed to rise to the level of threatening to expose past misconduct or pointing a pistol and that
coercion against a state representative had to be proven to be distinct from coercion against the
state, which was not prohibited at the time. Sakamoto Shigeki, Kyu Joyaku Mondai no Otosiana
ni Ochiitteha Naranai [We Should Not Fall into the Chasm of the Question of the Old Treaties],
652 SEKAl (Sept. 1998), 193, 196-200. On his argument negating the need for formal ratification
procedures, see id at 200-03. At a more general level, a popular Japanese international law
textbook asserted that article 51 (Coercion of a Representative of a State) of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties created a new norm on the ground that coercion against a state
representative was rare. YAMAMOTO Son, KOKUSAIHOU [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 618-19 (2004).
The author cited the forced signing by the President of Czechoslovakia of a treaty establishing a
Nazi protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia as the only such instance without any reference to
the 1905 Protectorate Treaty. Id. For critical appraisals, see Sasagawa Norikatsu & Kim Bong-
Jin's contributions in KOKUSAI KYODO KENKYU KANKOKU HEIGO TO GENDAI: REKISHI TO
KOKUSAIHo KARA No SAIKENTO [JOINT INTERNATIONAL STUDY ON THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA
AND MODERN TIMEs: REAPPRAISAL FROM HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW] (Sasagawa
Norikatsu & Yi Tac-jin eds., 2008) (Japan).
88. See Report of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Aug.31-Sept.8, 2001, Durban Declaration and Programme
of Action, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (Sept. 8, 2001). The controversy over colonialism
resulted in a vague compromise language at the 2001 Durban Conference. Id
89. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 2, 14.
90. Id. 169, 73. This was precisely North Korea's stated position. Id.
91. For the claims based on violations of international law, the Korean "comfort women"
and forced laborers by-passed the nationality issue by asserting crimes against humanity which
include atrocities against "any civilian population." See infra Part III.B.
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under Japanese law,92 this reasoning presumed a valid employment
relation instituted by legitimate authorities, and implicitly acknowledged
the legality of Japan's colonial rule over Korea.
The issue had political resonance for the Koreans, mindful of the
Kubota Statement and other conservative "absurd remarks" praising
Japanese rule of Korea. Many equated the admission of illegality with the
definitive repudiation of such perception in Japan.93 Tellingly, Tokyo and
Seoul had essentially agreed to disagree on this charged issue in 1965.94
The "comfort women" and other Korean victims, too considered their
sufferings to be the logical consequence of Japanese domination.9 5
However, even remorseful figures such as Socialist Premier Murayama
(1994-96) stated that the annexation was morally wrong but legal. As a
New York Times columnist put it, it was "as if the German Government
were to declare that its invasion of France during World War II had been
legal and amicable, because agreements were signed between Germany
and the puppet Government in Vichy." 96
B. Grounds for Individual Claims Under International Law
The "comfort women" claimed a number of violations of international
law by Japan. First, they contended that their ordeal constituted war
crimes and crimes against humanity under international humanitarian
92. The Japanese Supreme Court had established the employer's obligation to consider the
safety of the employees ( OAR) in its case-law. Saiko Saibansho [S. Ct.] Feb. 25, 1975,
Sho 48 (o) no. 383, 29 Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu [Minshu] 143 (Japan).
93. Yong Tae-Young, Ilbon Beobjeong seon Hanil Habbang Bulbeobseong [Illegality of
Korea-Japan Annexation on Trial in Japanese Court], HANKYOREH SHINMUN, July 3, 1993 (S.
Kor.). In 1993, 369 Koreans filed a lawsuit in Japan seeking a finding of illegality, official apology
and reparations for the 1905 and 1910 treaties. Id. In 2005, on the 100th anniversary of the 1905
Annexation treaty, the usually squabbling North and South Korean Governments jointly
confirmed that the treaty was null and void ab initio. Joint Press Release of the 15th North-South
Ministerial Conference, item 5 (June 24, 2005), https://reunion.unikorea.go.kr/reuni/home/pds/
policylaw/view.do?id=21&mid=SM00000130&limit-10&eqDataDiv=policy&page=1 (S. Kor.)
(translation in Korean).
94. See supra Part II.B.
95. TRUE STORIES, supra note 7, at 40. It is not uncommon to hear distraught "comfort
women" survivors exhort the Korean audience to make Korea strong to avoid repeating history.
96. Nicholas D. Kristof, Japan Says It Has No Qualms About Its 1910 Seizure of Korea,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/12/world/japan-says-it-has-no-
qualms-about-its-1910-seizure-of-korea.html. Recently, 109 Korean and 103 Japanese
intellectuals jointly called upon Tokyo to declare the Annexation Treaty null ab initio on its 100th
anniversary in 2010. Huh Jin-Seok & Yoon Jong-Gu, Hanil Byeonghap Bulboeb Woncheon
Muhyo Hanil Jisikin Ibaeksipsam Myeong Seongmyeong [213 Korean and Japanese Intellectuals
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law.9 7 With regard to war crimes, Japan argued that the respect for
"[flamily honour" stipulated in Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulation
did not explicitly ban rape.9 8 However, authorities stretching back to the
1863 Lieber Code,99 the report of the 1919 Commission on
Responsibility,100 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention,101 codifying
customary law,10 2 as well as World War II case-law,10 3 prohibited
wartime violence against women. Crimes against humanity, which
permitted prosecution of wartime atrocities "against any civilian
population,"l04 was significant since traditional war crimes covered
atrocities against "comfort women" of the Philippines or Indonesia but
not of Korea or Taiwan, who were deemed to be Japanese nationals.
0 5
97. International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Written Statement, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1993/NGO/36 (Feb. 17, 1993).
98. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 2, ¶ 101.
99. The Lieber Code: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field (Apr. 24, 1863) art. XLIV & XLVII, reprinted in 1 THE LAW OF WAR: ADOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 158, 167 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) (stipulating punishment for rape). The Lieber Code
served as a model for other nations' field manuals and international treaties. DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR 12-13 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelf eds., 3d ed. 2000).
100. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and in Enforcement of
Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 114-15 (1920). After World War 1, the Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, which included
Japanese delegates, created by the Allied and Associated Powers prepared a non-exhaustive list
of 32 wartime "offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity" for criminal
trials which included "(5) Rape" and "(6) Abduction of girls and women for the purpose of
enforced prostitution."
101. Geneva Convention No. IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (protection of women from "rape,
enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.").
102. Thomas J. Murphy, Sanctions and Enforcement of the Humanitarian Law of the Four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Geneva Protocol I of 1977, 103 MIL. L. REV. 3, 5 (1984).
103. See YOsHIMI YOSHIAKI, TOKYO SAtBAN: SEIBOURYOKU KANKEI SIRYO [TOKYO TRIAL:
MATERIALS RELATED TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE] (2011) (Japan) for the Tokyo International Military
Tribunal. Indeed, the Tokyo Tribunal was more explicit and extensive than the Nuremberg
Tribunal in condemning sexual crimes. Karen Knop, The Tokyo Women's Tribunal and the Turn
to Fiction, in EVENTS: THE FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 145, 145-46 (Fleur Johns et al. eds.,
2010). The Dutch also tried Japanese for enforced prostitution during the Batavia Trials in
Indonesia. Trial of Washio Awochi, Netherlands Temporary Court Martial at Batavia, Oct. 25,
1946, 13 L. Rep. Trials of War Criminals 122 (1949).
104. B.V.A. R6ling, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND: REFLECTIONS OF A PEACEMONGER 3
(1993). Article 5(c) of the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal initially contained this phrase, as
originally lifted almost verbatim from article 6(c) of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, but
was deleted to make "large-scale killing of military personnel" punishable as well.
105. Interestingly, an international tribunal recently found a Bosnian Serb guilty of war
crimes against Bosnian Muslims emphasizing the defacto ethnic allegiance rather than the dejure
nationality. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgement, 1¶ 166-168 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) ("allegiance to a Party to the conflict and,
correspondingly, control by this Party over persons in a given territory, may be regarded as the
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Japan argued against the retroactive application of crimes against
humanity to World War II, but it failed to square with the Nuremberg and
Tokyo precedents.0 6
The second claim concerned Japan's violation of anti-slavery norms
through its coercive recruitment, transport, and treatment of "comfort
women."107 Although Japan was not a party to the 1926 Slavery
Convention, os a long series of treaties and practice banned slavery.109
Third, it was alleged that Japan breached its international obligations
under the ILO Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), ratified by Japan in
1930, which criminalized forced labor of women.110 Japan claimed
exemption for military service and "cases of emergency""' but the ILO
Committee of Experts held that "comfort women" failed to meet the
requirement for genuine urgency.112
Fourth, the "comfort women" argued that Japan violated its obligation
to prosecute and punish human traffickers under Articles 2 and 3 of the
1921 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in
Women and Children, one of the three "anti-white slavery" treatiesl3 it
crucial test"). There were similar arguments about World War II war crimes. HISTORY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 172-
73 (U.N. War Crimes Commission ed., 1948).
106. Views ofthe Government ofJapan on the 1996 Coomaraswamy Report, in McDougall
Report, supra note 2, ¶¶ 25-26. For instance, the Nuremberg court did not hesitate to hang Julius
Streicher, a rabid anti-Jewish propagandist, for his sole conviction for crime against humanity.
See also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
60-82 (1999). But see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 105-07 (2008). In 1951,
Japan explicitly accepted the judgments of the Allied war crimes trials. San Francisco Peace
Treaty, supra note 29, art. 11.
107. International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Written Statement, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1993/NGO/36 (Feb. 4, 1994); ICJ Report, supra note 4, at 159.
108. Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253.
109. Karen Parker & Jennifer F. Chew, Compensation for Japan's World War H1 War-Rape
Victims, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 497, 517-18 (1994); McDougall Report, supra note
2, ¶¶ 12-16,27. See also Carmen M. Argibay, Sexual Slavery and the "Comfort Women" of World
War II, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 375, 379-87 (2002) (citing various grounds to argue expansively
that "forced sex was a form of slavery").
110. International Fellowship ofReconciliation, supra note 97, 15; Convention Concerning
Forced or Compulsory Labour (LO No. 29), art. 11 & 25, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, entered
into force May 1, 1932 [hereinafter Forced Labour Convention].
111. Forced Labour Convention, supra note I10, art 2(2)(a) & (d).
112. "The Committee concludes that the present case does not fall within the exemptions
contained in Article 2(2)(d) and 2(2)(a) of the Convention, and clearly therefore there was
violation of the Convention by Japan." Comm. of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations [CEACR], Int'l Labour Org., Individual Observation concerning Convention,
1930 (No. 29), Japan (ratification: 1932), 110 Doc. 061997JPNO29 (1997).
113. International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 18, 1904,
35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83; International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave
Traffic, May 4, 1910, 8 L.N.T.S. 278; international Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic
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had ratified. Japan excluded its colonies from the application of the 1910
and 1921 Conventions, but it was argued that the planning of the "comfort
women" institution in Tokyo, use of Japanese ships that were considered
Japanese territory, and involvement of Japanese military personnel under
Japan proper's jurisdiction made the treaties applicable.114
The claims based on the violations of international law had certain
advantages. Nationality was irrelevant in the application of universal
norms such as crimes against humanity, prohibition of slavery and forced
labor so the argument over the legality of colonial rule became moot. It
was also significant that claims based on violations ofjus cogens norms
"from which no derogation is permitted" under international law"1 5 were
not time-barred.116 Hence, Korean "comfort women" utilized human
rights norms to win redress for what many perceived to be colonial
injustice.
However, the notion that individuals could make claims against a state
as a subject of international law was a relatively novel one.117 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and human-rights treaties
stipulated the individuals' rights in relation to the state."8 In the 1980s,
John Humphrey, a legendary Canadian drafter of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, was instrumental in lobbying the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights to appoint a Special Rapporteur on
individual redress rights while acting on behalf of former Allied prisoners
in Women and Children, Sept 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 415.
114. International Fellowship of Reconciliation, supra note 97, ¶ 7. It was further pointed
out that many "Korean women" initially landed in Japan, which made the treaties applicable, and
that the intent of the drafters in permitting colonial exclusion was to allow for local customs not
to encourage trafficking. ICJ Report, supra note 4, at 158.
115. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.
116. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 490 (6th ed. 2003). See
also the general inapplicability of statute of limitations for international crimes. Id. at 567.
117. Richard M. Buxbaum. A Legal History of International Reparations, 23 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 314, 316 (2005) (providing a historical survey of the move toward individual reparations
in the early post-war reparations and stating that even the judgments denying individual
compensation "may state the law on the books" but "on the whole they do not fully reflect the
law in action.").
118. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(111), art. 8 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("right to an effective remedy for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by the law"). It may be argued that the
Universal Declaration lacks retroactive effect if it declares new norms instead of existing ones.
International jurisprudence doubts the retroactive effect of human-rights treaties. Drake v. N.Z.,
¶ 4.5 Communication No. 601/1994, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
273, U.N. Doc. A/52/40 (1997) (denying competence to hear the violations that occurred prior to
the Optional Protocol); Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), ¶ 96-105 (Int'l Ct.
Justice July 20, 2012) (denying the Torture Convention's retroactive effect in answer to questions
"put by [the U.S.] Member of the Court").
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of war (POWs) and later "comfort women" pressing claims against
Japan.119 The interpretation of article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention1 20
by scholars such as Fritz Kalshoven, Eric David, and Christopher
Greenwood (now a judge of the International Court of Justice) provided
grounds for individual claims for breaches of the Convention.121 In 2005,
the U.N. General Assembly resolved to affirm the individual redress
principles.12 2 However, doubts about the applicability of individual-based
approach for war-related claim have been raised for legal and policy
reasons.123 Not surprisingly, the Japanese Government and courts took
the traditional view that only states can bring claims under international
law.124
C. Post- War Claims Treaties
Japan insisted as a last resort that post-war treaties waived all claims
from other nations except North Korea.12 5 The war victims made counter-
arguments based on both the limited coverage of particular treaties and
the more general proposition about the limits of the states' power to
119. A.J. Hobbins & Ann H. Steward, Bringing Individual Human Rights Issues to the
United Nations: John Humphrey and the Quest for Compensation, 41 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 187,
192-207 (2003).
120. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land [Hague Convention IV]
art. 3, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
121. The Expert Opinions ofFrits Kalshoven, Eric David, Christopher Greenwood, in WAR
AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS, RENAISSANCE OF INDIVIDUAL COMPENSATION 31, 49, 59
(Hisakazu Fujita et al. eds., 1999). Japan claims that the Hague Convention did not prohibit rape
and that international humanitarian law did not protect colonial Korean "comfort women." The
"Views of the Government of Japan" on the 1996 Coomaraswamy Report cited in McDougall
Report, supra note 2, 14.
122. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of Dec. 16,
2005. This was the outgrowth of the works done by Theo van Boven, the Special Rapporteur on
the Right to Reparation to Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights, who strongly supported
and was relied upon by the "comfort women."
123. Rudolf Dolzer, The Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does International Law
Recognize a Victim's Private Right ofAction? Lessons After 1945, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 296
(2002).
124. Amnesty Report, supra note 4, at 40. To be fair, Japan is not the only the state holding
this restrictive view. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("To
say that international law is part of federal common law . .. is not to say that, like the common
law of contract and tort, for example, by itself it affords individuals the right to ask for judicial
relief.").
125. Selective Compensation for 'Comfort Women' Called Fair, JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE,
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dispose of individual claims through treaties. The more specific
discussion of the 1965 Agreement pointed out that the treaty covered
property claims that do not encompass tort damages.1 2 6 In the case of
"comfort women," it appeared odious for Japan to claim the treaty waiver
since it denied state involvement until 1992.
There have also been arguments based on human rights. For instance,
because of the jus cogens nature of anti-slavery norms, the treaty would
have been void if it waived the compensation claims arising from them.12 7
Similarly, international lawyers cited the provisions of the Geneva
Convention as prohibiting the states from absolving their liability for
breaches of international humanitarian law through treaties.12 8
Another effective circumvention of the treaty defense was the claims
arising from the failure to investigate and punish. Treaties and customary
international law obligated Japan to bring the perpetrators to justice, but
in fact Japan had punished none for its wartime atrocities after the Allied
occupation. The U.N. human-rights experts adopted the position that the
breach of the obligation created a new ground for compensation from the
offending states.12 9 The Janes case in the U.S.-Mexican arbitration in
1925 set the precedent for such a principle.130
Interestingly, the Japanese Government had argued from the 1950s
that the post-war treaties waived the state's right to exercise diplomatic
protection vis-ai-vis another state but not the individuals' substantive
rights or claims. Tokyo had adopted this idiosyncratic position in
response to domestic lawsuits from its own citizens who claimed that
waiver of their property and claims by treaties constituted expropriation
126. ICJ Report, supra note 4, at 164. But see David Boling, Mass Rape, Enforced
Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial Army: Japan Eschews International Legal Responsibility,
32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 533, 564-67 (1995) (emphasizing the finality of the 1965
Agreement).
127. Parker & Chew, supra note 109, at 538-39 ("If any provision of either the Allied Treaty
or the Korean Treaty effectively nullifies thesejus cogens rights or allows violations ofjus cogens
to go uncompensated, then that provision would be void."); The International Court of Justice,
however, has rejected such a broad reading of jus cogens norms in its recent decision.
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), ¶ 93 (Int'l Ct. Justice Feb.
3, 2012) (holding that substantive violations of jus cogens rules such as forced labor or civilian
massacres has no effect on procedural obstacles such as state immunity).
128. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
[Geneva Convention IV] arts. 7 & 148, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Amnesty
Report, supra note 4, at 45-47.
129. Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report,
submitted by Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, at 56 (1993)
[hereinafter Van Boven Report].
130. BROWNLIE, supra note 116, at 447; ICJ Report, supra note 4, at 171-72.
1112016]1
25
Shin: The "Comfort Women" Reparation Movement: Between Universal Women'
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1LORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
requiring compensation.13 1 This was Japan's official position with regard
to the 1965 Agreement as well.132
D. Statute ofLimitations
There have been arguments that civil claims arising from serious
human-rights abuses should not be subject to the statute of limitations
since there are corresponding norms for the prosecution of international
crimes. 13 3 This natural extension of the non-applicability of criminal
statutory limitations to compensation found support at the 1992
Maastricht Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and in subsequent U.N. instruments.134 It is also
generally recognized that the extinctive prescription does not apply to
131. See supra Part II.B.
132. On the evolution of the legal position of Japanese Government and courts, see Kinue
Tokudome & Azusa K. Tokudome, Individual Claims: Are the Positions ofthe U.S. and Japanese
Governments in Agreement in the American POW Forced Labor Cases?, 21 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 1, 4-19 (2003).
133. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, entered into force Nov. 11, 1970;
European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against
Humanity and War Crimes, Jan. 25, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82, (not yet entered into force). The
U.N. treaty failed to gain universal support due to the definitions of "war crimes" and "crimes
against humanity" used in the treaty. There was little objection to the confirmation of this principle
at the 1998 Rome Conference. The Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 29, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. The national
legislation and case-law also exclude the statutory limitations for international crimes.
134. Conclusions of the Maastricht Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1
27, Maastricht, Netherlands, Mar. 11-14, 1992. Principle 15 of "Proposed Basic Principles and
Guidelines" in Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report,
submitted by Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, at 58
(1993); Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, principle 6 & 7, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005);
Principle 24 of "Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through
Action to Combat Impunity" in Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights
Violations (Civil and Political): Revised Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to Sub-
Commission Decision 1996/119, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (1997); Principle 23 of
"Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to
Combat Impunity" in Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat
Impunity, Diane Orentlicher, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 at 14 (2005); Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the
Covenant, para. 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. 1/Add. 13, at 7 (Mar. 29, 2004).
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violations of the quasi-constitutional jus cogens norms.1 3 5 Not
surprisingly, Japan argued against such waiver of statutory limitation-
and certainly not for the retroactive application to its World War II-era
atrocities.136
IV. REPARATION MOVEMENT AT THE U.N. BODIES
In the 1990s, the "comfort women" groups advanced their redress
cause by adopting universal human-rights norms and enlisting the support
of women's rights activists to overcome the Japan lobby at the United
Nations. Under unprecedented international pressure, the Japanese
Government controversially created the private Asian Women's Fund
(AWF) to provide compensation while evading state responsibility.
Although many "comfort women" rejected the AWF as hush money, it
was a concession that Tokyo would not make for other Korean victims of
Imperial Japan. These other victims including the forced laborers failed
to win much traction at the U.N. human-rights bodies.
A. The "Comfort Women " Advocacy at the International Stage
In 1992 the jeongdaehyeop (Korean Council for Women Drafted for
Military Sexual Slavery by Japan) made a strategic decision to take the
"comfort women" issue to the United Nations. The jeongdaehyeop,
organized for "comfort women," and yujokhoe (Korean Association of
Pacific War Victims & Bereaved Families), representing mostly forced
laborers, were both reluctant to detach their causes, but Kim Chan-kyu,
an international law scholar, advised separate action since the former
could cite Japan's factual denial until 1992 against the treaty waiver.137
The jeongdaehyeop decided to focus on lobbying the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights (UNCHR), where they could argue that the statute of
limitation should not apply to war crimes.138 The small number of
surviving "comfort women" (234) and their indigence made costly and
prolonged litigation unattractive.13 9 The UNCHR, composed of state
delegations, had a subsidiary expert body, the Sub-Commission on
Human Rights (Sub-Commission). The Sub-Commission's expert
135. BROWNLIE, supra note 116, at 490.
136. McDougall Report, supra note 2, ¶ 6.
137. Lee, supra note 71, at 326.
138. Id.
139. Id. The yujokhoe and its Japanese partners had already brought a lawsuit in Japan
against the Japanese Government in December 1991 with 35 Korean plaintiffs including Kim
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members formed a number of working groups including the Working
Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery (WGCFS). These "special
procedures" were the main forums for "comfort women" in the 1990s.14 0
The jeongdaehyeop received critical support from non-feminist
groups in the early years.141 Totsuka Etsuro, a Japanese human-rights
lawyer and a Geneva veteran, had studied the wartime forced labor issue
at the request of Motooka Shoji, a Socialist politician, in 1990 and was
the first to raise the "comfort women" issue at the UNHCR in February
of 1992.142 He shared his valuable legal and tactical acumen with the
jeongdaehyeop. The World Council of Churches (WCC), a global
ecumenical organization with ECOSOC consultative status, gave the
jeongdaehyeop access to meetings from its first U.N. attendance in
August of 1992.143 As the conservatives dominated the state and
judiciary, Japanese liberals often appealed to the United Nations to
advance their human-rights agenda. 144 The jeongdaehyeop also worked
with the ethnic Koreans in Japan who addressed the "comfort women"
issue along with the wartime forced labor and on-going discrimination
against ethnic Koreans in Japan.14 5
As the jeongdaehyeop lobbied at the United Nations, it came to
incorporate human-rights norms. In August of 1992, the Sub-
Commission endorsed the WGCFS recommendation to submit the
"information ... regarding the situation of women forced to engage in
140. The human-rights treaty bodies have also expressed their views regarding "comfort
women" in its comments to Japan's periodic reports, but they tend to attract less publicity. The
individual complaints are not possible because Japan has yet to adopt optional protocols or issue
declarations.
141. Dearth of information about the United Nations due to the Cold War lockout of North
and South Korea until 1991 led the jeongdaehyeop to mistakenly fly to New York instead of
Geneva and miss the UNCHR in February 1992.
142. Id. at 365. He identified the abduction of "comfort women" and their "use as sex slaves"
as "a war crime under international humanitarian law and as a crime against humanity in peace
time" and recommended the UNCHR to establish a mediation panel or a truth commission. U.N.
Comm'n on Human Rights; Statement of Totsuka Etsuro (International Educational
Development), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/SR.30/Add.1, at 3 (1992).
143. Shin Hei-soo, Ilbongun Wianbu Munje Haegyeoleul Wihan Gukie Hwaldong ui
Seonggwa wa Gwaje [The Achievement and Challenges of the International Activities for the
Resolution of the Japanese Military "Comfort Women" Issue], in ILBONGUN WIANBU MUNJiE UI
JINSANG [THE TRUTH OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY "COMFORT WOMEN" ISSUE] 359, 363-64 (The
Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan and the Research
Association on the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan ed., 1997) [hereinafter
Shin].
144. YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW: THE
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAW (1998). However, Japan has yet to allow
individual complaints to the treaty bodies.
145. The resident Koreans in Japan had lodged an unsuccessful "1503 complaint systematic
violations" at the UNCHR for the racial discrimination against Koreans in Japan in the 1980s.
114 [Vol. 28
28
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss1/3
THE "COMFORT WOMEN" REPARATION MOVEMENT
prostitution during wartime" to Theo van Boven, the Special Rapporteur
on the Right to Reparation to Victims of Gross Violations of Human
Rights. 146 Van Boven's conception of reparation as including not only
material compensation but also restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction,
and guarantees of non-repetition in the forms of disclosure of the truth,
apology and acceptance of responsibility, criminal prosecution, and
commemorations of the victims re-shaped the movement.1 4 7 The
jeongdaehyeop refrained itself as a human-rights advocacy based on van
Boven's ideas and added the punishment of perpetrators to the list of
demands to distinguish itself from the yujokhoe's more limited
compensation demands.14 8
When Tokyo tried to silence the "comfort women" issue through
backstage diplomacy with Seoul in 1993, the activists challenged the
treaty defense by invoking van Boven's obligation to compensate for
non-punishment.14 9 The jeongdaehyeop initially considered the criminal
punishment of the perpetrators overly harsh, but Japan's obstinate refusal
of individual compensation changed the situation.150 On February 6,
1994,27 Korean "comfort women" and the jeongdaehyeop filed criminal
complaints in Tokyo.s' The International Fellowship of Reconciliation
146. Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Draft Resolution,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/L.3, ¶ 18 (1992). This was made possible because Totsuka had
requested the WGCFS to take steps to settle compensation claims including an international forum
for mediation in May of 1992. Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/34, ¶ 86-87 (1992).
147. Van Boven planned to study the "comfort women" reparation after the submission of
his final report in 1993, but it was shelved by his appointment as the Registrar of the newly
established International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Van Boven Report, supra
note 129, ¶¶ 25, 137; Letter from the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Restitution,
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Addressed to the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery
Pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/2, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (1992); Lee,
supra note 71, at 328.
148. Lee, supra note 71, at 328.
149. Id. at 329.
150. Totsuka Etsuro, Nihongun Seidorei Mondai no Rippo Kaiketsu no Teian Senji Seiteki
Kyousei Higaisha Mondai Kaiketsu Sokushin Houan no Jitsugen ni Mukete [A Proposal for the
Legislative Settlement of the Japanese Military Sexual Slavery Issue: Toward the Realization of
the Promotion of Resolution for Issues Concerning Victims of Wartime Sexual Coercion Bill] 41
RYUKOKU HOGAKU 486, 506 (2008).
151. Totsuka Etsuro, Kankokujin Higaishara Gojyunen Buri ni Kokuso Kokuhatsu [Korean
Victims Bring Criminal Complaints After 50 Years], 472 HOGAKU SEMINA 104, 104-05 (1994).
See the original text of the complaints at Kokusojyou [Criminal Complaint] 472 HOGAKU SEMINA
106-07 (the complaint by 27 "comfort women") and Sensou Sekininsha no Shobatsu wo
Motomeru Kokuhasujyou (1) [The Criminal Complaint Seeking the Punishment of Those
Responsible for the War (1)], 478 HOGAKU SEMINA 108-12 and Sensou Sekininsha no Shobatsu
wo Motomeru Kokuhatsujyou (2) [The Criminal Complaint Seeking the Punishment of Those
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(IFOR), at Totsuka's request, sent a letter to the premier urging him to
enact a law for the punishment of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.15 2 Facing a barrage of criticism from the NGOs for the
impunity for the "comfort women" at the UNCHR in mid-February, the
Japanese delegation kept its silence on the issue for the first time since
1992.153
However, the most critical factor in the jeongdaehyeop's activities
was winning the support of women's human rights groups. The
widespread rapes and forced impregnation in Bosnia made wartime
sexual violence a current topic.15 4 The "comfort women" case appeared
to fit neatly into the "structuralist understanding of male domination and
female subordination," espoused by feminist legal scholars such as Hilary
Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, who set out to reform international
law since the early 1990s.15 5 Their like-minded feminists became
influential in international organizations and have been remarkably
successful in the prosecution of rape under international humanitarian
law, which before the 1990s recognized rape as a crime only indirectly as
an affront to the "woman's honor." 56
At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June of
1993, the "comfort women" supporters took active part in the feminist
agenda including the Global Tribunal on Violations of Women's Human
Rights.15 7 The Conference adopted the Vienna Declaration and
Responsible for the War (2)], 478 HOGAKu SEMINA 33-36 (the complaint by jeongdaehyeop). In
Japanese law, as in German and South Korean law, there is a formal distinction between a criminal
complaint filed by the victim (kokuso; in German, Antrag) and by a third party (kokuhatsu; in
German, Anzeige).
152. TOTSUKA ETSURO, NIHON GA SHIRANAi SENSO SEKNIN: KOKURENNO JLNKEN KATSUDO
To NIHONGUN "LANFu" MONDAI [UNKNOWN JAPANESE WAR RESPONSIBILITY: HUMAN RIGHTS
ACTIVITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER PROSTITUTES WHO SERVICED
THE JAPANESE MILITARY] 26-27 TOKYO: GENDAIJINBUNSHA (1999) [hereinafter TOTSUKA].
153. Totsuka included the "compensation on the ground of non-punishment" in his NGO
submission to the UNCHR. International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Written Statement, ¶¶ 14-
15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/NGO/36 (Feb. 4, 1994).
154. Shin, supra note 143, at 369-70.
155. Id.
156. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 379,
386-88 (1993). For a critical appraisal of this feminist turn to criminalization in international law
see generally Janet Halley, Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in the
International Law ofArmed Conflict 9 MELB. J. INT'L L. 78 (2008); Janet Halley, Rape at Rome:
Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International
Criminal Law 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008).
157. The Tribunal, organized by Charlotte Bunch of the Center for Women's Global
Leadership at Rutgers heard women's testimonies in five fields: human rights abuse in the family,
war crimes against women, violations of bodily integrity, socio-economic rights, political
persecution and discrimination. Chung Chin-Sung and Kim Bok-Dong testified about the
"comfort women" in the war crimes section. U.N. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-
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Programme of Action that devoted a paragraph on the "violations of the
human rights of women in situations of armed conflict" including "sexual
slavery."" Japan lobbied to delete "sexual slavery" but failed. It also
tried to temporally exclude the "comfort women" from consideration by
replacing "[v]iolations" with "[c]urrent violations," but the move
backfired when the NGOs including the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations (JFBA) attained the even more definitive "[a]ll violations"
in the final text.15 9 The Vienna outcome helped overcome the temporal
restriction that had doomed the Allied POWs' 1503 procedure against
Japan. 160
The international pressure on Japan continued to mount as the number
of NGOs expressing criticism tripled to 15 at the Sub-Commission in
August of 1994.161 A year earlier, the Sub-Commission had adopted
resolution 1993/24 appointing Linda Chavez (USA) as the Special
Rapporteur on the systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like
practices during armed conflicts.162 In May 1994, the WGCFS
recommended the parties to consider submitting the dispute to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an international arbitral body
open to states as well as individuals, an idea proposed by Totsuka and
supported by the jeongdaehyeop.163 In June of 1994, the Second Asian
Pacific Ministerial Conference on Women in Development referred to the
punishment for "systematic rape" in its action plan over Japan's
25, 1993, Testimonies of the Global Tribunal on Violations of Women's Human Rights at the
United Nations World Conference on Human Rights (1993) (Compiled by Niamh Reilly, Center
for Women's Global Leadership, 1994).
158. "Violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict are violations
of the fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. All violations
of this kind, including in particular murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy,
require a particularly effective response." World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993,
Vienna Declaration and Programme ofAction, II. ¶ 38 (June 14, 1993). (It was the first time that
the United Nations used the term "sexual slavery.").
159. TOTSUKA, supra note 152, at 103.
160. The Sub-Commission had previously rejected the claims lodged in 1987 under the 1503
procedure by the Allied POWs against Japan in its controversial decision 1991/104 per
interpretation by the U.N. legal office. Totsuka cited the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action and other precedents to support expanded jurisdiction. See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council, Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/NGO/30
(1994). After the WGCFS and the Sub-Commission began considering the "comfort women"
issue, other World War II-era abuses were heard as well.
161. TOTSUKA, supra note 152, at 44-45.
162. See Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Wartime: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/L.12/Rev.l (1993). However, the UNCHR cited budgetary concerns to
shelve five new studies including the appointment of Linda Chavez in March of 1994. TOTSUKA,
supra note 152, at 50.
163. U.N Econ & Soc. Council, Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of
Slavery, T 94-95, 101, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/33 (June 23, 1994).
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opposition.'64 In August, the Sub-Commission asked Linda Chavez to
resume her study on the "comfort women"1 65  and transmitted
"information received concerning the sexual exploitation of women and
other forms of forced labour <uring wartime," to the Special Rapporteur
on the impunity of perpetrators of violations of human rights.166
B. Asian Women's Fund
In July 1994, Murayama Tomiichi became the first Socialist prime
minister since the occupation period in coalition with the LDP, a political
arrangement akin to the Democrats sharing power with the Republicans
in U.S. politics.'6 7 The Socialists sought to implement an individual
compensation program ahead of the 50th anniversary of the end of World
War II, but they were outvoted and outmaneuvered by their conservative
coalition partners and foreign-ministry bureaucrats, who backed the
existing government policy.168 In August, Murayama officially proposed
the payment of "consolation money" from private donations "in lieu of
compensation" to the dismay of the victims and activists but to the
acclaim of Japan's mainstream media.169
At this critical juncture, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ),
one of the leading human-rights NGOs, completed its draft final report
on the "comfort women" denying the settlement of "comfort women"
164. Jakarta Declaration and Plan of Action for the Advancement of Women in Asia and
the Pacific. TOTSUKA, supra note 152, at 109.
165. To avoid the budgetary roadblock by the CHIR, the Sub-Commission asked Chavez to
"submit without financial implications, a working paper on the situation of systematic rape, sexual
slavery and slavery-like practices during wartime." Slavery during Wartime: Draft Decision, U.N.
Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/L.8 (1994).
166. U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of
Slavery: Draft Resolution, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/L. 13 (1994).
167. GORDON, supra note 15, at 323-24.
168. Tsuchino Mizuho, Josei no tame no ajia Heiwa Kokumin Kikin no Seisaku Katei nikan
suru Hitokousatsu Akuta Bunseki wo Chusin ni [A Study on Policy Process of Asian Women's
Fund: Through Actor Analysis], 13 J. GRADUATE SCH. HUMAN. & Sc. (2011) (Japan),
http://teapot.lib.ocha.ac.jp/ocha/bitstream/10083/50787/1/34_329-338.pdf On the accounts of
the Socialist politicians who took part in the internal deliberations that led to the creation of the
AWF, see IANFU MONDAI TO AilA JOSEI KiKIN [THE "COMFORT WOMEN" ISSUE AND THE ASIAN
WOMEN'S FUND] 13-35 (Onuma Yasuaki et al. eds., 1998) (Japan). The socialists made little
efforts to explain its position or assuage the victims-possibly unnerved by a show of force by a
new parliamentary group formed by the nationalist faction within the LDP in December 1994
whose membership skyrocketed from 57 to 174, two-thirds of all LDP incumbents, in just three
months. WADA HARUKI, IANFU MONDAI NO KAIKETSU NO TAME NI: A.IA JOSEI KlKI N NO KEIKEN
KARA [FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE COMFORT WOMEN ISSUE: FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
ASLAN WOMEN'S FUND] 112-13 (2015) (Japan).
169. TOTSUKA, supra note 152, at 62.
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claims by treaties and recommending individual compensation.17 0 The
ICJ's practice of sharing its draft report with the relevant state before
publication to give time to act on the problem had been effective in
reforming the treatment of the mental patients in Japan in 1986.171
However, the Japanese diplomats withheld the ICJ's "comfort women"
report from the elected officials for two and a half months until its official
publication.17 2 The government halted the discussion after Totsuka
hurriedly transmitted the draft through his acquaintances, but the foreign-
ministry mandarins falsely reported that they never received the ICJ draft
and that the ICJ had never interviewed Japanese officials.1 73 Although the
diplomats later apologized for their "mishandling," the state's private-
donation plan had already been finalized.174
The eventual Asian Women's Fund (AWF) faced criticism as evading
Japan's responsibility. In theory, the AWF collected private donations
while the state paid for the ads and operating cost, but in practice the
public expenditures dwarfed the donationS17 The private-donations
formula may have been appropriate for wartime forced labor that
benefited businesses but dubious for "comfort women" exploited by the
military.1 76 While the well-meaning supporters saw it as an interim
measure, the AWF served the interests of those wishing to neutralize
international criticism with a semblance of compensation.17 7 To make up
for the lack of state action, the successive prime ministers wrote "letters
of atonement"17s but it was delivered only for those receiving the AWF
money. That the authors were right-wing nationalists such as Premiers
Hashimoto, Mori and Koizumi did not add to sincerity. The AWF also'
170. ICJ Report, supra note 4, at 199-205. The ICJ had accepted Totsuka and the
jeongdaehyeop's request to investigate the "comfort women" issue in early 1993. Shin, supra note
143, at 370.
171. TOTSUKA, supra note 152, at 64. The then-conservative Nakasone Government
immediately overhauled the relevant law in 1987. Totsuka recalls that the ICJ had succeeded
where years of previous domestic reform efforts had failed. Totsuka Etsuro, Nihon wa Kokusai
Shakai to Wakai Dekinainoka [Is It Impossible for Japan to Reconcile with the International
Community?], 45 RYUKOKU HOGAKU 153, 159 (2012).
172. The ICJ delivered its report to the Japanese Mission in Geneva on September 2, 1994
and made it public on November 22. TOTSUKA, supra note 152, at 70.
173. Id. at 72.
174. Id. at 74-77.
175. Two months after the official launch of the AWF, the state had spent 120 million yen
but only 50 million yen had been donated. Id. at 155.
176. Id. at 202.
177. Id. at 164.
178. The letters extended to victims the "most sincere apologies and remorse to all the
women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical
and psychological wounds as comfort women." Ryutaro Hasimoto, Letter from Prime Minister to
the Former Comfort Women (1996), http://www.awf.orjp/e6/statement-1 2.html.
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failed to stipulate fact-finding for still undiscovered government
documents or surveys of "comfort women" in countries other than South
Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines.'7 9
Japan's insistence upon the AWF despite the express objection and
demand for state compensation of most "comfort women" in Korea,
Taiwan and the Philippines led many to criticize the 2 million yen
($20,000) payment as "hush money."iso In 1995, the Sub-Commission
called upon Japan for additional steps such as the creation of an
administrative board or referral to the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA)."' At the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 attended
by 17,000 participants, the "comfort women" issue gained greater
traction from Western-based women's groups and the final Platform for
179. The AWF has made available on its website the Japanese Government's official report
along with the materials cited in the report in the early 1990s, but the AWF took no further
initiative to unearth Interior Ministry or police files relating to the "comfort women," available at
http://222.awf or.jp/e6/document.html. It was a private researcher that later made key discoveries
like the 1936 Nagasaki district court's judgment against private contractors accused of kidnapping
Japanese women for overseas trafficking. Nihon gun jugun ianfu higaisha no rachi jiken wo
shobatsu sita senzen no gekyusin keiji saiban wo hakkutsu shiryo kokugai isou yukai hikoku jiken
ni kansuru Nagasaki chihou saibansho keijibu showa juichi nen ni gatsu ju yokka hanketsu
[Prewar Lower Court Criminal Rulings Convicting Perpetrators of Kidnapping Japanese Military
"Comfort Women" Victims were Uncovered: [Document] Nagasaki Chiho Saiban-sho Keiji-bu
Hanketsu, Showa ll nen, 2 gatsu, 14 nichi, Kokugai Iso Jiken] (Japan), available at
http://ci.nii.ac.jp/elsl 0004636497.pdfid=ART0007352371&type=pdf&lang=en&host-cinii&
orderno &ppv type=O&langsw-&no=1459821746&cp=. Not only has the Japanese
Government been negligent in the survey of its own archives but it has also ignored the materials
used as evidence in post-World War II war crimes trials, the ex-Japanese veterans' memoirs and
the newly discovered documents from China. HAYASHI HIROFUMI, NIHOHGUN IANFU MONDAI No
KAKusmN [THE CORE OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY "COMFORT WOMEN" IssuE] 83-96 (2015)
(Japan).
180. Chung Chin-Sung, Tteodtteodji Mothan Ilbon eui Duiddon [Japan's Shady
Backhander], HANKYOREH SHINMUN, Jan. 23, 1997 (S. Kor.). Professor Chung, a sociologist and
"comfort women" activist, later served as a co-representative ofjeongdaehyeop and a member of
the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and its successor
Advisory Committee of the U.N. Human Rights council's Advisory Committee. See Chinsung
Chung, Resume, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/AdvisoryCom/CVM
embers/ChinsungChung.pdf. For the general reaction to the AWF, see Shin, supra note 143, at
332-35. Even Professor Wada Haruki, an early supporter of the "comfort women" redress efforts
and a key player in the operation of the AWF, admitted that South Korean and Filipino "comfort
women" that he interviewed, including at least one eventual AWF recipient, were dead-set against
the AWF. Wada, supra note 168, at 117-22. He also recounted that, in a private conversation, two
of the three jeongdaehyeop co-representatives reluctantly showed willingness to accept the
Japanese people's private donations if the Japanese state officials offered them in person to the
victims with an apology, but that the Japanese side failed to respond to this possible sign of
compromise. Id at 113-14.
181. U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of
Slavery: Draft Resolution, ¶¶ 139-141, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/L.26 (1995).
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Action explicitly called for criminal prosecution and redress measures for
wartime sexual slavery.18 2 In 1996, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Special
Rapporteur on Violence against Women, submitted her report on the
"comfort women," affirming Japan's legal responsibility to make
reparations.1 8 3 Despite all-out diplomatic efforts by Japan that viewed it
as a threat to the AWF, the Coomaraswamy Report was unanimously
adopted in the UNCHR with over 20 states including the Philippines,
India, and the European Union expressing support.184 However, Japan
persisted with the AWF.
The AWF divided the "comfort women" community as some
survivors opted to take it as the best alternative.'8 5 In Korea and Taiwan,
public pressure led the governments to make equivalent payments to the
strapped "comfort women," on the condition that they do not receive
AWF money. Ugly scenes unfolded as some jeongdaehyeop activists
denounced the AWF recipients as traitors or whores.'86 Even in the
182. The Platform for Action stipulates states and international institutions to "[Ulndertake
a full investigation of all acts of violence against women committed during war, including rape,
in particular systematic rape, forced prostitution and other forms of indecent assault and sexual
slavery; prosecute all criminals responsible for war crimes against women and provide full redress
to women victims." Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Beijing Platform for
Action,¶ 145(e), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (Sept. 15, 1995). Japan's U.N. ambassador drew fire
from the audience during his NGO briefing for denying culpability for the "comfort women" but
affirming the need to raise donations for the victims. TOTSUKA, supra note 152, at 115.
183. See generally Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 2. After CHR's appointment of
Coomaraswamy in April 1994, at Totsuka's suggestion, the jeongdaehyeop representatives flew
to Sri Lanka to request the investigation into the "comfort women" issue, which she promised to
make her priority. Shin, supra note 143, at 377.
184. TOTSUKA, supra note 152, at 182-94.
185. The NGOs in Japan and South Korea also split over the AWF. In South Korea, the
yujokhoe agreed to collaborate with Tokyo to serve as a go-between in the fund's distribution to
the survivors and forcibly dragged away the dissenting members, who later formed a separate
organization. Gil Yun-Hyeong, Sosong Jiok Gateun Gonan eui Haenggun [Lawsuits were Hellish
March of Tribulation], HANKYOREH SHINMUN, May 23, 2007, available at http://legacy.www.
hani.co.kr/section-021024000/2007/05/0210240 0 200705230661015.html (S. Kor).
186. In 1997, Professor Yun Chung-Ok, a pioneer of the "comfort women" movement and
co-representative of jeongdaehyeop, stated regarding the AWF that "Accepting consolation
money that does not recognize guilt will make the victim a registered prostitute [gongchang]" at
an international seminar organized by a South Korean NGO specifically to oppose the AWF.
Wada Haruki & Takasaki Soji, Hanguk ae Gyeshineun Beotdeul ege Deurineum Peyonji [Letter
to My Friends in Korea], 25 Q. CHANGBI [CH'ANGJAK KWA PIP'YONG] 286, 392 (1997). The same
NGO, which refused to distribute the private donations raised for "comfort women" in South
Korea to the seven survivors who received money from the AWF, also wrote letters to the South
Korean "comfort women" warning them "by accepting consolation money without apology
instead of compensation, we will be absolving the Japanese Government and selling away
ourselves again as slaves for the second time." Id. at 392-93. Even the critics of the AWF
acknowledged the veracity of these statements. Suh Kyungsik, Choshim eun eodi gago oae
Banding ei Mulgyeol ae bal eul Damgeushibnikka [What Happened to the Original Resolution
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Philippines where no state support was forthcoming, a group of "comfort
women" opposed to their umbrella group Lila Pilipina's retraction of
opposition to the AWF broke away to form the Malaya Lolas (Free
grandmothers), demanding Japan's recognition of war crime and state
compensation. 187
C. Legal Assessments and Application
The most comprehensive and detailed legal analysis of the "comfort
women" issue in the U.N. system can be found in a 1998 report prepared
by Gay J. McDougall, the Special Rapporteur on the systematic rape,
sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflicts, refuting
most of Japan's legal arguments for denying individual compensation and
finding the Asian Women's Fund inadequate.18 8 The McDougall report
found that Imperial Japan's "comfort women" system constituted war
crimes, crimes against humanity and violations of international norms
against slavery and slave trade.'89 It also held that the post-war treaties
could not waive the claims of the victims because Japan's concealment
of its systematic involvement, the limited scope of waiver claims by
and Why are you Dipping your Feet in the Wave ofReaction?], HANKYOREH SHNMUN (Mar. 11,
2016), available at http://wwwl.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/diplomacy/734569.html (S. Kor.). The
South Korean survivors affilitated with the pro-AWF yujokhoe who broke with jeongdaehyeop
also raised controversies by accusing the latter of financial impropriety and claiming that 80% of
surviving "comfort women" had been prostitutes. SOH, supra note 58, at 96-97. In financial
matters, the yujokhoe does not have a stellar record either: 3 yujokhoe executives were indicted
for fraud and battery and 2 of them were convicted although the chairperson was acquitted. Seo
Hye-Rim, Yangsunim Taepyeongyang Jeonjaeng Yujokhoejang sagi Hyeomeui Mujoi
Hwakjeongeoae [The Non-Guilty Verdict Against Pacific War Yujokhoe Chairperson Yang Sun-
Im Confirmed], YONHAP NEWS (Aug. 29, 2014) (S. Kor.), available at
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/society/2014/08/29/0701000000AKR20140829092600004.H
TML (S. Kor.). Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2014No755, Aug. 8, 2014 (S. Kor.).
187. Id. at 219. According to Professor Wada Haruki, the AWF's former director-general,
60 South Korean, 13 Taiwanese and 211 Filipino, 79 Dutch victims accepted payment or less than
one-third of those known in South Korea and Taiwan. Kishi Toshimitsu & Nakazawa Yudai, lanfu
Tsugunaikin: Kankokujin Juryo san wari jaku moto Kikin Kanbu Shogen [Comfort Women
Atonement Money Received by Less than 30 Percent of South Koreans according to Ex-A WF
Executive], MAINICHI SHiMnUN, Feb. 27, 2014 (Japan). The heavy-handed tactics used by NGOs
to block the receipt of the AWF money by some survivors also came under criticism. See generally
Cheah, supra note 6, at 107. In Indonesia, because of the Suharto regime's hostility to the local
supporters of "comfort women," the AWF provided 380 million yen to the government to build
69 social-welfare facilities for the elderly "in areas where the former comfort women were thought
to be living"; in the mid-2000s, some survivors belatedly asked for individual payments from the
AWF but was politely advised to refer the matter to the Indonesian government. Wada, supra note
168, at 159-63.
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treaties and jus cogens nature of the violations.'90 No statute of limitations
should apply to international crimes.1 9' Other U.N. and NGO reports
displayed similar conclusions setting aside technical legal arguments.19 2
However, the McDougall report and other works by the international
human-rights community were poignantly silent about the legality of
Japan's colonial rule of Korea. Although Totsuka characterized the
"comfort women" system as slavery at the United Nations and continued
to find grounds for claims under international law, he also argued that
Japan's colonial occupation of Korea was itself illegal under international
law.1 93 The Japan-based Fact-Finding Group on Forced Displacement of
Koreans also argued that the 1905 and 1910 treaties were invalid.194
However, the ICJ report did not question the legality of colonial rule by
stating that the Hague Regulation was not applicable for Koreans, who
were colonial nationals of Japan.19 5 Coomaraswamy introduced North
Korea's claim that the 1905 and 1910 treaties were illegal, without
expressing her views and found Japan to be in violation of international
humanitarian law without addressing the nationality question.19 6
MacDougall countered Japan's argument about Korea's colonial status
by finding slavery to be a crime by itself as well as a crime against
humanity; hence, the norm applied to Korean women "whether or not
they were civilians in an occupied territory."197
190. Id.¶53-62.
191. Id. 188-90.
192. See generally ICJ Report, supra note 4, at 155-82; Coomaraswamy report, supra note
2, iJ 91-124; Amnesty Report, supra note 4, at 18-48; 2000 Women's International Tribunal
Judgment, supra note 4, at 109-265.
193. International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Written Statement, 1 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1993/NGO/36 (Feb. 4, 1994).
194. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Statement ofLee Sang-Chil (Liberation), i¶ 31-34,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/SR.26 (1993) (referring to the 1905-1945 period as "military occupation
from 1905 to 1945").
195.
[A]s Korea was at that time a colony of Japan, Article 46 of the Hague
Regulations as the basis of the relevant customary international law did not apply
to it. Articles 42 et seq. only refer to occupied or enemy territory, whereas they
do not regulate the protection of the belligerents' own inhabitants, as in the case
of the Koreans.
ICJ Report, supra note 4, at 161.
196. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 2,169.
197. MacDougall Report, supra note 2, 1 29-30. She also avoids addressing the colonial
question in her discussion about individual compensation under article 3 of the Hague Convention
which arguably apply to war crimes but not crimes against humanity. See id. 46. The Women's
International Tribunal also avoids the issue by confining the indictment to crimes against
humanity even though the Charter confers jurisdiction for war crimes and "other crimes under
1232016]
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While the "comfort women" issue showed the effectiveness of the
universal human-rights norms, it also revealed its selectivity. The Asian
forced laborers,19 8 Allied prisoners of war (POWs)'99 and other victims 2 0 0
continued to raise their claims based on human rights at the United
Nations. In 1994 WGCFS heard the testimonies of three forced laborers
(two Koreans and one Chinese) and a Dutch civilian internee.2 01 The
jeongdaehyeop also initially argued for the compensation claims of the
women forced laborers as well.202 However, these claims simply did not
generate the same kind of pressure that the "comfort women" enjoyed
from the women's human rights movement. The Sub-Commission's
mandate for its Special Rapporteur included "slavery-like practices"
which referred to other forms of forced labor, but this too went largely
unnoticed.203
V. THE COURT-DRIVEN REDRESS MOVEMENT IN DEMOCRATIZED
SOUTH KOREA
Since the 2000s, the "comfort women" and other South Korean
victims turned to their home courts to press the South Korean
Government to actively espouse their claims against Japan. This course
international law" as well. 2000 Women's International Tribunal Judgment, supra note 4, at 11,
apps. A & B.
198. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Statement ofLee Sang-Chil (Liberation), ¶¶ 8-9, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1993/SR.26 (1993).
199. John Humphrey, the drafter of the Universal Declaration and former chairman of the
Sub-Commission, for the POWs argued that states cannot "negate human rights by invoking treaty
obligations" and asked the UNCHR to find that the Japanese "guilty of gross violations of human
rights." U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Statement of John Humphrey (War Amputations of
Canada), 172, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/SR.26 (1993).
200. Totsuka requested the WGCFS to investigate the bacteriological warfare waged by
Unit 731 and the recently excavated human remains near the military medical school in Tokyo.
Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on Its 18th Session, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/30 (1993). By comparison, the U.N. Economic and Social Council had urged
Germany to provide reparations to the victims of Nazi medical experiments in concentration
camps in 1951. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, The Right to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation for Victims ofGross Violations ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ¶ 19,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993).
201. TOTSUKA, supra note 152, at 32.
202. Shin, supra note 143, at 368. Karen Parker of the IED, an early active supporter of
"comfort women," argued that Japan should compensate all "victims, whether sex slaves, forced
labourers, allied prisoners of war or civilian detainees" for Japan's war crimes. U.N. Comm'n on
Human Rights, Statement ofKaren Parker (International Educational Development), at 3, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1993/SR.38 (1993).
203. Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Wartime: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/L. 12/Rev. 1, at 2 (1993).
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of action was made possible by post-democratization changes. In the
legal actions stemming from human-rights violations under former
authoritarian regimes, popular pressure-reinforced by new institutional
arrangements such as the operation of truth commissions and the
Constitutional Court-pushed the courts to relax the statute of limitations
and deny the legality of past government measures. It was in this
historical context that the courts handed down a number of victories for
the "comfort women" and other victims in support of redress for the
colonial-era injustice. The court-driven chain of events served as a sharp
rebuke to the government foreign-policy elite's counter-majoritarian
policies of diplomatic restraint.204
A. Democracy in South Korea
Democracy in South Korea had a tumultuous history since 1948.205
During the Korean War period (1950-1953), the U.S.-backed government
of President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) massacred alleged leftists.206
After the war, Rhee and his successors used the communist threat to
silence the opposition.207 The brief restoration of democracy after the
204. While admittedly in a far removed context of responding to the Jim Crow South's
atrocious criminal justice system, the experience of the U.S. Supreme Court's belated but decisive
interventions during the interwar period presented me with the idea of judicial response to public
outrage. Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L.
REv. 48, 48 (2000).
205. For South Korea's brief political history, see generally Paul Hanley, Transitional
Justice in South Korea: One Country's Restless Search for Truth and Reconciliation, 9 U. PA. E.
AsIA L. REv. 138, 141-48 (2014).
206. The communist insurgency began in April 1948 under the U.S. Military Government
in Jeju Island and followed suit in other areas. The South Korean authorities massacred hundreds
of thousands of civilians deemed to harbor pro-North sympathies. See Dong Choon Kim,
Forgotten War, Forgotten Massacres-the Korean War (1950-1953) as Licensed Mass Killings,
6 J. GENOCIDE RES. 523, 523-24, 529 (2004) For the official investigation and account of
individual massacres by the TRCK (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea), see TRCK,
Jonghap Bogoseo sam Minanin Jipdan Heuisaeng Sageon [Comprehensive Report Vol. TI: Cases
ofCivilian Mass Sacrifices] (2010) (S. Kor.).
207. The military, police and intelligence services conducted brutal interrogations, where
illegal detention and torture were often the norm. The victims included not only active dissidents,
but also apolitical citizens accused of being North Korean spies or of uttering criticism of the
government. In fact, the latter easily outnumbered the former. Until recently, those branded as
communist sympathizers and their families lived as pariahs. Cho Bong-Am, a social democrat
who had served as Rhee's first agriculture minister and came in second behind Rhee in the 1952
and 1956 presidential races, was convicted and hanged on trumped-up spy charges in 1959. After
the 1960 Revolution, a special court tried the former officials for corruption, electoral fraud and
shooting of protesters; a parliamentary committee investigated the Korean War-era massacres and
the state prosecutors indicted a few perpetrators at the request of the victims' families who formed
an association. The 1961 military government arrested and tried the leaders of the association as
1252016]1
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April 19 Revolution in 1960 ended with the May 16 Coup d'6tat in 1961
by General (and President) Park Chung-Hee.208 The 1972-1987 period
was the nadir of democracy in South Korea. President Park (1963-1979)
promulgated the Yushin (Renewal) Constitution under martial law in
1972 that substituted a rubber-stamp electoral college for direct popular
elections and authorized him to issue Emergency Measures to arrest and
prosecute real or suspected opponents en masse.209 After Park's
assassination in 1979, his prot6g6 General Chun Doo-Hwan removed his
army rivals by force in the December 12 Coup and massacred hundreds
communist sympathizers in its Revolutionary Tribunal and destroyed a monument erected for the
massacre victims. MICHAEL EDSON ROBINSON, KOREA'S TWENTIETH-CENTURY ODYSSEY 122
(2007). The National Security Law (NSL) often served as a convenient legal tool for the security
services. Id. at 111-12, 122, 135. The TRCK investigated and catalogued the numerous cases of
abuse of power, often involving torture, illegal detection and other flagrant violations of due
process, as well as the draconian laws such as NSL that permitted and assisted such abuses in the
late 2000s. TRCK, Jonghap Bogoseo sa Ingwon Chimhae Sageon [Comprehensive Report Vol.
IV: Cases ofHuman Rights Violations] (2010) (S. Kor.). One of the most egregious cases during
the Rhee presidency was the tragedy of Cho Bong-Am, a social democrat who had served in the
constitution-drafting committee and as Rhee's first agriculture minister before coming in second,
behind Rhee in the rigged 1952 and 1956 presidential races. CHUNG TAE-YOUNG, CHO BONG AM
GWA JINBODANG [CHO BONG-AM AND THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY] (2006) (S. Kor.). Cho was
arrested, tried and executed for NSL violation and trumped-up spy charges in 1959. LEE YOUNG-
SEOK, JO BONG AM NUGA GEU REUL JUKYEOTNEUNGA JUKSAN JO BONG AM EUI JEONGCHI JAEPAN
GEU BELL EUL BEOKGINDA [WHO KILLED CHO BONG-AM? TAKING THE VEIL OFF THE POLITICAL
TRIAL OF CHO BONG-AM] (2000) (S. Kor.). The muted U.S. response and possible connivance
have also been noted by some writers. Id. at 328-35; PARK TAE-GYuN, Jo BONG AM YEONGU [A
STUDY ON CHO BONG-AM] 374-89 (1995) (S. Kor.). See below V.B., for Cho's posthumous
exoneration by the Supreme Court 52 years later. After the 1960 Revolution, a special court tried
the former officials for corruption, electoral fraud, and shooting of protesters while the families
of Korean War-era massacre victims formed an association to successfully press for parliamentary
inquiry and prosecution of a few perpetrators. However, the 1961 military government rounded
up the leaders of the association as communist sympathizers, destroyed monuments erected for
the massacred civilians and desecrated their remains. TRCK, JONGHAP BOGOSEO IL UIWONHOE EUI
YEONHYEOK GWA HWALDONG JONGHAP GWONGO [COMPREHENSIVE REPORT VOL. 1: HISTORY AND
ACTIVITIES AND COMPREHENSIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSIoN] 2-4 (2010) (S. Kor.);
Kim Sang-Suk, Je sa dae Kukheui Yangmin Haksal Jinsangjosa Bogoseo wa Minganin Haksal
Sageon Daegu Gyeongbuk Jiyeok eui Girok eul Jungshim euro ["Fact-Finding Investigative
Report on the Cases of Civilian Massacres" by the Fourth National assembly and the Civilian
Massacre Cases: With the Focus on the Records for the Daegu/Gyeongsangbuk-do Area], I HIST.
& RESP. 99-121 (2011) (S. Kor.).
208. President Park Chung-Hee, the general who first seized power with the 1961 Coup,
gave dictatorial powers to the president. ROBINSON, supra note 207, at 125-29.
209. Id. at 135-37. The Emergency Measures, exempt from judicial review, allowed
President Park to exercise extraordinary powers such as arrest without warrant for such vague
offenses as spreading false rumor or criticizing the Yushin Constitution. DAEHANMINKUK
HUNBEOB [CONSTITUTION 1972] art. 24(2) & 53 (S. Kor.); Kim Min-Bae, Yushin Heonbeob gwa
Gingeub Jochi [The Yushin Constitution and Emergency Measures], 32 CRITICAL REV. HiST. 89,
95-98 (1995) (S. Kor.).
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during the May 18 Gwangju Uprising before assuming presidency (1981-
1988).210
South Korea's democratization came in staggered, tantalizing stages.
In 1987, a popular uprising forced President Chun to accept a new
constitution stipulating the direct election of president with a single five-
year term limit.2 11 However, Roh Tae-Woo, Chun's army mate, won the
subsequent presidential election.2 12 In 1990, longtime dissident Kim
Young-Sam joined forces with Roh's governing party and went on to be
sworn in as the first civilian president in 30 years (1993-1998).213
President Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003) next made history by becoming the
first opposition candidate to win the presidential election although he
formed a coalition with a splinter conservative faction and failed to
prevail over the National Assembly.2 14 Finally, the liberals first secured
an outright parliamentary majority in 2004 under their flamboyant leader
President Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2008).215
The convoluted history complicated transitional justice or "settlement
of past affairs (gwageosa cheongsan)"2 16 in Korean parlance. In 1990, the
government enacted a compensation law for the 1980 Gwangju
210. ROBINSON, supra note 207, at 139-43.
211. ROBINSON, supra note 207, at 144-45; DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 67, 70 (S. Kor.).
212. ROBINSON, supra note 207, at 168-69; Cho, supra note 210, at 581.
213. See ROBINSON, supra note 207, at 170-72.
214. Id. at 174, 180.
215. Id. at 185; Anthony Faiola, Korean Vote Shifts Power in Assembly; Turnover May Aid
Impeached President, WASH. POST. (Apr. 16, 2004), available at LexisNexis Academic.
216. The term "past affairs (gwageosa)" is translated as "past incidents" and the term
"clearing up (jeongri)" substitutes "settlement (cheongsan)" in the unofficial English translation
of the 2005 law establishing the truth and reconciliation commission: Jinsil hwahae reul wihan
gwageosa jeongri gibonbeob (Framework Act on Clearing Up Past Incidents for Truth and
Reconciliation by Law No. 7542, May 31, 2005). Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic
of Korea, "Truth and Reconciliation are Steps for the Future," at 13, http://www.
jinsil.go.kr/pdf/(%EC%98%81 %EBACB8)%ECA7%84%EC%8BA4%ED%99%94%E
D%95%B4%EC%B9%B4%EB%8B%A4%EB%AI %9DEC%B5%9C%EC%A2%857[1][2][
1].28.PDF. A nearly synonymous expression "settlement of the past (gwageo cheongsan)" is used
in an article cited by Soh. Kim Nam-Kwon, Gwageo Cheongsan Eobneun Goizumi Banghan
Bandae [Opposition to Koizumi's Visit to Korea Without Settling the Past], YONHAP NEWS, Feb.
24, 2003 (S. Kor.); SOH, supra note 58, at 234. The "settlement of past affairs (gwageosa
cheongsan)" has become a generic term in Korean to describe various transitional justice efforts
in other countries. See, e.g., AN BYEONG-JIK, SEGYE EUI GWAGEOSA CHEONGSAN YEOSKA WA
GIEOK [THE SETTLEMENT OF PAST AFFAIRS AROUND THE WORLD: HISTORY AND MEMORY] (2005)
(S. Kor.); LEE YONG-WOO, PEURANGSEU EUI GWAGEOSA CHEONGSAN SUKCHEONG GWA GIEOK
EUI YEOKSA, 1944-2004 [THE SETTLEMENT OF PAST AFFAIRS IN FRANCE: A HISTORY OF PURGE AND
MEMORY: 1944-2004] (2008) (S. Kor.).
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Uprising,2 1 7 but refused a criminal inquiry.218 In 1995, popular pressure
forced the reluctant Kim administration to make special laws tolling the
statute of limitations for the 1979 Coup and the 1980 Massacre, as well
as to prosecute Chun, Roh and their accomplices who were convicted but
pardoned after a few months.2 1 9 In 2000, the National Assembly enacted
a compensation committee and the Presidential Truth Commission on
Suspicious Deaths (Suspicious Deaths Commission) for the pro-
democracy activists, as well as a truth commission for the brutal counter-
insurgency campaign in Jeju (1948-1954).220 In 2005, the liberal majority
created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea (TRCK) with
a broad mandate that encompassed the Korean War-related massacres
and post-war human-rights violations under authoritarian regimes.2 2 1
Apart from the TRCK, semi-independent commissions within the police,
intelligence services, and military to investigate their past abuses as well
as a host of statutory commissions covering distinct historical events or
subject-matters such as a peasant revolt in 1894, pro-Japanese
collaboration during the colonial period, World War 11-era forced
mobilization of Koreans by Japan and suspicious deaths in the South
Korean military went into action.222
The redress movement for "comfort women" and other colonial-era
victims took place in this context of transitional justice in post-
217. 0 il pal minjuhwa undong gwanryeonja bosang deungae gwanhan beobyul [Act for
Compensation for Victims in the Democratization Movement in Kwangju], Act No. 4266, Aug.
6, 1990 (S. Kor.).
218. The state prosecutors shelved the first criminal complaint filed against Chun's clique
in October 1988 until formally dropping all charges in December 1992. Park Won-Soon, Baesang
eui Cheukmyeon eseo bon Gwagiu Hangjaeng [The Gwang/u Resistance from the Perspective of
Compensation], in 0 IL PAL BEOBJEOK CHAEKIM GWA YEOKSAJEOK CHAEKIM (LEGAL AND
HISTORICAL RESPONSIBLITY FOR MAY 18] 186-87 (Park Eun-Jeong & Han In-Sup eds., 1995); see
Hanley, supra note 205, at 148-49.
219. 0 il pal Minjuhwa Undong Deungae Gwanhan Teukbyeolbeob [Special Act on May
18 Democratization Movement], Act No. 5029, Dec. 21, 1995 (S. Kor.); See Heonjeong Jilseo
Pagoe Bumjoe ui Gongso Sihyo Deungae Gwanhan Teukbyeolbeob [Special Act on the
Prescription of Prosecution for Crimes of Destruction of Constitutional Order], Act No. 5028,
Dec. 21, 1995 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 96Do3376, Apr. 17, 1997 (S. Kor.) (confirming
the convictions and sentences). On the historical background of the trial, see generally James M.
West, Martial Lawlessness: The Legal Aftermath ofKwangfu, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 85 (1997).
220. Andrew Wolman, Looking Back While Moving Forward: The Evolution of Truth
Commissions in Korea, 14 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 27, 37-38 (2013); TRCK, JONGHAPBOGOSEO
IL UIWONHOE EUI YEONHYEOK GWA HWALDONG JONGHAP GWONGO [COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
VOL. I: HISTORY AND ACTIVITIES AND COMPREHENSIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION]
6-9 (2010) (S. Kor.) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE REPORT VOL. 1].
221. Wolman, supra note 220, at 43-45; COMPREHENSIVE REPORT VOL. 1, supra note 220, at
16-21.
222. An overview along with the list of commissions and laws created under the Roh Moo-
Hyun Government can be found in COMPREHENSIVE REPORT VOL. 1, supra note 220, at 8-15.
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democratization South Korea. The 1993 Act on Life Stabilizing Support
for the Japanese Military "Comfort Women" under Imperial Japan
extending welfare benefits to "comfort women" was one of the first major
acts of President Kim Young-Sam in his "righting historical wrongs
(yeoksa baro seugi)" campaign.2 2 3 The Roh Moo-Hyun Government
created truth commissions on Imperial Japan's wartime forced
mobilization and on the colonial-era collaboration, indicating that
transitional justice for the "past affairs" also addressed national
grievances against Imperial Japan and its Korean collaborators.2 2 4
Despite such progress, the opposition from the political right and state
bureaucracies as well as financial burden foiled comprehensive
legislation for compensation and expunction of past convictions.2 2 5 As
223. Ije ha Ilbongun Wianbu ae Daehan Saenghwal Anjeong Jiwonbeob [Act on Life
Stabilizing Support for the Japanese Military "Comfort Women" Under Imperial Japan], Act No.
4565, June 11, 1993 (S. Kor.); Lee, supra note 71, at 329; Shin, supra note 143, at 341-42. In May
1993, President Kim Young-Sam issued statements condemning the 1979 Coup as mutiny and
pledging to rehabilitate the 1980 Gwangju Uprising. Gwangfu Minjuhwa Undong Bokgwon gim
Daetongryeong o il pal Damjhwa [Rehabilitation of the Gwangfu Democratization Movement in
President Kim's Statement Concerning May 18], SEGYE ILBO, May 14, 1993 (S. Kor.). In 1994,
the new draft textbook symbolically rechristened the 1960 student-led revolt as April 19
"Revolution" while the formerly May 16 "Military Revolution" became "Military Coup." Lee
Chun-Gyu, Sa il gu sa wol hyeokmyeong o il yuk gunsa jeongbyeon geun hyeondaesa
jaejomyeong, [Apr. 19, April Revolution, May 16, Military Coup, Recasting of Modem and
Contemporary History], Sept. 1, 1994 (S. Kor.). Following the arrests of Chun's clique, President
justified his decision as part of "righting historical wrongs (yeoksa baroseugi)." Park In-Hwan,
Yeoksa baro seugi myeongye hyeokmyeong seoneon gim daetongryeong teukbyeol damhwa
euimi baegyeong [Declaring the Glorious Revolution of "Righting Historical Wrongs": The
significance and Background of President Kim's Special Statement] (1993) (translation in Korean
for most of documents at website www.kinds.or.kr).
224. Wolman, supra note 220, at 39-41. The ambitious scope of South Korea's truth
commissions set them apart from their counterparts in other post-transition societies. Id. at 50-51.
However, the commissions focused on the rehabilitation of victims and on particular cases rather
than on the punishment of perpetrators and structural causes, perhaps reflecting the lack of
consensus on broad historical narrative. Id. at 52-53.
225. The 2000 compensation law for the pro-democracy activists left out many victims,
including unaffiliated persons unjustly persecuted by denunciation or overzealous security
services. Minjuhwa Undong Gwanryeonja Myeongye Hoebok mit Bosang Deungae Gwanhan
Beobryul [Act on Honor Restoration of and Compensation to Persons Related to Democratization
Movements], Act No. 6123, Jan. 12, 2000, art. 2 (S. Kor.) (the definition of the "persons related
to democratization movement" requires links to "democratization movement" which is defined as
"activities performed on or after March 24, 1964, which contributed to the realization of the ideals
and values put forth by the Constitution and to the establishment of democratic constitutional
order and restored and expanded freedom and rights of people by resisting authoritarian rule that
had disrupted basic liberal democratic order and infringed on the basic rights of people guaranteed
by the Constitution."). As for the victims of the Korean War-era massacres, the National
Assembly passed a compensation bill for the infamous 1951 Geochang massacre, a rare case
where the responsible army commanders were convicted in court-martial, but the government
vetoed it for fear of inviting similar compensation demands for other massacres. Lee Sang-Gwon,
12920161
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will be seen in the next Part, this failure forced the victims of South
Korea's human-rights violations to individually seek remedies in the
courts, a course of action also taken by the victims of Imperial Japan's
colonial and waqtime abuses.
B. The Judiciary and "Past Affairs " Lawsuits
The judiciary was an unlikely avenue for social change in South
Korea. Since the reception of the Western legal system in the late 19th
century, and especially under Japanese colonial rule, the judges formed a
hierarchal elite bureaucracy.226 After liberation, the courts granted long
prison terms and even death sentences sought by the state prosecutors,
especially during the dismal 1972-1979 period when the Emergency
Measures issued under President Park's 1972 "Renewal Constitution"
resulted in mass arrests.22 7
Geochang Sageon Teukbyeolbeob Ibeon en Tonggwa Doelkka [Will the Special Act for the
Geochang Case be Passed this Time?], KYONGNAM SHINMUN (July 5, 2012), available at
http://www.knnews.co.kr/news/articleView.php?idxno=1035465 (S. Kor.) (translation in
Korean). The 1995 special law on the 1980 Gwangju Uprising gave those convicted a right to
retrial. 0 il pal Minjuhwa Undong Deungae Gwanhan Teukbyeolbeob [Special Act on May 18
Democratization Movement], Act No. 5029, Dec. 21, 1995, art. 4 (S. Kor.). There have been calls
for a similar bill to quash convictions for other authoritarian-era victims but to no avail. Lee Ho-
Joong, "Not Guilty" in the Retrial of the Case "Inmin-Hyulanyung-Dang" and Task Toward
Purging the Unjust Convictions, 16 MEMORY & FUTURE VIsION 112, 136-40 (2007) (S. Kor.). For
a 1998 German law expunging Nazi-era convictions, see Gesetz zur Authebung
nationalsozialistischer Unrechtsurteile [NS-AufhG] [Act Repealing Unjust Nazi Convictions],
Aug. 25, 1998, Das Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBL.) 1, at 2501 (Ger.). The normal procedure for retrials
to overturn criminal convictions required stringent conditions. See Hyeongsa sosong beob
[Criminal Procedure Act], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, art. 420-422 (S. Kor.). Even in the
exceptional cases where clear grounds for retrial existed, the process took long time. Ham Ju-
Myeong, falsely sentenced to life as a spy based on a confession extracted under torture before
being pardoned in 1998, waited five years to be retried and acquitted based on the 1999 confession
of his police tormentor, Lee Geun-An. Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2000Jae-Nol6, Oct
28, 2003 Decision (ordering a retrial), July 15, 2005 Judgment (acquitting Ham in retrial) (S.
Kor.).
226. Prior to the Western influence, local administrators functioned as magistrates
dispensing justice based on the Confucian legal code received from Ming China. MUN JUN-
YEONG, BEOBWON GWA GEOMCiAL UI TANSAENG: SABEOP UI YEOKSA RO INGNEUN
TAEHANMINGUK [THE CREATION OF COURT AND PROSECUTION: REPUBLIC OF KOREA AS READ
THROUGH HISTORY OF JUDICIARY] 53-72, 483-88 (2010) (S. Kor.).
227. On President Park's Emergency measures, see The Yushin Constitution and Emergency
Measures, supra note 209, at 95-98. The trials of Emergency Measures offenders were such a
disgrace that many jurists ironically accused the South Korean truth commission of political
vendetta against the judiciary for releasing the names of the convening judges in its review of
1412 trial and appeal decisions from 589 cases involving 1140 defendants in 2007. TRCK, Icheon
yuk Nyeon Habangi josa Bogoseo [The Investigative Report for the Second Half of 2006], 291-
442 (S. Kor.); Oh I-Seok, Gingeub Jochi Jaepan Beobgwan Silmyeong Gonggae neun Beobchi
130 [Vol. 28
44
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss1/3
THE "COMFORT WOMEN" REPARATION MOVEMENT
Democratization brought changes after 1987. The Constitutional
Court, newly created under the 1987 constitution, played an immediate
and dramatic role in expanding civil and political rights by striking down
hundreds of unconstitutional laws and executive acts.2 2 8 The individual
complaint system ensured case-flow, and the justices' conscious efforts
to justify their existence resulted in unexpected judicial activism.2 2 9
By contrast, the Supreme Court continued to betray a more
conservative streak, particularly in the rigid application of 5-year
extinctive prescription (statute of limitation) in the "past affairs" lawsuits
filed by the victims of authoritarian abuses.2 3 0 A 9-4 Supreme Court
decision in 1996 rejecting the claims of "Samcheong (purification)
education camp" inmates2 3 1 as time-barred set the terms for future
Jueui Geungan Hueson Daedasu Beobjoin Gwageosaui Bangchim ae Gangryeok Banbal
["Revealing the Names ofthe Judges in the Emergency Measures Trials Damages the Foundation
ofRule ofLaw" most Jurists Opposes the Past Affairs Commission'sPolicy], BEOBRYUL SHINMUN
(Feb. 1, 2007), available at https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-View?Serial
=24571 (translation in Korean).
228. See Gavin Healy, Judicial Activism in the New Constitutional Court of Korea 14
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 213, 219-20, 228 (2000). For a rare piece of legal journalism inspired by
Jeffrey Toobin covering the judicial politics of the Constitutional Court from its post-democracy
creation to the impeachment proceedings against President Roh Moo-Hyun, see LEE BUM-JOON,
HEONBEOB JAEPANSO HANGUK HYEONDAESA REUL MALHADA [THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SPEAKS CONTEMPORARY KOREAN HISTORY] (2009) (S. Kor.).
229. All individuals can file constitutional complaints for (non)exercise of governmental
power violating their basic rights or for allegedly unconstitutional statutes at issue in litigation.
Heonbeob Jaepanso beob [Constitutional Court Act], Act No. 4017, Aug. 5, 1988, art. 68 (S.
Kor.).
230. In principle, the claims against the state are time-barred either three years after the
plaintiff knows the facts or five years after the actual event. Minbeob [Civil Act], Act No. 471,
Feb. 22, 1958, amendedby ActNo. 8720, Dec. 21, 2001, art. 766(1) (S. Kor.); Yesan Hoegyebeob
[Budget and Accounting Law], Act No. 849, Dec. 19, 1961, art. 96(2) (S. Kor.) now replaced by
the identical provision in Gukga Jaejeongbeob [National Accounting Law], Act No. 8050, Oct 4,
2006, art. 96(2) (S. Kor.). For a comprehensive analysis of the issue of statute of limitations for
grave human-rights violations under international and South Korean law, see generally Yong-
Whan Cho, Yeoksa Eui Heuisaengjadeul Gwa Beob Jungdaehan Ingwon Chimhae ae Daehan
Somyeol Sihyo Eui Jeokyong Munje [Victims of History and Law: Application of the Statute of
Limitation to Gross Violation of Human Rights], I SEOUL NAT'L U. L. REv. 8 (2010). For the
extinctive prescription in international law, see BROWNLIE, supra note 116, at 481-82. To be fair,
the Constitutional Court too has been reluctant to waive the statute of limitations for the "past
affairs" lawsuits. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2004Hun-Ba54, Nov. 27, 2008 (S. Kor.).
231. In the early 1980s, the military regime sent thousands of alleged "social delinquents"
to military re-education camps allegedly to reduce crime where at least dozens died during the
atrocious "training." On the Samcheon education camp and its legal basis (or lack thereof) as well
as the post-democratization redress efforts, see Ihm Sahng-Hyeog, Samcheong Gyoyukdae eui
Uibeobseong wa Minsasang Baesang [The Illegality of Samcheong Education Camp and Civil
Compensation], 22 LAW & Soc'Y 75, 75-102 (S. Kor.). Cho, supra note 230, at 26-32.
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debates.232 The four dissenters took strong issue with the majority's
mechanic application of the prescription rule. They first reasoned that the
president and defense minister's (broken) pledge in 1988 to compensate
the Samcheong victims made the government's prescription defense an
"abuse of rights contradicting the principle of good faith [treu und
glauben]."233 At a more fundamental evel, the dissenting justices opined
that the state, as the defender of human rights,234 cannot "ignobly" resort
to such defense for massive, systematic torts.235 Retrials for past
convictions also proved futile.23 6
Fortunately for the "past affairs" lawsuits, two critical moves by the
Roh Moo-Hyun Government as well as the investigative commission
created under its watch helped to clear the Supreme Court roadblock. One
was the decision, bowing to popular outcry, not to appeal a series of lower
court decisions rejecting the state's timeliness defense following the
dissent's reasoning in the Supreme Court's 1996 Samcheong decision.237
In 2003, a district court rejected the prescription defense as contrary to
the principle of good faith and equity and ordered a record payment of
4.2 billion won ($3.56 million) in the macabre Suzy Kim case.238 In 2006,
an appeals court awarded 1.8 billion won ($1.89 million) to the family of
232. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 94Da22927, Dec. 19, 1996 (S. Kor.). See also Supreme Court
[S. Ct.], 94Da23692, Feb. 11, 1997 (S. Kor.) (reaffirming the 5-year limitation for other
Samcheong claimants).
233. See Minbeob [Civil Act], Act No. 471, Feb. 22, 1958, amended by Act No. 8720, Dec.
21, 2001, art. 2 (S. Kor.). The Supreme Court's case-law firmly established this exception.
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 95Da29895, Dec. 12, 1997 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 98Da42929,
Dec. 7, 1999 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Da32332, Oct. 25, 2002 (S. Kor.).
234. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 10(S. Kor.).
235. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 94Da22927, Dec. 19, 1996 (S. Kor.). In 2001, a newly
composed Supreme Court still rejected the main claims as time-barred but upheld the claims for
psychological damages caused by President Roh Tae-Woo's unrealized promise of compensation
in 1988. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 98Da38364, July 10, 2001 (S. Kor.). Subsequent lawsuits by
other Samcheong victims were ruled time-barred. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Da72156, Nov.
28, 2003 (S. Kor.). The government eventually enacted a compensation law for the Samcheong
victims in 2004. Samcheong Gyoyuk Pihaeja ui Myeongyae Hoebok mit Bosangae Gwanhan
Bubyul [Samcheong Education Victims Honor Restoration and Compensation Act], Act No. 7121
(Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.law.go.kr/%ED%8C%90%EB%Al%80/(94%EB/8B%
A422927) (S. Kor) (translation in Korean).
236. See the case of Shin Gui-young, whose retrial request for his 1980 conviction as a
North Korean spy secured by torture was twice rejected by the Supreme Court. Supreme Court
[S. Ct.], 97Mo92, Feb. 25, 1998 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Mo247, June 10, 2004
(S. Kor.).
237. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 94a22927, Dec. 19, 1996 (S. Kor.).
238. Seoul Central District Court [Seoul Cent. Dist. Ct.], 2002Ga-Hap32467, Aug. 14, 2003
(S. Kor.). In 1987, Suzy Kim was strangled by her husband, Yoon Tae-Shik, but the intelligence
chief framed her as a North Korean spy to stoke a red scare. Id. Yoon was arrested and prosecuted
following a media exposd in 2001. Id.
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the late Professor Tsche Chong-kil-who was tortured to death by
intelligence agents in 1973-explicitly citing the good faith principle as
well as international norms waiving limitation periods for grave human-
rights violations.239 Another court decision a few months later opined that
a cover-up made a lawsuit for the beating death of a Samcheong prisoner
impossible until the Suspicious Deaths Commission's 2001 findings.240
Concerning the eight dissidents executed in the infamous Inhyeok-Dang
(People's Revolutionary Party) case in 1975,241 the courts first acquitted
239. Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2005Na27906, Feb. 14, 2006 (S. Kor.). The court
held that "non-application of criminal statute of limitations for grave human-rights violations such
as crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture" in international law should apply to civil
actions as well. Id. This was closer to the reasoning of the dissenting opinions in the Al-Adasani
case decided by the European Court of Human Rights by a 9-8 vote in 2001 that criticized the
majority for affirming the sovereign immunity of foreign governments in a civil case even for an
egregious jus cogens violation, namely torture, by distinguishing it from criminal prosecution.
Lorna McGregor, Addressing the Relationship Between State Immunity and Jus Cogens Norms:
A Comparative Assessment, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 82-84
(Wolfgan Kaleck et al. eds., 2007). See also Cho, supra note 230, at 32-36. Interestingly, just over
a fortnight before the Tsche decision, another panel of the Seoul High Court also applied the good
faith principle to reject the timeliness defense when it ordered Dow Chemical and Monsanto to
pay a total of 63 billion won ($62 million) to 6,795 of the 20,615 South Korean Vietnam War
veterans who had sued the chemical multinationals for Agent Orange-related illnesses. Seoul High
Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2002Na32662, Jan. 26,2006 (S. Kor.); Goyeopje Sosong Pihaeja Seungso
Pangyeol Badanae [A Judgment for the Victims in the Defoliant Lawsuit], BEOBRYUL SHINMUN
(Jan. 27, 2006), available at https://222.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Print-News?serial=1 8730 (S.
Kor.). On appeal, a decidedly less sympathetic Supreme Court under a different chief justice
drastically reduced the compensation recipients to 39 plaintiffs by recognizing epidemiological
correlation for chloracne (acne-like rash resulting from exposure to chlorinated compounds) while
rejecting it for 10 other illnesses such as lung cancer-on top of holding the legal actions taken
over three years after the official registration as herbicide-related patients to be time-barred.
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Dal 7539, July 12,2013 (S. Kor.); Jwa Young-Gil, Goyeobje Pihaeja
39 Myeongman Baesang Chaekim Injeong 14 Nyeon Sosong 11danrak [Compensation Liability
Recognized for 39 Defoliant Victims Only; 14-year Lawsuit Concluded for Now], BEOBRYUL
SHINUM (July 15, 2013), available at https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Print-News?
serial=76752 (S. Kor.); Park Dae-Han & Han Ji-Hoon, Goyeobje Pihae Baesang Cheonggu
Wongo 99.8% Paeso Chuiti Pangyeol [Judgment Spells Defeat for 99.8% of the Plaintiffs
Claiming Compensation for "Defoliant Damages"], YONHAP NEWS (July 12, 2013), available at
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2013/07/12/0505000000AKR20130712159400004.HTM
L (S. Kor.). I thank Justine Guichard for bringing the South Korean Agent Orange lawsuits to my
attention with her presentation during the 2016 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association.
240. Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2005Nal 12095, Sept. 19, 2006 (S. Kor.) (Park
Young-Du case). On the factual background and aftermath of Park's death, see Hong Seuk-Ryule,
Bakyoungdu Sageon gwa Samcheong Gyoyukdae [The Park Young-Du Case and Samcheong
Education Camp], 7 HIST. & REsP. 131 (2014) (S. Kor.).
241. The Inhyeok-dang Eight were among the dozens of tried and punished for their alleged
attempt to reconstruct the pro-North Inhyeok-dang (People's Revolutionary Party). Seoul Central
District Court [Seoul Cent. Dist. Ct.], 2002JaeGoHap6, 2003JaeGoHap5, Dec. 27,2005 (Decision
1332016]
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the victims in a retrial based on a Suspicious Deaths Commission report
and then ordered compensation on the ground that the claims were
actionable only after the original convictions were quashed.2 4 2
President Roh's appointment of Lee Yong-Hoon--one of the four
dissenting justices in the 1996 Samcheong case-as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court for a 6-year term in 2005 also proved to be decisive.2 4 3
After apologizing for the past failure to uphold judicial independence in
his inaugural address, Chief Justice Lee ordered an internal study of 5000
problematic court decisions from the 1972-1987 period.24 While the
Supreme Court did not weigh in directly, Chief Justice Lee's apparent
resolve seems to have emboldened lower courts.245  When the
to start a retrial based on the Suspicious Deaths Commission's Report). The original death
sentences in drumbead court-martial in 1974 raised international criticism even before their
confirmation by the Supreme Court and execution the morning after in 1975. Edwin 0.
Reischauer, Letters to the Editor: South Korea on a 'Disastrous Course' (dated June 7, 1974),
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1974; Editorial, Repression in Korea, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1974.
242. Seoul Central District Court [Seoul Cent. Dist. Ct.], 2002JaeGoHap6, 2003JaeGoHap5,
Dec. 27, 2005 (Judgment finding all eight not guilty on retrial); Seoul Central District Court
[Seoul Cent. Dist. Ct.], 2006GaHap92412, Aug. 21, 2007 (S. Kor.) (ordering compensation to 46
surviving relatives).
243. Kim Beom-Hyeon, No Daetongryeong Iyonghun Daebeobwonjang Immyeonglang
Suyeo [President Presents the Letter ofAppointment o Supreme Court ChiefJustice Lee Yong-
Hoon], YONHAP NEWS (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?
mode= LSD&mid=shm&sidl=102&oid=00l&aid=0001 105366 (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean).
The Chief Justice is appointed by the President with the National Assembly's consent for a non-
renewable six-year term, while other Supreme Court justices are also appointed for six-year terms
by the President upon the recommendation of the Chief Justice and with the National Assembly's
consent. Woo-young Rhee, Judicial Appointment in the Republic of Korea from Democracy
Perspectives, 9 J. KOR. L. 53, 60-61 (2009). For the organizational structure and appointment
process of the South Korean judiciary, see id. at 58-61.
244. Ryoo Ji-Bok, Inteobyu iyong hun Sinim Daebeobwonjang [Interview with New Chief
Justice Lee Yong-Hoon], YONHAP NEWS, (Sept. 26, 2005), http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?
mode=LSD&mid=sec&sidl=102&oid=001&aid=0001107398 (S. Kor.); Kim Sang-Hee,
Daebeobwon Gwageosa Bansung Mudeogi Panrye Byeonhwa yego [Supreme Court "Reflection
on the Past" Portends Wholesale Changes to Precedents], YONHAP NEWS (Mar. 7, 2006),
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=shm&sidl=103&oid=001&aid=000123
7595 (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean). The embarrassing controversy over TRCK's revelation of
the names of convening judges in the Emergency Measures trials that included three and four
sitting justices respectively of the constitutional court and Supreme Court no doubt added the
public pressure. The Investigative Report for the Second Half of 2006, supra note 227, at 291-
442; Hwang In-Chan & Lee Go-Eun, Gingeub Jochi Pangyeol ee Heonjaesojan Deung Hyeonjik
Yeolse Myeong Poham [ The Emergency Measures Judgments Contain 13 Sitting Judges Including
ChiefJustice ofthe Constitution Court Lee], KYUNGHYANG SmINMUN (Jan. 31, 2007), http://news.
khan.co.kr/kh news/khan art view.html?artid=200701311827301&code=940301 (S. Kor.)
(translation in Korean).
245. By September 26, 2008, when Chief Justice Lee officially apologized for the political
judgments during the authoritarian era on the 60th anniversary of the South Korean judiciary, the
courts had ordered retrial in nine cases recommended by the TRCK, four of which had ended in
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conservative Lee Myung-Bak Government (2007-2012) began to appeal
the compensation and retrial cases,246 the Supreme Court held Emergency
Order No. 1247 unconstitutional, paving the way for thousands to
challenge their past convictions in December 2010.248 A month later, the
same court upheld the rejection of timeliness defense for "past affairs" in
January 2011.249 Finally, the Lee Yong-Hoon Court rejected the
acquittals; 15 more cases had been under consideration for retrial upon applications following the
TRC's recommendations. Seong Hye-Mi, Sabeobbu Gwageo Sagwa Jinsilwi Jaesim Gwongo
Isibsa geon [Apology for the Judiciary's Past; the Truth Commission Recommended Retrial in 24
Cases], YONHAP NEWS, (Sept. 26, 2008), http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&
mid=sec&sidl=100&oid=001&aid=0002285077 (S. Kor.).
246. The government initially appealed only the compensation rulings in civil suits and not
the acquittal judgments in retrial, but began to appeal the latter as well following a controversial
retrial case. Lee Hwan-Chun, Gwageosa Gwanryeon Gugga Baesang Sageon Hangso Ittara
[ "Past Relevant" National Remedy After Another Incident ofAppeal, BEOBRYUL SHINMUN (Oct.
5, 2009), available at https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-View?Serial=
4 9181
(S. Kor.); Song Gyeong-Hwa, Gugga Pokryeok Heuisaengia du beon Ulrinda [State Violence
Victims Sounded Twice], HANKYOREH SHNMUN (Feb. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/societygeneral/405418.html (S. Kor.).
247. Daetongryeong Gingeub Jochi il ho [Presidential Emergency Order No. 1], Decree #1,
Jan. 8, 1974 (S. Kor.) (stipulating warrantless arrest, military trials and draconian punishment for
criticism of or demanding revision of the constitution or spreading "rumors").
248. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Do5986, Dec. 16, 2010 (S. Kor.) (The retrial judgment of
0 Jong-Sang). All persons who had been convicted by laws subsequently struck down by the
Constitutional Court are eligible for retrials. See Heonbeob Jaepansobeob [Constitutional Court
Act], Act No. 4017, Aug. 5, 1988, art. 47(2) (S. Kor.), amended by Heonbeob Jaepansobeob
[Constitutional Court Act], Act No. 12897, Dec. 30, 2014, art. 47(3) (S. Kor.). In early December,
the Supreme Court had upheld retrial judgment from the lower court for the first time. Song
Gyeong-Hwa, Daebeob Shiguk Sageon Jaeshim Cheot Mujoe Hwakjeong [The Supreme Court
for the First Time Confirms Not-Guilty Verdict in the Pretrial of Political Cases], HANKYOREH
SHINMUN (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/societygenerall
452476.html (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Do8927, Oct. 28, 2010 (S. Kor.) affirming
Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2009Jae-No27, Jun. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.). The Supreme Court
also finally granted a retrial for Cho Bong-Am, a prominent social democrat that it had rendered
a death sentence 52 years ago, in October 2010 and quashed the conviction in January 2011.
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008JaeDol 1, Oct. 29, 2010 (Decision to start retrial), Jan. 20, 2011
(Judgment on retrial) (S. Kor.). On Cho's original 1959 Supreme Court decision, see Lee, supra
note 71, at 288-94.
249. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Da28833, Jan. 13, 2011 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2010Da35572, Jan. 13, 2011 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Da53419, Jan. 13, 2011 (S.
Kor.); see Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Dal03950, Jan. 13, 2011 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S.
Ct.], 2010Da78852, Jan. 27, 2011 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Da6680, Jan. 27, 2011
(S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Da21726, Jan. 27, 2011 (S. Kor.). The Supreme Court did
drastically reduce the damages by calculating the interest from the end of the trial-court
proceedings and not, as is customary, from the time of the occurrence of tort, apparently concerned
about imposing too much burden on the state finances. Lee Bum-Joon, Daebeobwon Gwageosa
Jaepan Sokdo Naenda Daebeobwonjang imgi nae Jeongri Tteut [The Supreme Court Speeds Up
the "Past Affairs" Trials Intent on Clearing Up the Issue Within the Chief Justice's Term],
KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN (Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://news.khan.co.kr/kh-news/khanart_
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limitation period for the Korean War-era civilian massacres, citing the
good faith principle.2 50
A few points are worth noting about the decisive role played by the
judiciary in the "past affairs" cases. First, it was popular pressure and the
gradual build-up of precedents from lower courts that set the stage for the
Supreme Court's bold moves in 2010-2011 rather than the top justices
imposing their counter-majoritarian views on other judges or the public.
The second point worth noting is the political dynamics of
institutional arrangement. The truth commissions' findings raised public
interest and provided factual and legal ammunition to sympathetic
judges.251' The jurisdictional competition between the Supreme Court and
Constitutional Court forced both to vie for popular legitimacy-for
instance, the former's surprise ruling striking down Emergency Measure
No 1 took the air out of the latter's anticipated decision.252
view.html?artid=201101132223385&code=940301 (translation in Korean).
250. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da72599, June 30, 2011 (S. Kor.) (Ulsan Massacre of
Aug. 1950); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da66969, Sept. 8, 2011 (S. Kor.) (Mungyeong Massacre
of Dec. 24, 1949). On the chronicle of lawsuits related to the Korean War-era massacres preceding
the landmark Supreme Court decisions in 2011, see Cho, supra note 230, at 36-62.
251. Because it is extremely difficult for average victims to find evidence of torture or other
serious violations of due process by state authorities that occurred decades ago, the courts relied
on the findings of the Suspicious Deaths Commission, TRCK and other investigative commissions
to quash old convictions and award state compensations. Lee Hwan-Chun, Sabeobbu Gwageosa
Jeongri Jaeshim 18 geon modu Mujoe Pangyeol [Clean Judiciary AcquittedAll 18 Cases Review
the Past.. .], BEOBRYUL SHINMUN, (Oct. 5, 2009), available at https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-
News/Legal-News-View?serial=49182 (S. Kor.). The TRCK explicitly included the grant of
retrials in its recommendations for individual cases with standing criminal convictions recognized
to be human-rights abuses. TRCK, JONGHAP BOGOSEO SA INGWON CHIMHAE SAGEON
[COMPREHENSIVE REPORT VOL. IV: CASES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS] 29-34 (2010) (S.
Kor.).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 247 & 248 (explaining the Supreme Court's retrial
judgment). The main points of contention are over the Constitutional Court's powers: (a) to strike
down non-statutory laws like executive orders tor internal regulations; (b) to declare "limited
constitutionality" of a statute which would render it unconstitutional unless interpreted by the
courts (including the Supreme Court) as iterated by the Constitutional Court; and (c) to hold court
judgments unconstitutional. The Supreme Court claims the authority to render a "final review" on
the constitutionality of "administrative decrees, regulations or actions" at issue in trial under
article 107(2) of the Constitution while the Constitutional Court interprets article 11 1(1)(5) of the
Constitution and article 68(1) of the Constitutional Court Act to include all laws including
subsidiary legislation as "exercise or non-exercise of the public authority" open to constitutional
complaint. Park Jin-Yeong, Myeongryeong, Gyuchik ae Daehan Beobwon eui Uiheon Uibeob
Shimsa [The Judicial Review of Regulations and Orders by the Court], 48 KYUNG HEE L.J. 3, 4-
8 (2013). In practice, the Constitutional court has been far more active in striking down non-
statutory laws than the lukewarm Supreme Court. Kim Ha-Yurl, Hanguk Heonbeob jedo eui
Seonggwa wa Gwaje [The Accomplishments and Tasks ofthe Constitutional Court ofKorea], 146
JUSTICE 94, 103-04 (2015). In the Emergency Measure No. I case, the Supreme Court held that
the Measure is not a law passed by the National Assembly but executive legislation, under its
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Third, the judiciary refrained from taking a radical step such as
waiving the statute of limitations altogether for grave human-rights
violations.2 53 The Supreme Court simply held the state's timeliness
purview. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Do5986, Dec. 16, 2010 (S. Kor.). A unanimous
Constitutional Court countered by striking down Emergency Measures No. 1, 2, and 9 arguing
that it had exclusive competence over the matter since the Measures had the same effect as laws.
Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 201OHun-Ba7O, Mar. 21, 2013 (S. Kor.). Less than a month
later, the Supreme Court struck back by declaring Emergency Measure No. 9 unconstitutional.
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2011 Cho-Gi689, Apr. 18, 2013 (S. Kor.). In a number of cases where the
Constitutional Court held a law to be unconstitutional unless interpreted in the constitution-
compliant manner as the Constitutional Court dictates, the Supreme Court openly snubbed the
interpretation imposed by the Constitutional Court and issued contrary decisions based on the
Supreme Court's own constitution-compliant interpretation. Heo Wan-Jung, Hanjeong Uiheon
Gyeoljeong eui Gisokryeok Bujeong Haneun Daebeobwon Panrye ae Daehan Bipanjeok Gochal
[Conflict Between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court in the Binding Nature of
Conditional and Unconstitutional Declaration], 1 J. CONST. L. 251, 257-63 (2014) (S. Kor.). The
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court have advanced contrasting arguments on the latter's
power to make "limited constitutionality" decisions. Id. at 263-69, 271-72. In a related matter,
article 68(1) of the Constitutional Court Act explicitly exempts court judgments from the
Constitutional Court's purview, but the Constitutional Court already held that the constitution-
compliant interpretation of article 68(1) requires allowing constitutional challenges against court
judgments based on statutory interpretation at odds with the Constitutional Court's "limited
constitutionality" decisions. Id. at 257-58. However, since the Supreme Court does not recognize
the Constitutional Court's "limited constitutionality" decisions, the latter's "limited
constitutionality" decision on article 68(1) cannot bind court judgments in practice. Id. at 312-13.
Given this futile situation, the Constitutional Court has consistently dismissed constitutional
complaints against court judgments other than the narrow exception stated above. Jung Seong-
Yun, Heonjae Jaepan Sowon Bulinjeong Jongrae Ipjang Jaehwakin [The Constitutional Court
Re-Confirms its Existing Position of not Recognizing Complaints Against Trials], BEOBRYUL
SHINMUN (Aug. 3, 2015), available at https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-
View?serial=94658 (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean). Instead, it has requested the National
Assembly to revise article 68(1) to explicitly allow constitutional challenges against all court
decisions. Jwa Young-Gil, Heonjae Jaepan Sowon Doip Heonjaebeob Gaejeong Euigyeon
Gukhoe Jechul [The Constitutional Court Submits to the National Assembly an Opinion for the
Revision of the Constitutional Court Act to Adopt "Complaints Against Trials'], BEOBRYUL
SHINMUN (June 18, 2013), available at https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-
View?Serial=75947 (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean). On the German debate and experience, to
which the South Korean constitutional court and its jurisprudence owes much intellectual debt,
following the seminal Liith decision of 1958 that firmly established the Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) as the de facto court of final instance in all trial cases, see
JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACY'S GUARDIANS: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 54-60 (2015). Since the outcome of this turf battle between the Supreme
Court and Constitutional Court is likely to be determined in a court of public opinion through
legislative or constitutional revisions, it is not surprising that each court constantly competes to
build popular support and legitimacy.
253. Legislative attempts to remove the criminal and civil statute of limitations faltered. Kuk
Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally Coping with Past Wrongs after Democratization, 16
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defense to be an impermissible violation of the good faith principle.254
The fourth, and related, observation is the conspicuous absence of
international even though treaties and customary international law have
the status of laws.25 5 The Supreme Court never seriously considered the
implications of international norms.256
Fifth, despite such apparent caution, substantive justice trumped legal
technicalities as victims of atrocities going as far back as 1949 won
compensation.2 57 The truth commissions made findings in 8,450 of
11,172 submitted cases, and over 500 "past affairs" lawsuits have been
filed.258 It was no longer unfathomable for courts to uphold claims for
Japanese atrocities in the 1940's.259
Lastly, the court appears to have become the final authority on the
legitimacy of state action. Many viewed the Supreme Court's decision on
Emergency Measure No. I of December 2011 as the juridical
denunciation of past authoritarian rule and reaffirmation of the values of
constitutional democracy.260 The "past affairs" victims also expected the
254. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Da28833, Jan. 13, 2011 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2010Da35572, Jan. 13, 2011 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.] 2010Da53419, Jan. 13, 2011 (S.
Kor.); see Supreme Court [S. Ct.] 2009Dal03950, Jan. 13, 2011 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S.
Ct.], 2010a78852, Jan. 27, 2011 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Da6680, Jan. 27, 2011
(S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Da21726, Jan. 27, 2011 (S. Kor.).
255. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [Constitution] art. 6(1) (S. Kor.).
256. South Korea is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which provides exception to the retroactive prosecution of crimes under international law in art.
15(2). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15(2), Dec. 16, 1966. South Korea
also ratified the Rome Statute in 2002 and enacted its implementing legislation in 2007. Gukje
Hyeongsa Jaepanso Gwanhal Beomjoe ui Cheobeol Deungae Gwanhan Beobyul [Act on the
Punishment of Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court], Act. No. 8719,
Dec. 21, 2007 (S. Kor.).
257. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da66969, Sept. 8, 2011 (S. Kor.) (Mungyeong Massacre
of Dec. 24, 1949).
258. Nam Do-young, Gwageosa Jeongni Gaein Munjae Anida [Settlement ofPast History
is not a Matter for Individuals], MUNHWA ILBO, Oct. 15, 2012 (S. Kor.).
259. In 2013, a court took a step further by ordering state compensation for the extrajudicial
killings of alleged communists by the police under the U.S. Military Government during the
Daegu October Incident of 1946, since the South Korean Government assumed the liability for
such illegal acts under its 1948 treaties with the United States. Daegu District Court [Daegu Dist.
Ct.], 2012Ga-Hap6923, Oct. 17, 2013 (S. Kor.), affirmed by Daegu High Court [Daegu High Ct.],
2013Na21872, Nov. 12,2014 (S. Kor.) and confirmed by Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2014Da234360,
Mar. 12, 2015 (S. Kor.) (the government did not raise issues with its succession of liability on
appeal).
260. Editorial, Minju Heonjeong Bulbyeon eui Gachi Hwakin han Gingeub Jochi Uiheon
Pangyeol [The Unconstitutionality Decision on the "Emergency Measure" Affirms the Immutable
Value of Democratic Constitutional Government], MUNHWA ILBO (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2010121701033937172002 (S. Kor.) (translation
in Korean); Editorial, 35 Nyeon man eya naon Gingeub Jochi I ho Uiheon Pangyeol [Editorial,
'35 Maneya Urgent Action from No. 1 Unconstitutional], KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN (Dec. 17,
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courts to make authoritative decisions acknowledging the state's
culpability as much as material compensation.261
C. The Landmark Japan-Related Litigation
It was during this transitional period that the South Korean courts
heard the cases involving Japan's World War II-era atrocities. The
consequent decisions, unthinkable before democratization, reflected the
popular disapproval of the government's handling of the "comfort
women" and other victims in its diplomacy with Japan. The South Korean
courts relied upon constitutional and other domestic legal reasoning to
uphold Japanese liability for the past affairs. The court decisions emerged
thanks to institutional dynamics and covered not only the "comfort
women" but also other victims, such as the forced laborers.
1. Administrative Suit for Disclosure of Documents Relating to the
1965 Agreement
In 2002, former "comfort women," forced laborers, military
conscripts, and post-war massacre victims with proceedings pending
against Japan and its corporations sued the South Korean Government to
disclose the records of normalization talks with Japan (1952-1965) that
had been kept classified at Tokyo's request.262 The post-democratization
information disclosure law made the litigation possible.263 In 2004, the
Seoul Administrative Court recognized the importance of the travaux
prdparatoires in interpreting the 1965 Agreement's legal effect on
individual claims at stake.264 It was held that diplomatic inconveniences
with Japan from the disclosure "appear bearable for the nation in light of
the historical particularity of Korea-Japan Relations," and ordered
partial release of 5 volumes.26 5
2010), available at http://news.khan.co.kr/kh-news/khanart-view.html?artid=2010121721
24485 (S. Kor).
261. Tsche Chong-kil's family rejected the court's initial 1.55 billion won settlement
proposal under compulsory meditation because it would have left unclear the state's liability. Ko
Na-Mu, Choe Chongkil Gyosu Yujok Baesang Geobu Jeongsik Jaepan Yocheong [Professor
Tsche Chong-Kil's Family Rejects Payment and Asks for Formal Proceedings], HANKYOREH
SMNMUN, Jan. 17, 2006 (S. Kor.).
262. Seoul Administrative Court [Seoul Admin. Ct.], 2002Gu-Hap33943, Feb. 13, 2004, (1-
2, 9) (S. Kor.).
263. Gonggong Gigwan ui Jeongbo Gonggaeae Gwanhan Beobyul [Act on Disclosure of
Information by Public Agencies], Act No. 5242, Dec. 31, 1996 (S. Kor.).
264. Seoul Administrative Court [Seoul Admin. Ct.], 2002Gu-Hap33943, Feb. 13, 2004,
(11-12) (S. Kor.).
265. Id at 13-14 (emphasis added). The court did not elaborate on the "historical
particularity of Korea-Japan relations," but one may presume it to be a subtle nod to the
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In the aftermath, the foreign ministry initially appealed the ruling, but
the presidential office intervened and agreed with the plaintiffs to release
the documents in return for dropping the suit.2 6 6 Upon the release, a joint
committee of state officials and civilian experts convened by the
government issued its study result that the 1965 Agreement addressed
only the property claims on the basis of article 4 of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty.267 The committee concluded that the treaty covered Japan's
liability for the forced laborers' wage claims but not crimes against
humanity including "comfort women" and special cases such as the atom
bomb survivors.2 6 8 Seoul decided to provide assistance to the forced
laborers and to continue diplomatic efforts for the "comfort women"
* 269issue.
The 2007 forced labor assistance law provided consolatory payment,
compensation for unpaid wages and medical support, but all assistance
was based on "humanitarian considerations."2 70 The victims themselves
maintained that the Japanese Government and businesses hould be held
accountable for the forced draft and labor.2 7 1 Meanwhile, Seoul made
importance of addressing the past wrongs for improved bilateral ties.
266. Cho Seung-Ho, Oegyobu Hanil Hyeobjeong Munseo Gonggae Hangso [The Foreign
Ministry Appeals the Korea-Japan Agreement Document Disclosure Case], YONHAP NEWS (Mar.
5, 2004), available at http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=shm&sidl=
100&oid=001&aid=0000583703 (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean); Yonhap News, Oegyobu
Pihaeja jjok Munseo Gonggae Hangso Chuiha [The Foreign Ministry- Victims Drop Appeals in
the Document Disclosure Case], HANKYOREH SHINMUN (Jan. 19, 2005), available at
http://legacy.www.hani.co.kr/section-003000000/2005/01/003000000200501191116420.html
(S. Kor.) (translation in Korean). Kim Jin-Kook, one of the lawyers for the plaintiffs, in the lawsuit
had joined the legal staff of the presidential office. Id. The government eventually released 156
volumes, 35,354 pages of documents. Lee Sang-Heon, Hanil Hoedam Munseo Gonggae Shimsa
ban Deung Ilmunildap [Q&A with the Document Disclosure Review Team for Korea-Japan
Talks], YONHAP NEWS (Aug. 26, 2005), available at http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode
=LSD&mid=shm&sidl=104&oid=001&aid=0001083541 (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean).





270. Taepyeongyang Jeongjaeng Jeonhu Gukoe Gangje Dongwwon Huisaengja Deung
Jiwonae Gwanhan Beobyul [Act on the Support for the Forced Mobilization Victims and Others
Abroad Around the Pacific War], Act No. 8669, Dec. 10, 2007, arts. 1, 4, 5 & 6 (S. Kor.).
271. Kim Ho-Kyoung et al., II Jaepanbu Imgeum Jigeub Pihae Bosang Myeongryeong dan
han geon Eubseo [The Japanese Courts Ordered Wage Payment or Damages Award in not a
Single Case], KOOKMIN ILBO (Feb. 28, 2010), available at http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/
view.asp?arcid=0003456970&code=1 1121200 (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean). Many victims
were encouraged in part by the Japanese foreign ministry's release of its internal documents for
the 1965 Agreement, after a lawsuit by Japanese NGOs supporting the compensation for wartime
forced labor, which appeared to support the existence of individual claims after 1965. Choi
Young-Ho, Ilbon Oemuseong Munseo wa Gaein Cheonggugwon [Japanese Foreign Ministry
140 [Vol. 28
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little renewed diplomatic efforts for the "comfort women."272
2. Constitutional Complaints by "Comfort Women" and Atom
Bomb Survivors
In 2006, a group of 109 "comfort women" who filed a constitutional
complaint to the Constitutional Court for the South Korean Government's
failure to make adequate diplomatic efforts to realize their claims against
Japan.2 7 3 They specifically asserted the government's obligation to
resolve the dispute between Seoul and Tokyo over whether the "comfort
women" claims "have been settled completely and finally" under article
2(1) of the 1965 Agreement through the dispute settlement procedures
including inter-state arbitration set out in article 3.274 Two years later,
Documents and Individual Claims], Comment on Current Events of Korea and Japan No. 212
(Mar. 15, 2010), available at http://iems.ysu.ac.kr/board/pds6/board.asp?action=read&seq=81&
page=6# (S. Kor.). In July 2010, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry agreed to enter into a compensation
negotiation with its former forced laborers. Kwon Ki-Seok, II Jeonbeom Gieob Teibeul Anchigi
Seonggong Shimin eui him Bitsatda ["Citizens' Power" Shines in the Success of Making a
Japanese War Crime Corporation Sit at the Negotiating Table], KooKMIN ILBO (July 16, 2010),
http://news. kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0003921643&code-11131100. Some victims
held the South Korean Government liable for bargaining away the unpaid wage and other claims
and unsuccessfully sued for damages. Seoul Central District Court [Seoul Cent. Dist. Ct.],
2009Ga-Hapl02419, June 17, 2010 (S. Kor.). In another lawsuit, the forced laborers filed an
administrative lawsuit against the South Korean Government claiming that the conversion rate for
unpaid wages under the 2007 law was unfair and the sympathetic court referred the matter to the
Constitutional Court for constitutional review. Seoul Administrative Court [Seoul Admin. Ct.],
2009A3734, Apr. 8, 2016 (S. Kor.); Kim Jae-Hong, Seoul Haeng/eong Beobwon ilje
Taepyeongyang Jeonjaeng Gukoe Gangie Dongwon Heuisaengja Jiwonbeob Uiheon Beobryul
Shimpan Jecheong [The Seoul Administrative Court Requests Adjudication on the
Constitutionality of the Japanese Empire's Pacific War Overseas Forced Mobilization Victims
Support Act], BEOBRYUL SHINMUN (June 18, 2010), available at https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/
Legal-News/Legal-News-View?Serial=53008 (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean).
272. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, arguably Japan's most ultranationalist post-war leader,
caused an international ruckus during his first term (2006-2007) with his "comfort women" denial,
which backfired disastrously with the adoption of critical resolutions in the U.S. Congress and
European Parliament. H.R. Res. 121, 110th Cong. (2007); Resolution on Justice for the "Comfort
Women" (Sex Slaves in Asia Before and During World War II), Eur. Parl. Doc. B60525/2007
(Dec. 13, 2007). Nevertheless, the South Korean Government played a rather passive role. There
have been unheeded calls to create a government office with exclusive mandate over the "comfort
women" issue. Chung Chin-sung, Ilbongun Wianbu Munje eui Hyeonjuso Jeongbu eui Yeokhal
[The Current State of the Japanese Military "Comfort Women," Issue: The Role of the
Government], 64th Women Policy Forum: Let Us Look Back at the Past and Present of the
Japanese Military "Comfort Women" and Discuss the Future, Aug. 26, 2010, at 21-26 (S. Kor.),
http://www.kwdi.re.kr/seminarView.kw?currtPg-3&sgrp=S01&siteCmsCd=CMOOO &topCms
Cd=CM0003&cmsCd=CM0023&pnum=3&cnum=0&src=&srcTemp=&ntNo=340&dvsn=.
273. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2006Hun-Ma788, Aug. 30, 2011 (2011 DKCC, 121)
(S. Kor.) [hereinafter Comfort Women Decision].
274. Article 3 of the 1965 Agreement stipulates that "[a]ny dispute between the High
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2745 South Korean atom bomb survivors instituted a similar
constitutional complaint.275
In the landmark 6-3 decisions of August 30, 2011, the Constitutional
Cort ruled for the complainants in both cases citing the state's duty to
defend human dignity threatened by a third party and Koreans abroad as
well as its "fundamental duty" as the legal successor to the 1919
Provisional Government-in-exile to restore dignity to the victims of
Japanese imperialism.276 Through creative (mis)interpretation, the Court
held that the reference to settlement of dispute "through diplomatic
channels" and submission of unsettled disputes to arbitration in Article 3
of the 1965 Agreement was an obligation rather than a right of South
Korea.277 The severity, urgency, and feasibility outweighed the state's
discretion in the conduct of diplomacy.278
The Comfort Women Decision raised a few interesting points. The
Court cited international actions on the "comfort women"279 and the
ILC's draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly.280  Nevertheless, the Court relied largely on
constitutional norms rather than international law for its ultimate
decision.28 1 Similar legal reasoning won the case for the atom bomb
Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or the implementation of this Agreement shall
be settled primarily through diplomatic channels" and that any dispute still unresolved "shall be
submitted for decision to an arbitral commission of three arbitrators."
275. Constitutional Court 2008Hun-Ma648, Aug. 30, 2011 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter Atom
Bomb Survivors Decision].
276. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [Constitution] pmbl., art. 2(2) & 10 (S. Kor.); Comfort
Women Decision, supra note 273, at 141-42.
277. Comfort Women Decision, supra note 273, at 146.
278. Id. at 148-53.
279. Id. at 149.
280. Id. at 151; "A State entitled to exercise diplomatic protection according to the present
draft articles, should: . .. (b) Take into account, wherever feasible, the views of injured persons
with regard to resort to diplomatic protection and the reparation to be sought." Draft Articles on
Diplomatic Protection, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11,
2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 19 (Recommended Practice)
(2006).
281. This perhaps accords with the prevailing international law as enunciated by the
International Court of Justice:
The municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its
citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to demand the
performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding
sanctions. However, all these questions remain within the province of municipal
law and do not affect the position internationally.
Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 1.C.J. 3, ¶ 78 (Feb. 5). For a progressive reform
proposal, see Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, First Rep. on Diplomatic Protection,
142 [Vol. 28
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survivors despite the much less international and domestic interest they
garnered.282 The two decisions also made a causal link between Japanese
colonial rule and grave human-rights violations-a point made more
explicit in an earlier decision concerning the confiscation of pro-Japanese
collaborators' property.283
While the Court decisions were arguably a radical exercise in judicial
activism, the South Korean public overwhelmingly welcomed this
judicial rebuke of the government's past inaction. The domestic criticism
forced Seoul to make the "comfort women" redress a top priority in the
bilateral relations since the summit talk with Tokyo on December 18,
20 11.284
3. Japanese Forced Labor Judgments
On May 24, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the damages claims of
five South Korean ex-forced laborers drafted under the National Service
Draft Ordinance in 1944 and put to labor at Mitsubishi factories in
Hiroshima.285 They survived the atomic bombing but were left with
permanent disabilities after their return to Korea.2 86 The plaintiffs first
sued Japan and Mitsubishi for damages and unpaid wages at the
Hiroshima District Court in 1995, but their claims were finally rejected
in 2007.287 Following their loss at the Hiroshima district court in 1999,
Int'l Law Comm'n, at 223-26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/506 (Mar. 7, 2000) (by John R. Dugard).
282. Atom Bomb Survivors Decision, supra note 275.
283.
[D]ue to the activities of pro-Japanese collaborators approving [the 1905
Protectorate] treaty entered into between Japan and Korea for Japanese
colonization, our ancestors not only lost the sovereignty of our nation but also
suffered all sorts of hardships including being drafted into the Japanese military
or being forced to serve the Japanese army as comfort women. They were also
either deprived of or violated on [sic] their basic rights including the protection
of life and body for reason of claiming self-determination or resisting the unjust
rule of Japanese imperialism. However, a large portion of those sufferings have
still not been relieved to this day when over half a century has passed after
liberation from Japan.
2008Hun-Bal4l, 2009Hun-Bal4-19-36-247-352 & 201OHun-Ba91 (consol.), Mar. 31, 2011,
(2011 DKCC 17, 50) (S. Kor.) (5-4 decision upholding the law).
284. For South Korea's diplomatic pressure against Japan, see Eric K. Yamamoto & Sara
Lee, Korean "Comfort Women" Redress 2012 Through the Lens of U.S. Civil and Human Rights
Reparatory Justice Experiences, 11 J. KOR. L. 123, 146-48 (2012).
285. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da22549, May 24, 2012 (S. Kor.) at 3-4 [hereinafter
Mitsubishi Judgment] (on file with the author).
286. Id.
287. Press Release, Supreme Court (May 24, 2012) at 2 (on file with the author).
1432016)
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the five plaintiffs sued Mitsubishi for the same claims in South Korea in
2000.288 The lower courts rejected their claims on the grounds that the
Japanese judgment should be recognized as res judicata and that in any
event the claims were time-barred.289
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on both points.290 First,
the Court held that the Japanese judgment cannot be recognized as it
assumed the legality of Japan's colonial rule which was "merely an illegal
occupation from the normative perspective" of the South Korean
constitution.29 1 Since the Japanese court adjudged the forced draft under
the National Service Draft Ordinance as such to be legal, its judgment
was not compatible with South Korea's "good morals and other social
order."292 The Supreme Court's case-law in the Korean War-era massacre
claims waived the timeliness defense as a violation of the good faith
principle given the various obstacles such as the belated disclosure of the
travauxprdparatoires for the 1965 Agreement in 2005.293
The Court also rejected two other defense contentions. Mitsubishi's
post-war reorganization could not be recognized as the resultant denial of
obligations to the forced laborers would be at odds with South Korean
ordre public.294 As for the claims waiver by the 1965 Agreement, the
Court went further than the 2005 findings by government and civilian
experts by holding: the 1965 Agreement did not cover damages for forced
labor since it only concerned property claims between the two nations on
the basis of article 4 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.29 5 Even assuming,
arguendo, that the plaintiffs' claims were the subject-matter of the 1965
Agreement, the states could waive the right to exercise diplomatic
protection but not the individual claims.296
While the judgment fits in with the Supreme Court's pattern of
disregarding legal technicalities to uphold the "past affairs" claims,
288. Id. at 1.
289. Busan District Court [Busan Dist. Ct.], 2000Ga-Hap7960, Feb. 2, 2007 (S. Kor.);
Busan High court [Busan High Ct.], 2007Na4288, Feb. 3, 2009 (S. Kor.).
290. Mitsubishi Judgment, supra note 285.
291. Id. at 13.
292. Id. at 11-13; Minsa Sosong beob [Civil Procedure Act], Act No. 547, Apr. 4, 1960, art.
217(3) (S. Kor.).
293. Mitsubishi Judgment, supra note 285, at 19-20. Justice Kim Neung-Hwan, the author
of the Mitsubishi judgment, also wrote the cited 2011 judgment ordering compensation for the
1950 Ulsan massacre.
294. Substantial identity between the "old" and "new" entities was inferred from the
continuity in assets, businesses and staff and Mitsubishi's own version of corporate history. Id. at
14-16.
295. Id. at 16.
296. Id at 16-17. The Court held that any other legal construction contravened the modem
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another significant factor may have been the Constitutional Court's 2011
decisions for the atom bomb survivors. Since the five plaintiffs have also
been the claimants in the 2011 decision, the Supreme Court's adverse
ruling would not have compared favorably in the public opinion.2 9 7 In the
event, the Mitsubishi decision met overwhelmingly positive reactions.2 9 8
On the same date, the Supreme Court also ordered compensation for
forced laborers against Nippon Steel in a separate appeal.2 9 9 Both cases
were remanded to lower courts to calculate damages. Since then, other
forced labor victims initiated new actions against wartime Japanese
corporations in South Korea.3 00 These developments put pressure not
only on the Japanese businesses to settle with the victims but also on
South Korea to resolve the issue diplomatically or face setbacks in
bilateral economic co-operation.
D. Legal Assessment and Application
In these pivotal decisions, the South Korean courts gave greater
consideration to substantive justice over technical legal arguments. The
contention of waiver of claims by treaty faced rejection as did the
timeliness argument.3 0 1 Most strikingly, the courts viewed "comfort
women" and other claimants against the Japanese state and businesses as
victims of colonial-era injustice as much as general human-rights
violations and explicitly rejected the legality of Japan's 35-year rule over
Korea on constitutional grounds.3 0 2
However, it is noteworthy that the decisions gave rather short shrift to
the arguments based on international norms. While the domestic tort
claims prevailed, the claims based on international law violations failed
on the ground that states not individuals can generally bring such
claims30 3 or were simply left undiscussed.304 The discussion about the
297. The Supreme Court's press release makes a reference to the Constitutional Court's
decision. Press Release, Supreme Court (May 24, 2012) at 7 (on file with the author).
298. A Supreme Court source did indicate that a panel rather than the full court issued the
judgment despite the magnitude of the case to avoid giving the impression of a full-fledged
judicial conflict with Japanese courts. Lee Bum-Joon, Kim Neunghwan Daebeobgwan sam Nyeon
sam Gaewol Ttuksim Yesang Ggaego Hangsosim Pangyeol Dwijibeo [Justice Kim Neun-Hwan
Unexpectedly Overturns the Appeals Court Judgment After Three Years and Three Months],
KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN, May 25, 2012 (S. Kor.).
299. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da68620, May 24, 2012 (S. Kor.).
300. There have so far been new lawsuits against Mitsubishi, Fujikoshi, and Nippon Steel.
301. Mitsubishi Judgment, supra note 285.
302. Id.; Comfort Women Decision, supra note 273.
303. Busan District Court [Busan Dist. Ct.], 2000Ga-Hap7960, Feb. 2, 2007 (S. Kor.)
(Mitsubishi first instance).
304. Busan High Court [Busan High Ct.], 2007Na4288, Feb. 3, 2009 (S. Kor.) (Mitsubishi
second instance); Mitsubishi Judgment, supra note 285.
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claims-waiver clause in treaties relied on constitutional provisions and
made no mention of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties or
customary international law on treaty interpretation.3 0 5 The international
instruments regarding universal non-application of civil statute of
limitations for grave human-rights violations were absent in the
decisions.306
South Korea's historical context appears significant. The court
decisions were the by-products of the post-democratization political and
judicial changes including the broader transitional justice for the "past
affairs." The courts were hardly acting counter-majoritarian; instead, they
forced the executive to reverse its counter-majoritarian diplomatic silence
vis-ia-vis Japan. Indeed, in reflection of the public sentiments, the
judiciary viewed "comfort women" and other claims against Japanese
state and businesses as redress for particular colonial-era injustice as
much as a universal human-rights cause. Despite the apparent legal
parochialism that accorded a peripheral role to international law, not only
"comfort women" but other victims such as forced laborers also benefited
from the court decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have compared the reparations movements for
"comfort women" and other victims in the U.N. and South Korean
forums. International human-rights law helped the "comfort women"
advance their reparation demands for the colonial-era injustice at the
United Nations, but it also revealed limitations. The universalism of
women's human rights condemned the "comfort women" system as
gender violence and avoided the critical appraisal of particular colonial
legal relations that engendered it. It is also noteworthy that victim groups
other than "comfort women" failed to realize the promise of universal
human rights. The international women's rights movement in effect
selected the victims of interest ("comfort women") and their
characterization (violence against women) at the international stage.
305. Mitsubishi Judgment, supra note 285.
306. The Professor Tsche Chong-Kil compensation ruling was exceptional in this regard.
See supra note 261. Admittedly, the South Korean courts could side-step international law since
sovereign immunity was not at issue as in the Ferrini and Distomo cases against the German state
for atrocities under Nazi occupation. There have been empirical studies showing that
the Constitutional Court too makes limited reference to international instruments especially in
politically sensitive national security, conscientious objection and labor cases. Yoomin Won, The
Role of International Human Rights Law in the Constitutional Court of Korea: An Empirical
Study of Decisions from 1988 to 2015 (2016) (unpublished Juridical Science Masters thesis,
Stanford Law School) (on file with the author).
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By contrast, South Korea's post-democratization courts directly
confronted the injustice of Japanese colonialism that lay at heart of the
grievances of "comfort women" and other victims. Given the popular
pressure from below as well as the competition for public legitimacy that
drove the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court to act in "past affairs"
cases, it is not surprising that they were more conscious of the historical
context of Japanese colonial rule and sought to remedy not just the
"comfort women" but other victims as well. Although the court decisions
relied largely on domestic jurisprudence and made limited reference to
the principles of international law, they were audacious enough to upend
Seoul's business-as-usual relations with Tokyo.
To be fair, the judiciary may not be the best venue for resolving
complex mass claims for vintage human-rights violations. Some
conservatives in South Korea, concerned by the price tag of the state
compensations awarded by courts that amounted to 134 billion yen won
($121.8 million) in 2012, questioned the findings of truth commissions
and called for legislative compensation.3 07 Ironically, it was the
conservative politicians and bureaucrats who had blocked compensation
bills and cut short the activities of the truth commissions established by
the earlier liberal administrations. A political settlement with the focus
on fact-finding, prevention of recurrence, and symbolic reparations may
indeed be preferable to judicial quagmire. This may be the lessons of the
German reparations and an option worth considering for Japan.3 0 8
Without such a political settlement, the court battles for redress of
World War II-era Japanese atrocities are likely to continue in courts-
and not just in South Korea.3 0 9 In 2004, even before their counterparts in
Korea, seventy "comfort women" of the Malaya Lolas in the Philippines
sought an injunction forcing their government to espouse their claims
diplomatically although the action failed in 2010.310 In Chinese courts,
307. Choi Hyeon-Chul, Yesan euro Gabneun Gwageosayeon Cheonsambaeksasip eok [134
Billion Won Spent Annually for the Past Affairs], JOONGANG ILBO, Apr. 29, 2013 (S. Kor.).
308. Rudolf Dolzer, The Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does International Law
Recognize a Victim's Private Right ofAction? Lessons After 1945, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 296
(2002) ("[G]overnments must more effectively, promptly and carefully incorporate the legitimate
concerns of groups and individuals particularly affected by a war into the inter-governmental
process of making peace.").
309. Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea: Forced Labor Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2014.
310. Vinuya v. Hon. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, (S.C., Apr. 28, 2010) (Phil.),
available at http://scjudiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm. However, it
was discovered that the Supreme Court decision plagiarized three foreign sources ("an article
published in 2009 in the Yale Law Journal of International Law, a book published by the
Cambridge University Press in 2005, and, an article published in 2006 in the Western Reserve
Journal of International Law") that actually were supportive of the claims by "comfort women."
An ethics commission appointed by Chief Justice Renato Corona cleared Justice Mariano Del
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several lawsuits have been filed against the Japanese state or businesses
for various wartime atrocities and one case seems close to settlement.11
The recent trial of an octogenarian farmer in Zhejiang Province for the
murder of a doctor in 1967 during the Cultural Revolution shows that
China's own dark past is not easy to bury.3 12 Although the Chinese courts
are unlikely to entertain cases involving domestic atrocities such as the
Cultural Revolution or the Great Leap Forward any time soon, sustained
interest in past sufferings will not spare Japan's part in it.
Lately, the victims of past colonial atrocities have been bringing
lawsuits against the former European colonial powers as well. The Dutch
Government accepted its own court's decision ordering compensation to
the Indonesian victims of the 1947 Ragawade massacre during the
Indonesian war of independence.3 13 After a U.K. court cleared legal
hurdles for Kenyans who brought lawsuits for torture, sexual assault and
other horrific treatments in colonial Kenya during the 1950s, London
settled to pay E19.9 million ($30 million) to 5228 surviving victims in
2013.314 Another lawsuit demands a new public inquiry about the military
campaign by U.K. colonial authorities in Malaya in 1948.315 These and
other cases demand a harder look at colonial history.3 16
It is true that the recent nationalist orientation of Japanese society is
not encouraging. In the past decade, over 500 teachers faced disciplinary
Castillo, the author, of any wrongdoing, but this formed one of the bases for impeachment
proceedings against him in Congress. Malaya Lolas tell Supreme Court to adopt South Korean
Court decision, available at http://sanpedrostreet.word press.com/2013/04/02/malaya-lolas-tell-
supreme-court-to-adopt-south-korean-court-decision/#comments.
311. Mitsubishi Materials Set to Settle 3,765 Chinese Wartime Labor Redress Claims,
KYoDoNEWS, Jul. 24, 2015, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/24/national/
history/mitsubishi-materials-apologize-settle-3765-chinese-wwii-forced-labor-redress-claims
(Japan).
312. Chris Luo, Details of Cultural Revolution Murder Exposed, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 28, 2013.
313. Associated Press, Dutch Court Orders Compensation Related to 1947 Massacre in
Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011.
314. Ndiki Mutua& Others v. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [2011] EWHC 1913
Q.B. (Eng.); Faith Karimi, UK to Compensate More Than 5,000 Kenyans Over Colonial-Era
Torture, CNN, June 7, 2013, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/06/world/africa/uk-
colonial-compensation.
315. Keyu v. Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2012] EWHC 2445
(Admin) (Eng.).
316. Gregory Viscusi, Hollande Calls France's Algerian Rule Brutal; No Apology,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 20,2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-20/hollande-
calls-france-s-algerian-rule-brutal-no-apology.html; Ian Johnston et al., Colonial Sins Return to
Haunt Former World Powers, NBC WORLD NEWS, Oct. 1, 2012, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/
news/2012/10/01/13722339-colonial-sins-return-to-haunt-former-world-powers. For a
decidedly less remorseful view, see The Scramble for Africa, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1999,
available at http://www.economist.com/ node/347120.
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actions for refusing to sing the national anthem associated with the
military past.317 Prime Minister Abe Shinzo publicly doubted Japan's
past aggression on the grounds that there is no established legal definition
and visited the controversial Yasukuni shrine as did many other top
politicians. 318 Nor has South Korean President Park Geun-Hye's hardline
diplomacy and impolitic, semi-autocratic antics such as the prosecution a
Japanese newspaper's Seoul correspondent made Tokyo amenable for
agreement on the "comfort women" and other victims.319
Given this context, it is not surprising that the sudden announcement
of agreement between Tokyo and Seoul on the "comfort women" on
December 28, 2015 for Japan's payment of 1 billion yen (8.3 million
USD) for the surviving South Korean victims caught many off guard.320
To be fair, there have been signs of rapprochement between the two sides
most likely with Washington's blessing.321 However, the final accord
317. Alex Marshall, Why Should Japan's Teachers Have to Sing the National Anthem?
GUARDIAN, Oct. 20, 2012.
318. Editorial, Shinzo Abe's Inability to Face History, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2013; Ayako
Mie, Record 168 lawmakers visit Yasukuni, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013; Chico Harlan, Japanese
Prime Minister's Visit to Yasukuni War Shrine Adds to Tensions in Asia, WASH. POST, Dec. 26,
2013.
319. Martin Fackler, Japan Protests Indictment ofJournalist by South Korea, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2014.
320. The respective foreign ministers made purely verbal "announcements." Japan-ROK
Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Dec. 28, 2015, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/
page4eO000365.html. There have been claims in South Korea that the non-written agreement
cannot be considered a legally binding treaty. Seoul-Tokyo Deal on Wartime Sex Slaves Cannot
be Viewed as Treaty: Lawyers, YONHAP NEWS (Jan. 12, 2016), available at
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/01/12/0302000000AEN20160112009200315.ht
ml. However, international practice and scholarship generally acknowledge the existence or
validity of oral treaties. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 7-8 (3d ed. 2013);
BROWNLIE, supra note 116, at 581 ("The distinction between a transaction which is a definitive
legal commitment between two states, and one which involves something less than that is difficult
to draw but the form of the instrument, for example, a joint communiqu6, is not decisive.").
Xiaocheng Qin, Oral International Agreement and China's Relevant Practice, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L
L. 465, 466-472 (2005). One may conjecture that the absence of any written instrument resulted
from the desire to avoid the standard ratification process for treaties including a legislative debate
and vote. In South Korea, the opposition publicly vowed to nullify the accord. Song Su-Gyeong
& Park Su-Yun, Mun jae in Wianbu Hyeobsang Gukhoe Dongeui Eobseodda Muhyo Seoneon
[Moon Jae-In Says the Comfort Women Negotiation Lacked the National Assembly's Consent and
Declares It Void], YONHAP NEWS (Dec. 30, 2015), available at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/
bulletin/2015/12/30/0200000000AKR20151230049400001 .HTML (S. Kor.) (the main
opposition party leader was rejecting the agreement as void without the National Assembly's
approval).
321. The American policy-makers appear hardly sympathetic to the "comfort women"
denial prevalent among some official circles in Tokyo and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
reportedly used the term "enforced sex slaves" in the internal discussion. Eric Randall, Hillary
Clinton and Japan are in a Tif Over 'Sex Slaves'and 'Comfort Women,' WIRE (July 12, 2012),
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available at http://www.thewire.com/global/2012/07/hillary-clinton-and-japan-are-tiff-over-sex-
salves-and-comfort-women/54502. However, the U.S. officials, most notably Under Secretary
Wendy Sherman, began to express exasperation at the seemingly endless bickering between its
two regional allies-especially by President Park's refusal to even talk with Prime Minister Abe
until the latter resolved the "comfort women" issue. Wendy Sherman, Remarks on Northeast Asia
(Feb. 27, 2015), available at http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2015/238035.htm ("The Koreans and
Chinese have quarreled with Tokyo over so-called comfort women from World War II."). The
Under Secretary's comment made at least one South Korean wonder how the public would have
reacted if she had remarked that the Israelis and Jews have quarreled with Bonn/Berlin over so-
called Holocaust from World War II. Even Ms Sherman's reference to realism (describing the
United Nations as "the handiwork of clear-eyed realists just emerging from the crucible of the
Holocaust and global conflict") is revealingly ironic: it rests on the common ahistorical
misconception that the prominence of the Nazi extermination of Jews-as opposed to the general
wartime fascist atrocities-in the public memory dates from the immediate post-war years rather
than the 1960s or 1970s. Id.; SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 47,
81-82 (2010). Whether due to pressure from Washington or other pressing concerns such as the
North Korean nuclear crisis, President Park had already softened her stance and stated that a
"comfort women" accord was in sight in June 2015. Lally Weymouth, 'Eventually we will Face
a Situation that will be Beyond our Control,' WASH. POST (June 11, 2015), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/an-interview-with-south-korean-president-park-geu
n-hye/2015/06/l l/15abee3e-1039-1 le5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.html ("There has been
considerable progress on the issue of the comfort women, and we are in the final stage of our
negotiations."). Park and Abe had a summit meeting in November. Choe Sang-Hun, Leaders of
South Korea and Japan Meet in Effort to Mend Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015. There were
speculations that Tokyo was considering another round of "humanitarian" payment, essentially
AWF 11. Lee Se-Won, Ilbon seo Wianbu Pihaeja Indojeok Jiwonan Jumok [Japan's
Humanitarian Support Proposal for the "Comfort Women" Victims Draw Attention], YONHAP
NEWS (Nov. 3, 2015), available at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2015/11/03/
0200000000AKR20151103062000073.HTML (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean). Nevertheless,
the talks between mid-level officials faced impasse as late as mid-December. Cho Joon-Hyung,
Hanil gun Wianbu Hyeobsang Yeonnae Tagyeol Sashilsang Musan Ipjangcha Jaehwakin [Korea
and Japan Practically Fail to Conclude the Military "Comfort Women" Negotiation Within the
Year; Reconfirm Differences], YONHAP NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015), available at
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2015/12/15/0200000000AKR20151215101052073.HTM
L (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean). Interestingly, the jeongdaehyeop also signaled a softened
stance in the 2014 Recommendations to Japan during the 12th Asian Solidarity Conference on the
Issue of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan in Tokyo. Recommendations to the Government of
Japan for the Resolution of the Japanese Military "Comfort Women" Issue (June 2, 2014),
available at http://wam-peace.org/20140726/ (Japanese original). The Recommendations
(irreversible apology; compensation as proof of apology; fact-finding including full disclosure of
all documents in state possession; prevention o reoccurrence through education and prohibit of
denial), adopted again in the 2015 Conference, notably did not include the admission of legal
responsibility and punishment of perpetrators, which were standard jeongdaehyeop demands
against Japan from the 1990s. Jyisu Nintei Shazai Baisho ga Hashira Kankeisha Shobun wa
Higenjitsuteki tomo yun mi Hyang Daihyou tono Ichimon Ittou [Recognition of Facts, Apology
and Compensation are the Pillars; Even Says the Disposition ofthe Participants are Unrealistic:
Q&A with Representative Yoon Mi-Hyang], KYODO NEWS, June 29, 2015. On the record, Yoon
insisted there was no change of jeongdaehyeop osition since the four recommendations were
merely the materialization of legal responsibility and even demanded corrections from a
newspaper that reported that Yoon abandoned legal responsibility. Breaking the History of
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appears to have been struck in a few days of secret talks between Abe and
Park's personal envoys.3 22 Abe apparently proposed a deal following a
Seoul Court's acquittal of the Japanese correspondent for libel on
December 17 and the Constitutional Court's dismissal of challenge
against the 1965 South Korea-Japan Claims Agreement on December
23 323
The actual foreign ministers' announcement was a compromise
between Tokyo and Seoul: the Japanese Government acknowledged
responsibility for "comfort women" and Prime Minister Abe
"expresse[d] anew his most sincere apologies and remorse" to the victims
in his official capacity; Japan pledged to contribute from its budget 1
billion yen (8.3 million USD), which will be used by the South Korean
Government to create a foundation to support the survivors; in return,
South Korea agreed that the issue was "resolved finally and irreversibly";
the South Korean Government acknowledged Japanese concerns about
the "comfort women" statute erected before the Japanese embassy and
vowed to "strive to solve this issue in an appropriate manner through
taking measures such as consulting with related organizations"; South
Korea also pledged to "refrain from accusing or criticizing each other
regarding this issue in the international community, including at, the
United Nations."324 Apart from the failure to admit legal responsibility,
which was upsetting to many but probably unattainable, the accord is also
Silence, http://wam-peace.org/20150430-2/ (Japan). Such explanation appears questionable and
Tokyo may have plausibly interpreted it as a retreat.
322. Lee Gui-Won, Hyeobsang Makieonmakhu Sankei Pangyeol hu geub Mulsal
[Negotiations on and Behind the Scene; Crest of Wave After the Sankei Verdict], YONHAP NEWS,
Dec. 28, 2015.
323. Id See also Fackler, supra note 319. The Constitutional Court's case originated from
an administrative suit related to the adequacy of the South Korean Government's compensation
for wartime forced laborers under the 2007 assistance law. Seoul Administrative court (Seoul
Admin. Ct.], 2009A3734, Apr. 8, 2016 (S. Kor.); see supra note 271. The claimants argued inter
alia that the 1965 Agreement adversely affected their rights and claims, but the Constitutional
Court dismissed without prejudice to the 1965 Agreement's constitutionality on the ground that
that issue was irrelevant to the interpretation or application of the relevant 2007 law.
Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2009Hun-Ba317, 2010 Hun-Ga74 (cons.), Dec. 23, 2015 (S.
Kor.); Lee Jang-Ho, Heonjae Hanil Cheonggugwon Hyeobjeong Heonbeob Sowon Daesang anid
[The Constitutional Court Says, "The Korea-Japan Claims Agreement is not a Subject-Matter for
Constitutional Complaint], BEOBRYUL SmRNMUN (Dec. 23, 2015), available at
https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-View?Serial=97630 (S. Kor.).
324. Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Dec. 28, 2015, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/a o/nalkr/page4e_000365.html. The South Korean experts appeared
divided in their assessment of the Accord. Kim Young-Man & Lee Young-Jae, Jeonmunga deul
Jungdae Jinjeon il Chaekim Injeong Bujok [The Experts: "Significant Progress" vs. Japan's
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silent about the Japanese Government's revision of textbooks or response
to "comfort women" denial by prominent officials.32 5 But perhaps the
greatest defect of this most formal admission of responsibility by Japan
so far was indeed its very formality devoid of human touch: neither Prime
Minister Abe nor any South Korean survivor was present and the two
announcements by two foreign ministers was a far cry from a deeply
moving moment evocative of genuine remorse with cathartic effects to
the victims or viewers.32 6
Indeed, the reaction to the December 28 Accord remains mixed. The
United States unsurprisingly hailed the deal while there were calls in
Taiwan and the Philippines for Japan to implement similar measures for
the survivors there.32 7  The South Korean Government appears
325. On the refusal by even Germany to acknowledge legal liability, see Part II.C. It did not
take long for the Japanese Government to continue whitewashing descriptions of "comfort
women" in textbooks or for an ex-education minister to claim that "comfort women" were just
prostitutes. Comfort Women were "prostitutes, " LDP Lawmaker says, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
Jan. 14, 2016, available at LexisNexis Academic; Japan Textbook Publisher to Delete Depictions
of "Comfort Women, " JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE (Jan. 9,2015), available atLexisNexis Academic;
Lee Se-Won, II abe Jeonggwon Gahae Yeoksa mul tagi gun Wianbu Ganjeseong Mohohage
[Japan's Abe Government Waters Down the Perpetrator's History; Coercion of Military Comfort
Women Blurred], YONHAP NEWS, Mar. 18, 2016, available at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/
bulletin/2016/03/18/0200000000AKR20160318040551073.HTML (S. Kor.). Even Professor
Onuma Yasuaki, a prominent Japanese international lawyer and AWF promoter who has long
favored a negotiated solution for the "comfort women," expressed concerns that the deal was "Too
complete a victory" for Tokyo for the South Korean public to swallow. Yoo Shin-Mo, Ilbon
Jeonmunga do Ilbon I Neomu igin Hyeobsang Iraneunde [Even Japanese Experts are Saying
"Japan Won Too Complete a Victory in the Negotiation'], KYUNGHYANG SmTNMUN (Jan. 5, 2016),
available at http://news.khan.co.kr/khnews/khanart-view.html?artid=201601052228435 (S.
Kor.).
326. Professor Wada Haruki, a former AWF director-general, urged that the Japanese
ambassador in Seoul to meet the survivors and deliver the apology in person. Japan Needs More
Work to Convey Apology to "Comfort Women": Expert, JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE (Jan. 13, 2016),
available at LexisNexis Academic. Even an American senior fellow at the Sasakawa Peace
Foundation USA, whose founder and namesake happen to be fascist businessman and Class A
war crimes suspect Sasakwa Ryoichi, had sense enough to presciently call for "a direct meeting
between the survivors and the Prime Minister in which he expressed his personal condolences to
the women for the horrors they suffered." Daniel Bob, PacNet #81 - Japan, Korea and
reconciliation Center for Strategic and International Studies (Nov. 24, 2015), available at
https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-8 I -japan-korea-and-reconciliation.
327. Kakumi Kobayashi, US. Backs Japan-S. Korea Deal on Wartime Military Brothel
Issue, JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE (Dec. 28, 2015), available at LexisNexis Academic. Juliet
Eilperin, 'Comfort Women'Agreement Offers U.S. a Strategic Benefit, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2016.
The Taiwan officials made a formal request for apology and compensation while the Filipino
"comfort women" staged a protest during the Japanese Emperor Akihito's state visit. Ko Shu-
ling, Taiwan Draws Up List of Demands for Tokyo on "Comfort Women" Issue, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 5, 2016, available at LexisNexis Academic; Ronron Calunsod, Filipino Comfort
Women Call for Japan Emperor's Help in Seeking Redress, JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE (Jan. 29,
2016), available at LexisNexis Academic. The Chinese and Dutch also spoke up. Lee Mi-Suk,
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determined to implement the Accord going so far as discouraging the
sympathetic members of U.S. Congress from taking actions related to
"comfort women."328 The South Korean public has taken a generally dim
view of the "comfort women" deal.329 Several survivors themselves have
publicly expressed frustration at the lack of prior consultation, denounced
the Accord, and declined to accept any money.3 3 0 On the legal front, a
dozen "comfort women" had already been moving for a civil trial against
the Japanese government in a South Korean court from 2015.331 Now, a
Jung Daeman Pilipin Pihaeja do il Sagwa Chokgu [Victims in China, Taiwan and the Philippines
Also Call For Japan's Apology], MUNHWA ILBO, Dec. 30, 2015, http://www.munhwa.com/news/
view.html?no=2015123001070409041002 (S. Kor.). However, Tokyo flatly rejected such
demands. Japan Does Not Intend to Apply "comfort women" Deal Elsewhere, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE (Jan. 4, 2016), available at LexisNexis Academic.
328. Lee Gwang-Kil, Oegyobu Yeoseong Gajokbu wa Wianbu Jaedan Seolip Junbi jung
[The Foreign Ministry "Preparing for the Establishment of 'Comfort Women' Foundation with
the Ministry of the Gender Equality and Family], TONGIL NEWS (Mar. 22, 2016), available at
http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html? idxno-1 15925 (S. Kor.); Son Jemin, Miguk
Euiwon Wianbu Gwanryeon Jochi Hanguk Daesagwan Yocheong ae Geuman Dwotda [U.S.
Congressman Dropped "Action related to Comfort Women" at the South Korean Embassy's
Request], KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN (Feb. 23, 2016), available at http://news.khan.co.kr/khnews/
khan art view.html?artid=201602232228255 (S. Kor.). A South Korean delegate did rebuke his
Japanese counterpart's denial of coercion in the recruitment of "comfort women" at the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. Oh Young-Hwan & Chun Su-
Jin, Wianbu Gangie Yeonhaeng Hwakin Doeji Anatta Ilbon Yuen ae Jechul [Japan Submits to the
UN: "No Forced Taking of Comfort Women Confirmed'], JOONGANG ILBO (Feb. 1, 2016),
available at http://news.joins.com/article/19506765 (S. Kor.); S. Korea Rebuts Japan Denial of
Forceful Recruitment of Comfort Women, JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE, available at LexisNexis
Academic. On the other hand, the Japanese Government and public seemed to be interested in the
removal of the "comfort women" statute erected before the Japanese embassy in Seoul as a
precondition for the payment of 1 billion yen. Kang Young-Su, IlJamindang Wianbu Sonyeosangi
Joneom Haechyeo [Japan LDP's Resolution Calling for the Early Removal of "the Comfort
Women Statute Hurts Dignity'], CHOSUN ILBO (Jan. 26, 2016), available at http://news.chosun.
com/site/data/html dir/2016/01/26/2016012602683.html (S. Kor.).
329. A Gallup poll found that 56% of South Koreans thought the agreement was misguided,
58% supported renegotiation and 72% opposed the removal of the "comfort women" statute. Park
Da-Hae, Gukmin 56% Wianbu Habeui Jalmotdoaetda 58% Jaehyeobsang Haeya Hanguk
Gaelleop [56% Say the Comfort Women Agreement is Wrong; 58% Say It Should Be Renegotiated
According to Gallup Korea], available at http://the300.mt.co.kr/newsView.html?no=201601
0810217682053 (S. Kor.). By contrast, a Yomiuri poll found that 49% of the Japanese supported
the accord against 36% opposed. 49% Support 'Comfort Women' Deal, JAPAN NEWS (Jan. 12,
2016), available at LexisNexis Academic.
330. Kwon Yeong-Jeon & Kim Bo-Gyoung, Wianbu Halmeoni 6 Myeong Hanil Habeui
Muhyo 10 eok en an Batneunda [Six "Comfort Women" Say the Korea-Japan Agreement is Void
and Refuse to Accept 1 Billion Yen], YONHAP NEWS (Jan. 13, 2016), available at http://www.
yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/01/13/020000000 OAKR20160113080252004.HTMIL (S. Kor.).
331. Baek Min-Jeong, Wianbu II Indang II Eok Baesang Ilbon ae Jeongsik Sosong Naenda
[Comfort Women to Formally Sue Japan for 100-Million-Won Compensation Each], JOONGANG
ILBO (Sept. 17, 2015), available at http://news.joins.com/article/18682971 (S. Kor.); Bang
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larger group of "comfort women" and their surviving relatives have filed
a constitutional complaint against the Accord of December 28.332 The
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein have
also weighed in on the side of the "comfort women" urging dialogue with
the victims.3 33 The opposition victory in the April 13 parliamentary
elections further complicates the picture, but the Park government has
been pressing ahead with the "Reconciliation and Healing Foundation"
in anticipation of the 1 billion yen to be received from Japan to which the
defiant "comfort women" and their supporters have responded by
creating the "Justice and Remembrance Foundation" with citizens'
donations.334
Hyunduk, Wianbu Halmeoni deul il Jeonbu Sangdae Jeongsik Sonbaeso Bangchim ["Comfort
Women" Plans to Formally Sue the Japanese Government], YONHAP NEWS (Sept. 17, 2015),
available at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2015/09/17/0200000000AKR20150917022
400004.HTML (S. Kor.); Wianbu Halmeoni il Jeongbu Sangdae Sageon Jeongsik Sosong euro
Neomeoga [Comfort Women's Case Against the Japanese Government Move to a Formal Trial],
BEOBRYUL SHINMUN (Dec. 30, 2015), available at https://www.1awtimes.co.kr/Legal-
Info/Precedent-Analysis-View?serial=97767 (S. Kor.); Im Mi-Na, Beobwon Wianbu Halmeoni
deul 11 Sangdae Sosong Jaepan Shifak [The Court Commences the Comfort Women's Lawsuit
Trial Against Japan], YONHAP NEWS (Jan. 29, 2016), available at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/
bulletin/2016/01/29/0200000000akr20160129201000004.HTML (S. Kor.); Lee Youngjin, A
Study on "State Immunity": In Re the Claim for Damages of the "Comfort Women" Victims, 25
STUD. ON THE AM. CONST. 321 (2014) (S. Kor.).
332. Hong Se-Mi, Hanil Habeui Wiheon Wianbu Pihaeja Halmeoni deul Heonbeob Sowon
["The Korea-Japan Agreement is Unconstitutional"; "Comfort Women" Victims File a
Constitutional Complaint], BEOBRYUL SHINMUFN (Mar. 28, 2016), available at https://www.lawt
imes.co.kr/Legal-News/Print-News?serial=99498 (S. Kor.) (29 "comfort women" and 12
relatives submitted the complaint and the case number is 2016Hun-Ba253).
333. Rights Chief Urges Japan, S. Korea to Reach Out to "Comfort Women," JAPAN EcoN.
NEWSWIRE (Mar. 11, 2016), available at LexisNexis Academic; Japan Should Hear Opinions of
"Comfort Women ": U.N. Panel, JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE (Mar. 7, 2016), available at LexisNexis
Academic. However, Japan defiantly claimed that the issue was "finally and irreversibly" resolved
on Dec. 28, 2016. Japan Rejects U.N. Panel View on "Comfort Women," JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE
(Mar. 8, 2016), available at LexisNexis Academic.
334. Kim Dong-Hyun & Lee Shin-Young, Ibbeob Gwonryeok Gyeokbyeon 16 Neyon
Manae Yseoso Yadae [Upheaval in the Legislative Power; The Opposition Outnumbers the
Government after 16 Years], YONHAP NEWS (Apr. 16, 2016), available at http://
www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/04/16/0200000000AKR20160416026200001.HTML (S.
Kor.); Park Su-Jin, Kim Bok Dong Halmeoni Jaedan Pilyo Eobda Ilbon Sajoe Haeya [Kim Bok-
Dong Says "The Foundation is not Needed. Japan Should Apologize, "], HANKYOREH SHINMUN
(May 31, 2016), available at http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society general/746290.html (S.
Kor.); Woo Gyeong-Im, Wianbu Jaedanmyeong Hwahae Chiyu Jaedan Yuryeok [ "Reconciliation
and Healing Foundation" is the Strongest Candidate for the Comfort Women Foundation's
Name], DONGA ILBO (May 21, 2016), available at http://news.dona.com/3/all/20160521/
78216871/1 (S. Kor.); Choi Pyeong-Chcon, Jeongdaehyeop Deung Shimin Danche Jeongeui
Gieok Jaedan Seolrib [Jeongdaehyeop and Other Civic Groups Found "Justice and
Remembrance Foundation'], YONHAP NEWS (June 9, 2016), available at http://www.
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It is difficult to judge how the latest turn of events on the "comfort
women" issue will affect the outcome for other World War I-era victims
in South Korea, namely the forced laborers. The Constitutional Court's
long-awaited decision of December 23, 2015, which set the stage for the
"comfort women" accord five days later, was a blow to the forced labor
victims, but it reflected the conservative tilt of the courts under two
successive right-wing governments of Presidents Lee Myung-Bak (2008-
2013) and Park Geun-Hye (2013-present).335 It will be seen if Japan will
yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/06/09/0200000000AKR20160609173400004.HTML (S. Kor.).
Washington does not seem to have lost its enthusiasm for the Tokyo-Seoul deal either. Wendy
Sherman, President Obama, go to Hiroshima, CNN (Apr. 23, 2016), available at http://edition.
cnn.com/2016/04/23/opinions/obama-should-visit-hiroshima-sherman (Wendy Sherman, who
had held the State Department's No. 2 post until October 2015 commented that "[t]he political
courage of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye
should make President Obama's decision [to make a first-ever visit to Hiroshima by a sitting U.S.
president] an easy one" after observing that Germany's vaunted post-war contrition was the
exception to the rule and driven largely by realpolitik calculation). The former Under Secretary
appears to stretch diplomatic sweet talk beyond the art of the possible when she attributes the
Abe-Park deal to "the commitment by Japan and South Korea to remembrance-to not hiding the
past when writing textbooks for the next generation." Id. Not only is the verbal pact deafeningly
silent about the textbook or education of any kind but both governments have not in the least
relented in their quixotic efforts to white-wash their history textbooks in their respective countries.
Editorial, Politicians and Textbooks, N.Y. THvES, Jan. 13, 2014; Hwang Hee-Kyung, Pak
Daetongryeong Gukjeong Yeoksa Gyogwaseo Chujin Euyi Jaehwakin [President Park
Reconfirms Will to Proceed with Government-Issued History Textbooks], YONHAP NEWS (Apr.
26, 2016), available at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/04/26/020000000OAKR
20160426180600004.HTML (S. Kor.) (translation in Korean); Lee Se-Won, II abe Jeonggwon
Gahae Yeoksa mul tagi gun Wianbu Ganjeseong Mohohage [Japan's Abe Government Waters
Down the Perpetrator's History; Coercion of Military Comfort Women Blurred], YONHAP NEWS
(Mar. 18, 2016), available at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/03/18/0
2000 00 00 0
AKR20160318040551073.HTML (S. Kor.). By contrast, the U.S. Congress, perhaps more
sensitive to the public opinion, has called for a more human-right conscious approach vis-a-vis
Japan. Yonhap News, "Comfort Women" Issue Added to U.S. Spending Bill, Korea Herald (Jan.
16, 2014), available at http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140116000518.
335. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2009Hun-Ba317, 201OHun-Ga74 (cons.), Dec. 23,
2015 (S. Kor.); see also supra notes 323 & 271. To be fair, in comparison with the Supreme Court,
the Constitutional Court is institutionally less inclined to be conservative because one of its nine
justices is nominated by the minority party by convention, and more importantly, because its
raison d'etre is voiding unconstitutional acts, without which its very existence will be challenged
by the Supreme Court. Hence, the Constitutional Court has continued to make its presence known
with its high-profile decisions like striking down the law punishing adultery. Constitutional Court
[Const. Ct.], 2009Hun-Bal7, 205, 201OHun-Bal94, 2011 Hun-Ba4, 2012Hun-Ba57, 255, 411,
2013 Hun-Bal39, 161, 267, 276, 342, 365, 2014Hun-Ba53, 464, 2011 Hun-Ga3l, 2014Hun-Ga4
(cons.), Feb. 26, 2015 (S. Kor.). In the "past affairs" cases, the Constitutional Court continued to
declare authoritarian-era laws unconstitutional with retroactive effect allowing retrials for past
convictions. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2014Hun-Ga5, Mar. 26, 2015 (S. Kor.) (a special
law curtailing labor rights); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2013Hun-Ga2O, Oct. 21, 2015 (S.
Kor.) (a criminal code provision against "insulting the state"). By contrast, the Supreme Court
1552016]1
69
Shin: The "Comfort Women" Reparation Movement: Between Universal Women'
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
take the 1 billion yen fund for South Korean "comfort women" as a model
for other classes of its wartime victims as well. The long-term effects of
President Obama's historic visit to Hiroshima on Japanese society, if any,
may also influence future outcomes.3 36 Coincidentally, a few days later,
Mitsubishi Materials, a sister company of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry
under the current chief justice, Yang Sung-Tae, has dealt a series of setbacks to the "past affairs"
victims and the human-rights community, notably in Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Da202819,
May 16, 2013 (S. Kor.) (restricting the evidentiary value of the TRCK's factual findings),
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2013Da201844, Dec. 12, 2013 (S. Kor.) (applying 6-month instead of 3-
year statute of limitations from the quashing of the authoritarian-era convictions for the victims
seeking damages against the state); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Da48824, Mar. 26, 2015 (S.
Kor.) (holding that a 20-day detention per se under Emergency Measure No 9 does not create
damages claims against the state). In the World War II-era forced labor lawsuits against
Mitsubishi and other Japanese businesses, the Supreme Court has not confirmed the damages
computed by lower courts leading to the speculation that it might overturn its own 2011 Mitsubishi
Judgment. Hyeon So-Eun, Hanil Hyeobjeong Gaein Cheonggugwon Somyeol doen geot Anida
Haenotko Jaesangoshim eun 2 Nyeon jjae Ggeuneun Daebeob [The Supreme Court Sits on
Reappeal Cases Having Stated that Individual Claims Not Extinguished by the Korea-Japan
Agreement], HANKYOREH SHINMUN (Mar. 17, 2016), available at http://www.hani.co.kr/artil
society/societygeneral/735376.html (S. Kor.). See supra Part V.C.3 (discussing the 2011
Mitsubishi Judgment). In a perhaps not unrelated development, the state prosecutors indicted five
lawyers for taking up the compensation cases against the government that they had previously
handled as TRCK members. Yoo Hee-Kon, Gwageosa Suim Minbyeon Byeonhosa Abbak Suwi
Nopineun Geomchal [The Prosecutors Add Pressure on the Minbyun Lawyers for "Acceptance
of Past Affairs Cases'], KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN (June 22, 2015), available at http://news.khan.
co.kr/kh news/khan art view.html?artid=201506222142275 (S. Kor.); Seoul Central District
Court [Seoul Cent. Dist. Ct.], 2015Go-Hap620, Feb. 17, 2016 (S. Kor.). The government lobbied
against a bill to extend the mandate of investigative commission for World War 11-era forced
mobilization and labor which expired at the end of 2015 although many victims are still calling
for revival. Kwon Yeong-Jeon, Il Jisikin do Naseotneundae Gangie Dongwon Josawi Haesan
Doel Deut [Forced Mobilization Investigative Commission Likely to be Disbanded Despite
Japanese Intellectuals Coming Forward], YONHAP NEws (Nov. 29, 2015), available at
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2015/11/28/0200000000AKR201511280466004.HTML
(S. Kor.); Bae Seok-Jun, Ije Seonggwa Naoneundae Mun Dadgae Doen.Jingyong Pihae Josawi
[The Commission to Investigate Damage for Forced Mobilization to Close Just as It was
Delivering Results], DONG ILBO (Dec. 29, 2015), available at http://news.donga.com/3/all/
20151229/75618465/1 (S. Kor.).
336 For the full text of Obama's speech at Hiroshima, see The Memory of the Morning
ofAugust 6, 1945, Must Never Fade, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2016. Many observers feared
that Obama's visit would encourage the Japanese to view themselves more as victims
than aggressors of World War II in general and boost the political standing of Abe
Shinzo, the inveterate revisionist, in particular. Gardiner Harris, Obama Legacy Taking
Shape at Hiroshima, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2016. On a more (rare and) positive note, a
South Korean journalist expressed his hopes that perhaps Abe Shinzo may meet and hug
and the "comfort women" as Obama did with the atom bomb survivors for historical
reconciliation. Choi Won-Seok, Obama eui Hiroshima Yeonseol [Obama's Hiroshima
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notorious for its Korean forced laborers in Hiroshima, agreed to make an
apology and compensation to its Chinese forced laborers.337 The jury is
still out on the eventual success of the South Korean courts' high-stakes
gambit for a lasting and just settlement for "comfort women" and other
issues in the collective interest of East Asia.
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